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ABSTRACT
Very little has been written about the political career of Matthew Lyon, who
served in the United States House of Representatives from 1796 to 1800. Only a few
biographies of his life have been written, which has contributed to the general lack of
knowledge concerning his political affairs. The purpose of this thesis, then, is to
identify Matthew Lyon the man, as well as his time in history, the Federalist Era.
Special attention will be dedicated to Lyon’s controversial presence in the U.S. House,
his violation of the Sedition Act of 1798, and the status of freedom of speech during the
latter part of the Federalist Era. Cluster Bloc analysis will be used in order to
ascertain the level of opposition Lyon encountered during his expulsion proceedings,
as well as the level of support achieved for the Sedition Act.
Matthew Lyon arrived in America in the 18th Century as an indentured servant
from Ireland. After being released from the requirements of his indentured servitude
Lyon began a life-long struggle for status and recognition. He was viewed as an
outsider who relentlessly fought to become an insider. He attempted to become an
insider in Federalist America through business ventures and political exploits. Lyon
would eventually own many businesses and factories throughout New England. After
serving in the U.S. Army during the Revolutionary War, Lyon believed that he was
ideally suited for politics, both local and national. Once in the U.S. House of
Representatives he continued his quest for acceptance and recognition through actions
largely negative in nature. Expulsion proceedings were put into motion on more than
one occasion to oust him from Congress, with the most celebrated cause being a
physical altercation with his Federalist enemy Roger Griswold on the House floor.
vii

Lyon believed himself to be a complete Republican. His Federalist enemies
saw him as a Republican as well, but for different reasons. In short, the Federalists
detested his presence in Congress, and this attitude towards Lyon was reflected in
the passage of the Sedition Act, as well as his prosecution for violating the act. After
his stormy four years in Congress and his jail sentence, Lyon moved west to Kentucky
where he again took up his entrepreneurial and political activities.
Through the use of Cluster Bloc and other primary and secondary sources, the
analysis will show that the group of Congressmen who voted in favor of Matthew
Lyon’s expulsion will be the same one that voted in support of the Sedition Act, and
that the Federalist Era, although not the only period of American History to witness
repressive legislation, was embarrassingly intolerant of the First Amendment rights
of American citizens.
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CHAPTER ONE
MATTHEW LYON’S EARLY LIFE
Matthew Lyon suffered from an inferiority complex. He first came to America
as an indentured servant from Ireland and lived in New England, an area of the country
where people took pride in somehow being the “true” Americans. The blue-blooded
aristocrats of the Eastern American seaboard often resented the presence of nonEnglish inhabitants. Matthew Lyon was not exempt from feeling this resentment and
fought most of his life either to make his Irish ancestry a non-issue, or to go
completely overboard in displaying extreme Irish nationalism. In short, Matthew Lyon
was an outsider who relentlessly strove to become an insider; but he never succeeded
in becoming a true insider, due mainly to his provocative personality.
Matthew Lyon also exhibited a truly entrepreneurial nature in his business
affairs. If he were alive today those who supported his behavior and accomplishments
would call him an independent self-made man, while those who found themselves
opposed to Lyon’s behavior would probably call him an opportunist. In terms of
business, from the first day he arrived in the New World, Lyon possessed a plan of
action whereby he too would become a wealthy businessman. Later on in this study a
brief outline of his business activities will be provided, including his successful
completion of an iron factory and textile mill. However, his business pursuits will not
be the main focus of this study. It is rather a political study. Lyon’s business pursuits
will be discussed mainly in terms of their relation to his brand of politics. Lyon’s
success as a businessman actually opened up the door to his political career.
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But Matthew Lyon’s personality either repelled or attracted the people with
whom he came into contact. To some, Lyon was an angry and rebellious man. His
often rough-around-the-edges disposition immediately turned people off to whatever
he had to say, whether good or bad. He loved a good adventure and spirited
excitement regardless of the setting. Lyon certainly had his share of adventures, from
his days as one of Ethan Allen’s “Green Mountain Boys,” to his near expulsion from
the United States House of Representatives, to his trial on charges of violating the
Sedition Act of 1798. His middle name could appropriately be termed “conflict,”
because his name seemed to be associated in one way or the other with conflict. This
antagonistic quality of Matthew Lyon again either endeared him to his acquaintances,
or alienated him. More often than not it was the latter.
In every sense of the word, Matthew Lyon was a democrat. He literally
loathed anything associated with monarchy, aristocracy, triviality, or Europe. To Lyon
they were all one in the same. Monarchy was a trivial, unfortunate European
institution which had no place in America. Lyon saw democracy as the one true form
of government that embraced the best hope for a new nation. Matthew Lyon was
above all a pragmatist, a realist who had no time for the trappings of monarchal
Europe. He believed in honest, hard work, and the various rewards, whether political,
business, or social, that resulted from that hard work. He despised the aristocrats of
New England, who, according to Lyon, possessed no self-worth. A true man in
Lyon’s estimation was a man who maintained a vision, who knew how to accomplish
that vision, and while in the process never allowed himself to submit to arrogance of
others.
Perhaps most important, Lyon can best be described as a survivor. Soon, the
many roadblocks Matthew Lyon encountered, and for the most part overcame, will
indicate his true nature. In fact, some of the obstacles Lyon encountered were
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potentially career-ending. Yet Lyon somehow, and in some way, was able to
overcome those hazards, and move to new accomplishments. The reasons behind
Lyon's success and resilience are theories at best. It seems no matter what
controversy engulfed Lyon, or how bleak things looked for him while in the throes of
controversy, he always emerged standing—a true winner.
Matthew Lyon was born on July 14, 1750, in Ulster, Wicklow County, Ireland.1
He came from a distinguished line of proud and productive farmers. Lyon’s ancestors
identified their entire existence with their land holdings. This seemingly unbreakable
bond to their land made it especially difficult for Lyon’s ancestors when they were
forced off their property by James I and his “Commission for the Investigation of
Defective Titles in Ireland.” This English Commission investigated every land title in
Ireland, a colonial appendage of England, searching for any abnormality that would
allow the British government to evict the Irish inhabitants and in effect make them
more subservient. The lands confiscated would become the domain of the British
crown.2 The Irish inhabitants living on these contested lands did not allow the British
to confiscate their property without resistance. An organization called the “white
boys,” a quasi-military organization dedicated and sworn to the protection of Irish
lands, was formed. Matthew Lyon’s father was a member of this military group. He
was eventually captured and sentenced to death under the orders of James I. Not long
after his death the Irish insurrection, succumbing to British pressures, came to an
unsuccessful end. The British crown had succeeded in confiscating extensive tracts of
Irish land.
After the dreadful experience of his father’s execution young Lyon, now only
12, moved to Dublin in order to find work. It soon became apparent that young Lyon
was not going to allow this significant tragedy in his life to prevent him from some day
being successful himself, whether farming or otherwise. In fact, Lyon got a job as a
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bookbinder in a Dublin printing office. There he was exposed to the printing trade, a
trade that would make him a successful businessman in the United States. Lyon
succeeded well enough in Dublin that many acquaintances persuaded him to go to
America to live out his dreams of wealth and status. In 1765, at the age of 14, Lyon
resolved to go to America, but he did not have enough money to pay for his trip across
the Atlantic Ocean. So, in a very Lyon-like manner, he struck up a deal with the
ship’s captain, which included in exchange for Lyon’s safe passage to America,
permission to sell him into indentured servitude, with the captain retaining the money
paid for his service. At that time anyone being sold into servitude had to serve until
he was 21 years of age. Once in America, however, the captain, out of regard and
fondness for young Lyon, informed the auction crowd that he was 18, thus only
required to serve three years of indentured servitude.
It seems the captain of the ship saw a quality in young Matthew that caused
him to hide his true age. Lyon also must have appeared older than he really was to
avoid detection by his potential purchasers. A man by the name of Jabez Bacon, a
successful and wealthy merchant from Woodbury, Connecticut, paid $60 for
Matthew’s three years of service.3 Bacon dealt primarily in commodities, namely
pork, and saw various qualities in the boy that hastened his decision. Lyon biographer
Tom W. Campbell had this to say about the union of Lyon and Bacon: “Bold,
impetuous, and daring in the extreme himself, the young Wicklow emigre’, by a rare
felicity of fortune, attracted the keen eye of the Connecticut merchant, in whom Lyon
saw many of his own qualities reflected, but on the part of Bacon they were directed
by mature judgment and the cool New England temperament.”4 It appears that Bacon
and Lyon had something in common. Like Lyon, his “leading trait of his character
[Bacon’sjwas self-reliance. This, with his keen intellect, enabled him to decide
matters of great importance almost instantly.”5
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Throughout the first year of his indentured service Lyon began to realize that
although he and Bacon had many things in common, such as the belief in hard work
and determination, in terms of politics, they were on opposite ends of the spectrum.
Using the appropriate political terms of the Colonial Era, Bacon can best be described
as a Tory, one who remained loyal to the British Crown. This stands in considerable
contrast to Lyon, who considered himself to be a Whig, one who questioned British
colonial policies. Because these ideological differences became more extreme as time
progressed Lyon began thinking of ways in which he might evade his obligations under
his indentured servitude to Bacon. Lyon still had two more years left of obligated
service to Bacon. By a process that has proven quite confusing to the historians who
have studied Matthew Lyon’s early life, it seems a Whig businessman whom Lyon
befriended, Hugh Hannah, gave Lyon two of his bulls to give to Bacon in order to pay
off the rest of his service. Bacon accepted the animals, and Lyon, after serving only
one year of his indentured service, became a free man in America.6
After unsuccessfully offering his indentured services to Hugh Hannah, Lyon
thanked him for his assistance and moved to Salisbury, Connecticut. There Lyon
worked at an iron works which was owned by Ethan Allen, a man whom Lyon would
eventually get to know very well during the American War of Independence.7 While it
is true that Lyon had no previous experience working in an iron factory, the Allen
family apparently discovered a resourceful, plucky individual who would fit nicely into
their business. It is important to note the political climate in New England at the time,
both in terms of the individual colonies, and in terms of their colonial relationship with
England. Both relationships, inter-colonial and intra-colonial, proved to be very
strained at times. When Lyon came to America the future state of Vermont was
known as the New Hampshire Grants. More succinctly, during “the colonial period,
the territory that lay North of Massachusetts, east of Lake Champlain, and west of
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the Connecticut river was claimed both by New York and New Hampshire,” and both
colonies granted lands for its respective citizens to settle. This tense situation
ushered in a period of rival land claims with citizens of both colonies claiming the same
parcels of land, leaving the British government to be the ultimate judge of ownership.8
After both colonies stated their positions as to the proper owners of the land the
British government settled the land claims in favor of New York, the more populous
and more influential colony in the region. In 1767, after appealing the decision to the
British government to respect their long standing land claims within the New
Hampshire Grant of which Ethan Allen owned a considerable amount, New
Hampshire was able to obtain from the Crown its own title to a portion of the Grants.9
New York had managed to wrestle most of the land away from New Hampshire, and
had made numerous half-hearted attempts to regain total control of the New
Hampshire Grants. The citizens of the New Hampshire Grants were a stubborn lot,
withstanding the desperate attempts of New York to take control of their own lands
and livelihoods. In fact, one of the most stubborn of all grantees, Matthew Lyon,
settled there in 1769.
The year 1771 was personally a very memorable one for Lyon, as he married
the niece of Ethan Allen, a Miss Hosford.10 For unknown reasons none of the
definitive biographies of Matthew Lyon mentions the first name of Lyon’s new bride.
It is safe to assume, however that Miss Hosford was a passive partner in her
marriage to Lyon, moving according to Lyon’s latest whim or business venture
without raising significant concerns. In fact, in 1774, after giving birth to two children,
Hosford followed her husband to Wallingford, New Hampshire, a location whereby
Lyon hoped to become one of the more influential citizens, positioning himself for the
coming war of independence.11 Matthew Lyon wanted to be where the action would
take place, whether involved politically or militarily, and he moved himself and his
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family accordingly. The most significant way Lyon positioned himself to become
involved in the increasingly hostile colonies of New England was by joining Ethan
Allen’s pseudo-military ensemble the “Green Mountain Boys.” The Green Mountain
Boys was originally an organization aimed at preventing New York grantee’s from
securing land within New Hampshire’s domain.
On the eve of the War of Independence the Green Mountain Boys numbered
only about 300 men, a number disproportionate to the importance given to them by
many historians. For all practical purposes the Green Mountain Boys was not a real
military organization. Although they did take part in quasi-military pursuits, they did
not train together as an official army. They were simply a band of young men who
already knew how to shoot and march, and they assembled only when summoned by
Ethan in response to some serious situation. The title of their organization merely
added an “official” nature to their pseudo-military activities. One interesting piece of
information about the Green Mountain Boys is the fact that they took part in what is
called today “guerrilla warfare.”12 Their guerrilla tactics helped the Green Mountain
Boys accomplish their biggest, if not their most widely known accomplishment, their
successful attack on the British military establishment at Fort Ticonderoga. On May
10, 1775, Ethan Allen, Matthew Lyon, and some 250 other Green Mountain Boys
surprised the British post, forced the troops to evacuate their mighty fort, and
surrender all of their munitions to the Green Mountain Boys.13 Historians have
argued over the importance of this action, but there is no doubt that Lyon was a part of
the preparations, as well as the actual assault on Ft. Ticonderoga. As a result of their
valiant efforts the Continental Congress actually paid the Green Mountain Boys for
their success in taking the British fort. The capture of Ft. Ticonderoga was Lyon’s
first military expedition, and it would not be his last. As a result of his preparation
and bravery in the military expedition, General Schuyler named Lyon a lieutenant,
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then a captain, and finally a colonel. Lyon eventually led his own regiment of Green
Mountain Boys in the battles of Bennington, Hubbarton, and Saratoga.14 This was
the most significant period of Lyon’s military aspirations. At this time Lyon’s political
convictions, especially his Whig convictions, surfaced fully to embrace the political
philosophy of American independence.
On July 19, 1776, Lyon was commissioned a second lieutenant in the
Continental Army.15 His first assignment as a second lieutenant was his most
unfortunate, and haunted his entire political career and damaged his social standing.
Lyon’s regiment was assigned to the city of Jericho, New York, with specific orders
to protect a blockhouse, a building where wheat was stored during the harvest. After
manning their post for only a short period of time, the men under Lyon’s command
became upset because they believed that their assignment was to protect the
interests of wheat speculators. Since most of the men were farmers themselves, Lyon
faced a difficult task of preventing them from deserting. Another factor contributing to
the regiment’s agitated state was the sighting of what appeared to be hostile Indians
near their encampment. Believing themselves to be in a very vulnerable position, the
men mutinied. The specific details are sketchy, but Lyon’s account contains repeated
pleas to his men to stay and respect their orders. However, after the other officers of
the regiment followed the exodus of the men Lyon believed that he had no choice and
left with the others. Upon hearing this story General St. Clair, Lyon’s superior officer,
ordered Lyon court-martialed for deserting his post. He was convicted and sentenced
to be cashiered and to receive corporal punishment.16 In the end, General St. Clair,
for unknown reasons, ignored his own judgment, refused to carry out the sentence, and
appointed Lyon paymaster to General Phillip Schuyler in 1777. Matthew Lyon’s first
experience as a second lieutenant proved disastrous for both Lyon and the Continental
Army. The cashiering incident would dog his political career for years to come,
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especially during his expulsion proceedings during the Fifth Congress. Those who
sought to gain politically at Lyon’s expense claimed Lyon had been sentenced to wear
a wooden sword, a sign of humiliation and punishment, not trusted enough to wear a
real weapon. All too often Lyon responded to these allegations with great anger and
contempt. Lyon always maintained that technically he had not been cashiered from
the Army and did not wear a wooden sword. This did not matter to his political
opponents, who would use any evidence of dishonor to ruin Lyon politically.
After this misadventure, and as the colonies became embroiled in their war of
independence, Lyon believed that he did not have much of a future in the Continental
Army. He decided to move to Arlington, New Hampshire Grants, a Tory stronghold,
where he hoped to bolster the Whig cause through his own brand of politics. Lyon
attended the General Convention of 1776 and 1782, and was instrumental in creating a
Constitution for the new state of Vermont.17 Although in terms of politics things could
not have been going better for Lyon, personal tragedy befell him in 1782 when his wife
died. According to the various Lyon biographies it becomes clear that he took the
death of his beloved first wife very hard. Despite his grief Lyon found love once again,
and married Beulah Chittenden-Galusha in 1783. Ms. Chittenden-Galusha was the
daughter of Vermont’s first governor, Thomas Chittenden. With this marriage Lyon
became a member of an elite family in New England. Whether by accident or design
Lyon now held a position of prominence in Vermont and New England politics.
In 1793 Matthew Lyon purchased 1,000 acres of land in Western Rutland
County, Vermont. There he founded the town of Fair Haven, which became the site of
Lyon’s most important entrepreneurial undertakings.19 Lyon’s first task was the
construction of a saw mill located at the confluence of the Castleton and Poultney
rivers. The sawmill, along with the entire town, was designed by Lyon himself. Lyon
even lent his assistance in the construction of most of the homes of the citizens who
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moved there. After the fortunate discovery of iron ore in the hills outside Fair Haven,
Lyon proceeded to build an iron foundry. His other business pursuits included an inn,
a tannery, and a printing plant that ran from paper produced from the bark of the
basswood tree.20 Many historians have given Lyon credit for being the first
commercial manufacturer of wood paper.21
Despite Matthew Lyon’s varied interests and numerous business ventures, he
still held a special place in his heart for the printing business, the first business he
encountered in Ireland. Recalling the education he had received in Dublin, Lyon put
that knowledge to good use when he launched his own publication, The Scourge of
Aristocracy and Repository of Important Political Truth.22 This publication was
written, edited, and published by Lyon himself. The title explains Lyon’s particular
political view. Anti-monarchal in nature, The Scourge of Aristocracy was a democrat’s
newspaper. Lyons’s motivations for writing this publication were varied but by no
means complicated. He was tired of numerous Federalist newspapers disseminating
what in his estimation were outright falsehoods and wished to redirect the new nation
on the proper political course. Lyon exhibited an “If you can’t beat ‘em, join ‘em
attitude.”23 He believed the only way the Republicans could defeat the Federalist
presses was by playing their own game. He simply started his own publication in
order to set forth his own republican views.
His political views blossomed on the political scene between the years 1784
and 1796 when Lyon actively represented the town of Fair Haven in the Vermont
General Assembly.24 The assembly was charged with the responsibility of creating a
constitution for the infant state. Here Lyon’s political views emerged quite clearly.
According to the new Vermont Constitution, which did not simply copy the U.S.
Constitution, the legislature, not the executive, was intended to be the most powerful
arm of the new government. The reason for making the legislative branch the most
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powerful branch finds its origin in Lyon’s fear of an all-powerful executive. Many New
Englanders still had strong negative feeling towards George III and his repressive
measures. The legislature, the people’s branch, would reign supreme in Vermont.
Lyon and his colleagues made the executive subordinate in a number of ways. The
governor of Vermont was not provided the power to veto legislation from the state
assembly. The governor’s official duty was limited to carrying out the laws passed by
the legislative branch.25 The democratic ideas inherent within the Vermont
Constitution did not end there. The Vermont Constitution went as far as to outlaw
slavery. Lyon’s democratic ideals were ingrained in the Vermont Constitution, the
most democratic state constitution at that time.
Matthew Lyon’s constructive input into the new Vermont Constitution was a
great honor for him as well as an opportunity to place himself in the political spotlight
in New England. Just a couple of years later Lyon was involved in another significant
occasion in Vermont when in 1791 he was active in promoting the chartering of the
University of Vermont, an action that credited him with being the “Father of the
University of Vermont” ever since.26 However, Lyon had his eyes set on an even
larger prize, the United States Congress. After running unsuccessfully for the United
States House of Representatives in 1790, 1792, and 1794, he was finally elected to
Congress in 1796. Yet Lyon was a man who was never completely satisfied with his
most recent accomplishments. Once in the House Matthew Lyon, above all else,
accomplished one more important thing, he achieved notoriety. The following chapters
will focus specifically upon Lyon’s turbulent and controversial career in the U.S.
House, devoting special attention to his stormy and violent relationship with his
fellow Congressman, Roger Griswold, an ardent Federalist from Vermont’s
neighboring state of Connecticut. Eventually due to the behaviors of both Matthew
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Lyon and Roger Griswold, two men who just could not get along, resolutions would be
introduced into the House floor calling for the expulsion of both from Congress.
Congressman Lyon was the object of great political controversy within the
Congress of the United States. His behaviors led to efforts by the House of
Representatives to expel him, and his role in a strong mounted opposition to President
Adams and the Federalist party was also a catalyst in the action of Congress to pass
the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798. The political divisions and alignments on the
issues can be read in the recorded votes of the Congress. The recorded roll-calls on
the selected votes taken in the Congress are analyzed through a research technique
called Cluster-Bloc Analysis.
Rice-Beyle Cluster Bloc analysis will be used to explore the voting patterns of
the members of the House of Representatives, Fifth Congress, second and third
sessions. The Congressmen of the Fifth Congress unfortunately left little in the way
of personal papers, but they did leave an important record behind, the votes they cast
as members of the U.S. House or Representatives. In its most basic form cluster bloc
analysis allows the researcher to identify core groups of Congressmen on a given
topic.27 In this study cluster bloc analysis will help to determine exactly who
supported and who opposed the expulsion of Matthew Lyon, as well as who
supported and who opposed the passage of the Sedition Act of 1798. Finally, cluster
bloc analysis will contribute vastly to either proving or refuting the hypothesis of this
paper which includes the assertion that the faction of Congressmen who supported the
expulsion of Matthew Lyon from Congress will be the same one that supported the
passage of the Sedition Act. All pertinent roll-call votes will be included in the study,
with nine roll-call votes concerning the expulsion proceedings of Matthew Lyon, as
well as four roll-call votes concerning the passage of the Sedition Act. An historically
sound evaluation of the political climate of the latter part of the Federalist Era will be
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provided, a period when Americans were attempting to define and determine the limits
of freedom of speech under the federal Constitution of 1789. The search, of course,
continues to this day.
This study in no way claims to provide a complete history of Lyon’s political
career, or the struggle to define the meaning of the First Amendment rights of
American citizens. Because Lyon did not write specifically about his political career
the research has focused primarily upon the Annals of Congress, newspapers,
biographies, and other secondary sources such as journal articles, books, and law
reviews. Because secondary sources were used in the compilation of this study, some
difficulties became apparent while during the research, such as the fact that many of
the authors lacked knowledge of the Federalist Era and the life of Matthew Lyon.
Also, the issues presented in this study were highly partisan in nature, which in turn
tended to obscure the real issues facing Matthew Lyon, the Fifth Congress, and the
American people during the Federalist Era.
Throughout the compilation of this study every effort has been made to portray
Matthew Lyon accurately and fairly; therefore many notes have been utilized
throughout the paper in order to allow for complete documentation. The words of
Matthew Lyon, as well as the words of his contemporaries, will be used in order to
arrive at a better understanding of the subject and the times in which he lived.
Although other biographies of Matthew Lyon have been written, none of them
has utilized Cluster Bloc analysis as a primary research tool. I believe that it will add
an entirely new dimension to Matthew Lyon and the Sedition Act of 1798.
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CHAPTER TWO
CONTROVERSY IN THE HOUSE
This early period of American History is known as the Federalist Era because
the Federalist party, led by John Adams and Alexander Hamilton, was the most
influential and powerful party of the time. Historians and political scientists have
argued whether or not the Federalists and the other major party, the Republicans,
constituted true parties, but by the Fifth Congress they can be considered true parties,
and will be treated as such for the purposes of this study. First of all, the Federalists
and Republicans adopted fairly solid political philosophies which differed markedly
from each other. This ideological difference applied not only to domestic politics but to
foreign policy as well. Secondly, the two parties were active in calling their
adversaries names, not necessarily Federalists and Republicans, but often
Monarchists and Jacobins. It is clear that they viewed themselves as fundamentally
different. In order to differentiate themselves in terms of policy, the political factions
demonized opponents with perjorative labels. A note of caution must be sounded at
this point however; although the Federalists and the Republicans will be considered
true parties within the scope of this study, they cannot be compared to the party
system of the twentieth century. The parties of the Federalist Era were in their
infancy, just beginning to emerge from the political fabric, and still unsure of their
proper role to play in the new American society. One characteristic of the Federalist
Era, strong partisan animosities, has stood the test of time, and continues to plague
the business of government to this day. Clearly the two groups saw one another as
adversaries.
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In terms of political ideology it is safe to state that the Federalists believed in
a strong national government.1 They believed that only a strong central government,
possessing powers superior to those of the various states, was the best way for the
young nation to survive foreign interference and internal strife. The Federalists
believed the loose political configuration established under the framework of the
Articles of Confederation was a huge failure. Only with a strong central government
could the fledgling republic manage to meet the myriad of challenging issues inherent
in domestic and foreign policy. In contrast, the Republicans, led in the beginning by
Thomas Jefferson and James Madison, believed the best form of government consisted
of a weak, decentralized central government with the states reigning supreme.
Heated debate over this issue of federalism, whether the real power lies with the
states or the federal government, was commonplace during the Federalist period and
continues to this day.
The Federalists peered across the Atlantic Ocean to Great Britain as the best
available European model of government.2 Although the Federalists realized that the
British system of government contained some weaknesses, they needed only to look
to other European countries, especially France, to understand that America’s best
hope was to mimic the British system of government, minus a few of its shortcomings.
What exactly was it that attracted the Federalists to the British system of
government? One of the major contributing factors for the Federalists pro-British
attitude was the relationship in England between those who governed and the
governed. Great Britain was an aristocratic country, marked by hierarchy and class
differentiations. The Federalists embraced this political and social system, which
included a sense of superiority of those who governed over the governed. In reality,
many American citizens possessed a real fear and distrust of democracy.3 The elitism
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and aristocratic nature of British society appealed greatly to the Federalists, who
enjoyed a political stronghold in New England.
The Federalists and other American citizens distrusted democracy because it
involved the rule of the majority.4 The New England Federalists believed that only a
select few people from society, invariably the upper echelons of the social ladder, were
capable of governing.5 It was a very “gentlemanly” type of an attitude that somehow
only “gentlemen,” those within the upper tier of society, were endowed with the
proper skills for governing. The only true gentlemen were considered to be
Federalists, hence the Federalists were the only citizens capable of ruling. Historian
Aleine Austin had this to say about this Federalist social mentality: “Those to be
entrusted with the reigns of government should be men of education and
responsibility, which almost invariably meant that they should be men of substantial
property interests.”6 This emphasis on status permeated the new nation’s social and
political environments to the greatest extent in New England. Like Britain, the
United States was divided between various classes of citizens. Elitism did not exist
in America to the same degree as it did in Britain, yet it is safe to assume that it
played an important part in the politics of the Federalist Era.7 This will become
apparent shortly when Matthew Lyon’s elitist opposition questioned his social
standing during his expulsion proceedings. Lyon continually fought in opposition to
the elitist mentality which permeated Federalist and New England society.
Despite these extreme expressions of party, class, and nationalistic
animosities, it is safe to assume that not every Federalist embraced such excesses of
aristocratic elitism.8 Many Federalists realized that the United States, although tied
to Britain by strong cultural bonds, was fundamentally different both in terms of
society and in politics. A minority of Federalists believed that if the United States
were to steer a different course from Britain and Europe in general, elitism would have
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to be moderated, if not thrown out all together. The United States was, after all,
supposed to be a country of individuals endowed with basic rights, at least according
to the Declaration of Independence. The United States was intended to be a country
where every man was considered equal. This moderate wing of the Federalists
realized that the future success of the Federalist party hinged upon acceptance of
others, rather than outright rejection. Only through the winning of new recruits could
the Federalists remain an important political force. Unfortunately for the Federalists,
they were conducting a policy of exclusion rather than inclusion, handicapping their
hopes of remaining a strong and lasting political force.9
Matthew Lyon, along with his Republican counterparts, could be just as
narrow-minded as his Federalist enemies. One of the most illustrative examples of
this incredibly partisan atmosphere surfaced during the United States’ quasi-war with
France. Since the Federalists embraced a pro-British foreign policy the political affairs
of revolutionary France attracted little sympathy from them. The Republicans
countered the hostility to the French and their recent revolution with fierce
accusations (occasionally rooted in fact) aimed at the Federalists. On more than one
occasion Matthew Lyon and his Republican colleagues accused the Federalists of
advocating violence, bent on nothing short of war with France.1*^ Most historians
writing about the political climate of the Federalist Era have cast the Federalists as
the villains, with the Republicans cast in a moderate, reasonable role. It must be
stated at the very beginning that both the Federalists and Republicans gave as well
as they received. Both parties resorted to extreme partisan behavior. This political
reality will become painfully clear during the debates concerning the possible
expulsions of Matthew Lyon and Roger Griswold, as well as discussions surrounding
Lyon’s trial under the Sedition Act of 1798. Both parties, with a slight edge given to
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the Federalists, administered low blows to their political opposition at every available
opportunity.
For Lyon and the Republicans, belief in the proper functioning of government
differed fundamentally from the Federalists. For the Republicans, government in the
hands of the common man was the best form of government.11 The preceding
statement begs the question, “who is the common man?” According to the
Republicans the common man included men who embraced democracy with two hands.
They were the men who did not own large amounts of property, nor did they hold
dearly to the bonds of union with Britain. They differed markedly from elitist,
monarchal, Federalist New England. Quite the contrary, the common man was the
small farmer and the laborer who did not live in nation’s growing cities. Matthew
Lyon, as a common man and as a Republican, believed that government controlled by
the majority of the American citizens was good.12 This belief system was in direct
opposition to the Federalist belief that the best form of government was the
government controlled by the chosen few. This debate still surfaces from time to time
today, with some Americans arguing that complete democracy, with all citizens taking
part personally in most of the affairs of government, is the best course the United
States ought to take. Yet others, like the Federalists in the Federalist Era, believed
that a handful of competent, well-versed citizens alone were capable of making the
proper decisions for the country.
The Republican party was perhaps most unified in its general opposition to
anything monarchal in nature. Thomas Jefferson spoke for Matthew Lyon and the rest
of the Republican party when he wrote to George Washington from Paris in 1788:
I was much an enemy to monarchs before I came to Europe. I am ten
thousand times more so since I have seen what they are. There is scarcely
an evil known in these countries which may not be traced to their king as
its source, nor a good which is not derived from the small fibers of
republicanism existing among them. I can further say, with safety, there
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is not a crowned head in Europe whose talents or merits would entitle
him to be a vestryman by the people of any parish in America.13
It is difficult to imagine anyone reading this letter of Jefferson’s and failing to grasp
fully his viewpoint. In the eyes of the Republicans, monarchy was an evil to be
avoided at all cost, leaving the superior republican form of government alone capable of
affecting positive government for the nation. The Republicans, judging from Jefferson’s
quote, did not bother to hide their true feelings on the subject of European monarchy.
Another important difference between the two parties during the Federalist
Era was their judgment on the proper role of elected representatives. The Federalists
in general believed that once the voters of the nation made their choice of
representatives in Congress, their job was completed. In other words, once the voters
did their part by casting their votes, they failed to remain an active part of the political
process. The Republicans believed the opposite was true. A proper democratic
government was one in which the citizens were involved, not only at voting stations,
but throughout the political process. The act of voting by the nation’s citizens was
only the first step in that process. Unlike the subservient positions embraced by the
Federalist philosophy, the Republicans embraced a more active, involved citizenry.
Some caution must be injected here because it is far too easy to judge the Federalist
Era’s ideas on the role of democracy with the standards of today. If the Republicans
of the Federalist Era were alive today they would no doubt be horrified at the extent
to which democracy has been taken.
The final fundamental difference between the Federalist and Republican
parties, was that the two parties relied upon different power bases for their support.
The Federalists received much of their support from the New England area, especially
from the numerous wealthy merchants and substantial property owners, and from
South Carolina in the South.14 These were the men of considerable wealth, who in
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turn wielded significant influence in local and regional politics. The Republicans
received a majority of their growing support from the southern and western sections of
the country. The frontier regions and the South were fast becoming Republican
strongholds, with Virginia and Maryland firmly in control of the Republicans. They
received most of their support from the numerous propertyless citizens, as well as
small farmers and a scattering of small business owners, of which Matthew Lyon was
a part.15 Throughout the rest of this study keep in mind these differences in terms of
varying power bases. They will become significant in the succeeding pages concerning
the fate of Matthew Lyon.
This background to the Federalist Era should provide some sense of what the
period entailed. This understanding will become crucial to fully grasp the political
wranglings of the two parties over Lyon, his altercations with his nemesis Roger
Griswold, and his trial on charges of violating the Sedition Act of 1798. It will soon
become apparent that Lyon’s behavior as a Representative from the new state of
Vermont during the Fifth Congress was frequently quite provocative. Yet his
personality, often fiery and impassioned, endeared him to many of his constituents.
At times they enjoyed the fact that their small, often unnoticed state gained attention
on the national scene, even if it was basically negative in nature. It is important to
keep in mind that Lyon was not some renegade politician with little or no support from
his constituents.16 He enjoyed great support from the voters in his Western Vermont
district; they embraced nearly everything Lyon accomplished as their representative.
In fact, Lyon was made a martyr in Vermont during his expulsion proceedings.17
Lyon’s defense throughout these proceedings often rested upon the belief that he was
simply doing what his constituents asked of him, a true democrat representing his
constituents’ interests perfectly. If he did not represent his constituents properly he
believed and expected that they would vote him out of office at the next election.
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The first important example of Matthew Lyon’s controversial behavior while a
member of Congress occurred in November of 1797. It had become tradition that at
the time of each opening session of Congress the President, then John Adams, would
address both Houses of Congress concerning the legislation of the upcoming session
of Congress. It had become a ritual for the House to draft and deliver a reply to the
President’s speech. In accordance with this practice, a resolution was submitted
calling for the Congress to respond to the President’s speech opening the Fifth
Congress:
Resolved, That a respectful Address be presented by the House of
Representatives to the President of the United States, in answer to his
Speech to both Houses of Congress at the commencement of the present
session, containing assurances that the House will take into consideration
the various and important matters recommended to their attention.18
Matthew Lyon was opposed to delivering a reply to the President’s speech
because he believed it to be an outmoded tradition that wasted important
congressional time. Lyon contended that the reply to the President’s speech was a
very “troublesome and greatly derided custom of turning out en masse to wait upon
the President.” 19 Those who thought a reply to the President’s speech was
worthwhile, mainly Federalists, believed that the mere fact that it was the traditional
thing to do was reason enough to draft and deliver a reply. Lyon responded to this
blind faith in tradition by questioning these long-held parliamentary traditions, the
appropriateness of these traditions in a democratic body, and their usefulness to the
conduct of legislative business. Lyon believed the Congress would function more
efficiently if it omitted unneeded pageantry and tradition. Today this seems a trivial
matter, but in 1797 it was a very important debate. Would the nation retain its old
customs as England had done, or would it disregard them and get on to the business
at hand?

Federalists viewed Lyon as upsetting established practices. After voting

on the resolution, the Congress proceeded to draft a reply to the President’s speech.

24

Lyon was not finished, however, for he requested to be excused from waiting
upon the President at his residence in order to deliver the response. He believed
waiting upon the President was monarchal in nature and a waste of time. He wanted
to replace the part of the resolution that read, “attended by the House,” with
“attended by such members as may think proper.”20 On the one hand Lyon’s
proposal seemed practical enough, for it simply stated that those who wanted to be
excused from waiting upon the President, for whatever reason, would be excused. On
the other hand it seems Lyon was looking for trouble. Was it after all such a terrible
thing to participate in a traditional ceremony? To Lyon it was. His fellow
representatives did not agree, and unanimously dismissed Lyon’s objections to
delivering the Congressional response at the President’s residence.21 Representative
Nathaniel Smith, a Connecticut Federalist said, “Whenever gentlemen gave a
reasonable excuse for an absence from the duties of the House, they were constantly
consented to; but when a gentleman came forward to ask for the indulgence, without
giving any reason for telling the House they had acted like fools, he could not consent
to his being excused.”22
Lyon’s preceding behavior may be chalked up to his extreme devotion to
democracy. In his view Americans ought not be party to frivolous tradition adopted
from England. The answer to the President’s speech simply provided Lyon an
opportunity to muddy the political waters, as he “loved a fight or a frolic.”23 It seems
Matthew Lyon was at his best when he was embroiled in political controversy, yet his
convictions were sincere.

Journalist Claude G. Bowers characterized Lyon as “A

constant provocation to the Federalists. Hot-tempered, ardent, uncouth in his
manners, but thoroughly honest at heart.”24 Although Lyon possessed a strong
belief system, he was greatly misunderstood by many of his peers in Congress. To
many colleagues he was a demagogue, playing on the emotions of the American
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people. To others he was a thoroughly realistic, sincere, motivated man. Perhaps his
means were questionable, but hardly anyone could question his ends.
This question, however, of being excused from the traditional ceremonial
functions of government continued throughout the second session of the Fifth
Congress. Again on June 3, 1798, Lyon objected to the practice of attending the
answer to the President’s speech, as well as the unified parade of Congressmen
moving to respond to the Executive. On June 3rd, Lyon again made a motion on the
House floor to be exempted from attending the answer to the President’s speech.
Lyon used the same justifications as he had in November of 1797, objecting to
outmoded traditions. This time his colleagues supported his cause and excused him
from marching in the parade by a unanimous vote.25 The Congress, believing it had
more important tasks on its agenda, caved in to Lyon’s wishes.
Lyon struggled to uphold his varied convictions, as well as those of his
constituents. His first commitment while a member of Congress was in fact to his
district. In 1791 when he first ran for Congress he “sought to identify himself with
those who labored productively.”26 This statement can be attributed to his desire to
represent the common man in direct opposition to many elitist citizens of the country.
In reference to the elitist politicians of New England, Lyon said he was fighting “to
emancipate this country from the domination of a set of men who assumed all
appointments upon themselves.”27 There was no doubt in the minds of the politicians
of the early 1790’s, as well as in the minds of the historians who have since studied
the Federalist Era and Matthew Lyon, that he was a man of conviction, unafraid to
target his political opponents publicly.
In response, Lyon’s Federalist targets struck back by questioning about where
the majority of his political support originated. Although the vast majority of Lyon’s
support came from the mainstream of society, Lyon could not deny and the Federalists
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could not help but point out that much of his support came from the various Democratic
Societies popping up around Vermont and the rest of the nation.28 These Democratic
Societies were controversial and most people treated them with a great deal of
skeptisicm. The Federalists both feared and loathed these quasi-political groupings,
and promptly took advantage of every possible opportunity to remind Lyon that he
received support from a highly questionable group of people, both in terms of their
loyalty to the United States, as well as the means they utilized for attaining their
ends. It would be like a candidate for Congress in our own time accepting support
from the mafia or the Irish Republican Army. Perhaps no one but William Cobbet, the
British editor of the Porcupine’s Gazette, reminded Lyon more often of his
questionable power base. Throughout Lyon’s career in American politics, Cobbet and
other Federalist newspaper editors sought to undermine Lyon’s credibility and ability
to represent the people in his district.
Besides the issue of Lyon’s political support, the slavery issue was also an
important one during the Fifth Congress. The Society of Quakers presented a
memorial to Congress objecting to black enslavement. In that memorial, the Quakers
demanded “neither import nor purchase [of] any slaves imported after the first day of
December next, after which we will wholly discontinue the slave trade.”29 In firm
support of of the Quaker memorial Lyon called upon his colleagues to support the
resolution. Unfortunately his calls for no further slave importation fell on deaf ears.
Another example of Lyon’s defiance as a member of the Fifth Congress revolved
around the issue of a proposed Stamp Act. The Stamp Act proposed by the Federalist
majority included a tax on certain paper goods, which in turn would help pay for a
military build up, inspired by French threats, and recommended by President John
Adams.30 Why was Lyon so opposed to to a measure that would conceivably protect
the country from its foreign enemies? Lyon believed that the Stamp Act was a design
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of the rich which would have a disproportionate affect on the poor of the country.
During congressional debate on the act, Lyon expressed his opposition to it because it
did not “bear equally on all classes of men.”31 It seems Lyon’s election promise to
be the representative of the common man carried over to his initial actions in the U.S.
House.
An additional bone of contention between the Federalists and Republicans
during the Fifth Congress involved a Federalist proposed tax upon certificates of
naturalization. In its simplest form the plan involved a tax upon every new immigrant
to the United States. Lyon, an immigrant himself, opposed the measure vehemently.
The proposed naturalization tax was eventually tabled.
Lyon did not always emerge on the winning side of every controversy of the
Fifth Congress. He was accused by his Federalist opponents of abusing his franking
privileges, privileges whereby Congressmen were allowed to mail a certain amount of
literature home, informing their constituents of the business at hand.32 At that time,
the mail was a vital link between a Congressman and his constituents, and Lyon used
this privilege to the utmost. He was accused of including in various mailings to his
district a highly partisan newspaper, the Aurora, printed by the arch-Republican
newspaper editor, Benjamin Bache, a grandson of Benjamin Franklin. Lyon embraced
Bache’s political philosophy so wholeheartedly that he was willing to replace his own
words with those of Bache. According to the rules of the Congressional franking
privilege, Lyon’s practice of including the Aurora with his own materials was
considered highly questionable. Lyon eventually ceased including the Aurora in his
literature home.
Although Lyon eventually gave in to the enormous political pressure for his
alleged abuses of his franking privileges, he did not give up without a fight. He
despised anyone who claimed any sense of authority over him. He resented both
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Federalist and Republican leaders for enforcing Congressional rules when they
involved his political affairs. This aspect of Lyon’s behavior probably was the one
aspect that divided his supporters and opponents most definitively. Lyon’s
personality was described as “black and white.” You either loved Lyon and
supported his political pursuits, or you hated him and opposed every move he made.33
Lyon demanded complete loyalty from his supporters; if for some reason he could not
count on their loyalty he tried as hard as possible to win them over. “His convictions
ran clear to the bottom of subjects, and nothing he said or did was commonplace.”34
These words from Lyon biographer James F. McLaughlin go to the very heart of
Matthew Lyon the man, and Matthew Lyon the politician.
Although Lyon frequently seemed to be too partisan to speak for all of society
on most policy questions, it must be understood that Lyon spoke for all of society
when it involved the possible advancement of democracy. James F. McLaughlin also
stated, comparing him to Thomas Jefferson, that
Matthew Lyon became a Democrat of Democrats, and regarding the
Federalists as thinly disguised Tories, he waged ceaseless warfare against
them. As Jefferson stripped to the fight in Virginia, grappled with promogeniture, the title gatherers of the Established church and the ceremonies of
religious liberty, so Lyon sprang into the breach in Vermont in the same
fight, defeated the Federalists after a prolonged battle, and became the
pioneer Democrat of New England.33
Judging from McLaughlin, Matthew Lyon had become a powerful political force to be
reckoned with in New England.
Matthew Lyon was not the only strong-willed politician from New England,
however. Just to the south of Vermont lies another small state, Connecticut. From
Connecticut, a Federalist stronghold, emerged a politician just as strong-willed, just
as partisan, and just as driven as Matthew Lyon. His name was Roger Griswold, a
Federalist member of the United States House of Representatives. Roger Griswold
became Lyon’s worst enemy during the Fifth Congress. It is difficult to imagine two

29

men with such absolutely opposite political philosophies. Griswold was considered
to be a high-Federalist, one of the few ultra-Federalists who led their party into battle.
Griswold had heard of Matthew Lyon, and heard the rumors of his rough-and-tumble
disposition. Griswold too was an aggressive politician, but prided himself on being a
“polished” member of the fashionable Federalist party. The two Congressmen soon
got to know one another very well. Both were soon to be targeted for expulsion.
Roger Griswold experienced a very different type of upbringing than that of
Matthew Lyon. Unlike Lyon, Griswold was born in America, in Lyme, Connecticut, on
May 21, 1762.36 He graduated with honors from Yale University in 1780, and was
admitted to the bar in 1783. His family was a very influential one in the New England
area, and Roger was the beneficiary of their social position. Griswold enjoyed the
presence of both parents throughout his path to maturity. Lyon did not experience
such a luxury. Griswold enjoyed a stable home environment, living in one place
throughout his entire childhood. Lyon, again, did not. Griswold was the direct
recipient of all that was bestowed upon a family enjoying a high social standing. Lyon
had no such luck. In 1784 Roger Griswold became the Governor of Connecticut, and
served until he was elected to the United States Congress in 1794, where he served
until 1804. Again in 1811, Roger Griswold was reelected Governor of the state of
Connecticut.37 Roger Griswold lived a life of comfort and accomplishment.
At the time of Roger Griswold’s death in October of 1812, the Connecticut
General Assembly wrote that “the impartial Biographer will assign him a place in the
temple of fame with the most enlightened, upright and virtuous of his
contemporaries.”38 It went on to characterize Griswold as a man with “a sound mind
in a sound body.”39 It also said that
his influence was not exceeded by that of any other man. His political enemies
awarded him the praise of acting uprightly, and under the direction of an
enlightened mind.40
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Obviously the Connecticut General Assembly overlooked his behavior toward
Matthew Lyon in Congress.
The violent altercations between Matthew Lyon and Roger Griswold, both
verbal and physical in nature, will make it more difficult to believe that Roger Griswold
was an “upright,” “virtuous” man, and a man with “a sound mind,” and someone
who acted “uprightly.” Of course there is almost always a vast difference between
what people say about someone at the time of his death, and what people thought
about him while he was living. Like Matthew Lyon, Roger Griswold had many
positive qualities, but unfortunately the bad qualities are what people have most
remembered about both of them. Roger Griswold was well known for using dirty
tactics in order to get at his Republican foes. He was one who was known to have
initiated rumors about an enemy, hoping to use character assassination as a weapon
against his opponents. Claude G. Bowers has described Griswold, alleging that
no one could be more arrogantly dogmatic or more offensively intolerant.
His political views were those of the extreme Federalists, bitterly hostile
to democracy. He did not confine his attacks to the open and on the
floor, but was prone to busy himself in the circulation of whispered gossiping
about the mess-table and in the cloak-rooms.41
Compare Bowers’s observation of Griswold with Tom Campbell’s on Lyon:
“He was essentially a man of action, accustomed by nature and habit to control men,
as well as being a Democrat of long experience and courage of the Andrew Jackson
type.”42 Both authors chose their words carefully, and with a proper understanding of
the two politicians. The stage had been set for the clash of two hard-headed
politicians, Matthew Lyon and Roger Griswold.
The first Lyon-Griswold altercation took place in the House of
Representatives of the Fifth Congress. The Federalists held the majority of the 117
Congressmen by a margin of 65 to 52.43 Although the Republicans were at a
numerical disadvantage, their party was experiencing some growth and popularity.
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The Federalists realized this, which only added intensity to partisan politics. This
rocky relationship between Federalists and Republicans helps to explain the
expulsion proceedings of both Lyon and Griswold. Also, like most issues, the fate of
these two controversial politicians will hinge on mathematics, on how many votes the
Federalists and Republicans were able to muster in order to pass legislation.
The First altercation between Lyon and Griswold occurred on November 29,
1797, while the House was conducting a ballot selection for managers of the
impending impeachment of William Blount. While the ballots were being counted, and
an air of general relaxation prevailed, Jonathan Dayton, a New Jersey Federalist and
the Speaker of the House, walked around the House chamber in order to gain some
exercise while the ballots were being counted. Speaker Dayton’s leisurely stroll
through the chamber ended when he took the chair usually occupied by Samuel Dana,
a Connecticut Federalist, who was also taking advantage of the break in the House
activities. Mr. Dana ended up standing next to the fireplace next to Lyon, where they
immediately struck up a conversation, which soon became heated. According to
Dayton’s testimony, the Speaker responded forcefully to the discussion now taking
place at the fireplace between Dana and Lyon, and said, “Gentlemen, keep yourselves
cool, if you proceed much further, you will want seconds.”44
After Congressmen Dana and Lyon tempered their conversation, Speaker
Dayton asked Lyon why he opposed the Stamp Act. Lyon responded to Dayton’s
query with a verbal barrage against his Federalist enemies. He believed that the
controversy over his opposition to the Stamp Act had been blown entirely out of
proportion by his Federalist colleagues.45 Also, Lyon allegedly began a lengthy
discussion upon the backwardness of the people of Connecticut, the state Dana and
Griswold represented. Lyon stated his opinions loud enough so nearly everyone could
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hear his remarks. He proceeded to question the Connecticut delegates’ motives for
becoming representatives of their state. Lyon claimed
that the members from the state were acting in direct opposition to the
opinions of nine-tenths of their constituents; that, regardless of the public
good, they were seeking their own private interests; that their object was to
obtain for themselves; that if they could not obtain the most lucrative, they
would not refuse those that were less so.46
Clearly Matthew Lyon was out of line when he made these remarks about his
colleagues in the House. Congress was, after all, supposed to be a place where
people could state their personal opinions calmly and professionally. However, the
manner in which Lyon spoke angered many associates, especially those from the state
of Connecticut, the main focus of Lyon’s criticism. Lyon went so far as to say that if
he went to Connecticut himself he could single-handedly effect a revolution, and turn
out the Connecticut representatives.47
When Lyon made this final remark, threatening to raise a revolution in
Connecticut in opposition to self-aggrandizing representatives, Griswold took special
notice. He, like most of the people who heard Lyon, was offended. At the time Lyon
made the controversial remark Griswold was sitting in another member’s seat, and he
responded to the accusations. Griswold referred to Lyon being cashiered from the
Army, and the jokes surrounding it, which included the assertion that he was
sentenced to wearing a wooden sword, and chided Lyon that if he were to go into
Connecticut to raise a rebellion, “you had better wear your wooden sword.”48 The
House promptly erupted into playful laughter. It is not known how serious a remark
was intended by Griswold at that time. It does appear that it was meant to belittle
Lyon’s military record.
Lyon made no reply, positive or negative, to this remark. Either he did not
hear Griswold’s remark, or he heard it and chose to ignore it. Either way, the
discussion was not over. Lyon continued to talk to the Speaker about the state of
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Connecticut, with his back turned to Griswold. Lyon told Speaker Dayton that on
many occasions various citizens from the state of Connecticut, who possessed a
strong dislike for him (Lyon), visited Vermont, but after a short time he was able to
win their loyalties by pointing out numerous negative features of the Connecticut
delegation in Congress. Griswold, still privy to the discussion transpiring between
Lyon and Dayton, got up from the chair he was sitting in, walked over to where Lyon
and Dayton were conversing, laid his hand upon Lyon’s arm and said, “If you were
able to enter into Connecticut for the purposes you mention, you could not alter the
opinion of the nearest ostler.”49 Lyon, again ignoring Griswold’s remarks and the
varied chuckles of the eavesdroppers, repeated his assertions, stating that if he were
able to set up a press in Connecticut, within a year he could effect a revolution, and
turn out all of its members.
At that juncture of the increasingly tense conversation Speaker Dayton
questioned Lyon’s assertions that the Connecticut Representatives acted in direct
defiance of their constituents’ desires, and that the people of Connecticut had
repeatedly elected gentlemen of similar, negative political principles. Lyon responded
to Dayton’s questioning by stating that the representatives had blinded their eyes to
their constituents, dictated their political philosophies to them, and allowed only their
own, narrow opinions to be heard. Lyon went on to add that he believed that there
was perhaps only one member of the Connecticut delegation that he might spare, and
that he had serious thoughts of moving into the state and “fighting them on their own
ground.” At this point, hearing all he could bear, Roger Griswold restated his earlier
remark that if Lyon chose to move to Connecticut and start a rebellion he had better
wear his wooden sword. Lyon failed to ignore the insult a second time, and spat in the
face of Griswold.50 Griswold proceeded to lift one arm in a quick motion appearing to
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strike a blow at Lyon, but instead pulled out a handkerchief from his breast pocket ,
refraining from violently assaulting Lyon.
Immediately the Federalist-controlled Congress burst into partisan warfare.
The Federalists demanded some sort of punishment for the behavior of Matthew
Lyon. Their search for the proper punishment resulted in a motion submitted by
Samuel Sewall, a Massachusetts Federalist, made on January 30, 1798. The motion
read as follows:
Resolved, That Matthew Lyon, a member of this House, for a violent attack
and indecency committed upon the person of Roger Griswold, another member,
in the presence of this House, whilst sitting, be, for this disorderly behaviour,
expelled therefrom.51
After the resolution was presented to the Whole House, a “Breach of
Privileges” committee was formed to investigate the Lyon-Griswold altercation.52
The vote on the creation of that committee is the first relevant roll-call vote of this
study. The resolution referring the Lyon-Griswold matter to the Committee of
Privileges passed by a narrow margin of 49 votes in favor, and 44 votes opposed.53
It is interesting to note that immediately following this first Lyon-Griswold
altercation, and immediately preceding Representative Sewall’s resolution, Mr.
Sewall moved that the galleries be cleared of all possible spectators, as the subject
about to be taken up was one “which would considerably affect the feelings of the
members of the House.”54 Judging by the events following, however, this was a
considerable understatement. The expulsion proceedings ignited intense party
antagonisms and caused acute embarrassment to the members of the House,
especially the representatives who were chosen to be the members of the Breach of
Privileges Committee: Thomas Pinckney, Federalist of South Carolina; Abraham
Venable, Republican of Virginia; John Wilkes Kittera, Federalist of Pennsylvania;
Isaac Parker, Federalist of Massachusetts; Robert Williams, Republican of North
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Carolina; James Cochran, Federalist of New York; and George Dent, Federalist of
Maryland.55 These Committee members were assigned the unenviable task of
holding congressional hearings inquiring into the question of whether Matthew Lyon
ought to be expelled from the House. The Federalists no doubt enjoyed seeing Lyon
under such extreme political pressure.
The second relevant roll-call vote on Matthew Lyon occurred on the same day,
January 30, 1798. A motion was submitted, which stated, “Resolved, That this House
will consider it a high breach of privilege if either of the members shall enter into any
personal contest until a decision of the House shall be made thereon.” A separate
motion was made, again by an unknown source, which would add to the previous
motion the following: “And that the said Matthew Lyon be considered in the custody
of the Sergeant-At-Arms until the further order of the House.”56 No doubt both
resolutions were submitted by Federalists, since the Federalists were at risk of
losing Griswold, a key player in Congress, if any further altercations followed. Also,
many Federalists would have liked nothing more than to see Matthew Lyon placed in
the custody of the Sergeant-At-Arms, because they believed him guilty of the stated
charge. Being placed in the custody of the Sergeant-At-Arms would be tantamount to
being placed under arrest.
There was no debate on this second roll-call vote, and the Annals of Congress
do not specify why. The results of the second roll-call were in Lyon’s favor, however,
as the motion failed by 29 votes in favor, to 62 votes opposed.57 This vote was a set
back for the Federalist initiated resolutions to have Lyon placed in the custody of the
Sergeant-At-Arms, and further demoralize their political foe. Lyon was free to go
about his normal business, without conditions placed upon future behavior and
freedom of movement. After this second roll-call vote the House, having had a very
momentous day, adjourned at eight-o’clock in the evening. The fate of Matthew Lyon
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would be decided by committee on another day. One minor note bears mentioning at
this point. When the Congress again took up the Breach of Privilege Resolution on
February 1, 1798, two Committee members removed themselves from their appointed
duties, Venable and Pinckney, claiming illness would not allow them to perform their
Committee duties. John Rutledge, a Federalist from South Carolina, assumed a
position on the Committee at that time. The Committee now had only one Republican
member, leaving the Federalists free to do as they wished. Whether or not these
defections from the Committee had anything to do with the notoriety of the
embarrassing incident is unknown. It does, if nothing else, seem a bit peculiar.
Later on that same day, February 1, 1798, Speaker Dayton received a letter of
apology from Matthew Lyon. A motion was made to read the letter, which read as
follows:
To the Speaker: Sir: As the attention of the House of Representatives has
been called to my conduct in a dispute with Mr. Griswold, on a suggestion of
it being a violation of the order of the House, and the respect due to it from all
its members, I feel it incumbent on me to obviate the importation of intentional
disrespect. Permit me, sir, through you, to assure the House of
Representatives that I feel as much as any of its members the necessity of
preserving the utmost decorum in its proceedings; that I am incapable of an
intentional violation of its rules; and that, if, in the present instance, I am
chargeable with disregard of them, it is owing wholly to my ignorance of
their extent, and that the House of Representatives claimed any superinten
dance over its members when not formally constituted, and when they are not
engaged in actual business. If I have been mistaken in my understanding on
this subject, I beg the House to believe my fault has been without intention,
and that I am very sorry that I have deserved its censure.58
Lyon’s letter of apology was then referred to the Breach of Privileges Committee.
Lyon’s letter of apology deserves further attention. First, Lyon claimed in his
letter to the Speaker that he meant no intentional disrespect to the House. This is
probably a sincere statement. Yet on too many occasions during Lyon’s political
career he acted before thinking about the potential results of those actions. His
personality did not always allow a cooling-off period. Lyon did not believe spitting in
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the face of his fellow colleague was an intentional act of disrespect, since it did not
occur when the House was formally constituted. This reasoning served as a
convenient loophole for Lyon. It was, however, perceived by many of his Federalist
colleagues as an intentional act. It was an act which perhaps did not include
premeditation, yet it is hard to believe that someone can accidentally spit at someone.
Still, Lyon claimed that he believed strongly in the preservation of House decorum.
Second, and most important, Lyon claimed that the atmosphere of the House at
the time of the incident proved that the House was not really conducting official
business. Lyon’s latest claim did not gain much support, since despite the lack of
immediate debate the House had been called to order by the Speaker. Still, Lyon
utilized nearly anything on which to base his defense. Finally, the wording of Lyon’s
pseudo-apology demands attention. For all practical purposes Lyon did not actually
apologize to the House, or take responsibility for his actions. He simply said that he
was sorry that he had deserved the censure of the House. The letter to the Speaker is
very important because the House soon began to hear the testimony from the eye
witnesses to the first Lyon-Griswold altercation. Perhaps if Lyon had been more
sincere in his letter the House would have been more lenient in meting out his
punishment. However it is difficult to believe the Federalists would have accepted a
letter of apology; they wanted him expelled.
On February 2, 1798, after the Breach of Privileges Committee interviewed
several witnesses to the first Lyon-Griswold altercation, Lyon stated on the floor of
the House that he wished the information received by the Committee be made
available to the entire House.59 In debate on this question Nathaniel Macon, a
Republican from the state of North Carolina, stated his belief that once the House
heard the report from the Committee, “the punishment which the report proposed was
equal to death itself.”60 Lyon received at least some support at that time from his
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fellow Republicans. Lyon’s friends also supported the testimony to be released to the
Committee of the Whole House. The third relevant roll-call vote on Matthew Lyon
was now at hand. It revolved around the question of whether the Committee of the
Whole House should be authorized to examine the testimony of the eye-witnesses.
The vote resulted in a lop-sided victory for the Federalist majority, 88 votes in favor,
and 4 votes opposed.61 The only congressmen who voted against release of the
testimony were William Gordon, a Federalist from New Hampshire, Samuel Sewall, a
Massachusetts Federalist, Samuel Sitgreaves, a Federalist from Pennsylvania, and
George Thacher, a Massachusetts Federalist. No reasons have been found why
these four Congressmen voted nay on roll-call three, except that they were perhaps
hardliners who wanted to go ahead and convict Lyon without a close examination of
the witnesses. Ironically all four of the members were Federalists. All of the
testimonies in their entirety may be found in the Annals of Congress on February 12,
1798. Those who provided testimony were Jonathan Dayton, Federalist of New
Jersey, David Brooks, Federalist of New York, Hezekiah L. Hosmer, New York
Federalist, Samuel Dana, Connecticut Federalist, Joshua Coit, Connecticut Federalist,
Chauncey Goodrich, Connecticut Federalist, Christopher Champlin, a Federalist from
Rhode Island, and Joseph B. Varnum, A Republican from Massachusetts.62 Note that
only one Republican was invited by the Committee to provide testimony. The
Committee accordingly received very partisan testimonies from its eye-witnesses.
The form of the presentations consisted of each member stating his personal
recollections of what transpired the day of the Lyon-Griswold spitting incident,
followed by a brief question and answer session between the witnesses and the
Whole House.
In order to grasp the full meaning of the evidence and its effect on Lyon’s
political fate, it is necessary to read all the testimony.63 Since space is short, a brief
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synopsis must suffice. For the most part all of the testimony agreed. When
Representative Dana gave his testimony, the only testimony which provided a slightly
different perception of the altercation than those of the other Federalists, the House
listened intently.64 The only significant difference revolved around the conversation
Mr. Dana had been having with Lyon at the fireplace, just prior to the Speaker’s
demand that they compose themselves. It had to do with Dana’s asking for a
clarification of Lyon’s alleged statement to another congressman, that if the
Connecticut representatives voted for the Stamp Act their constituents would throw
them out of office. Dana claimed that Lyon said that his words were taken out of
context. According to Dana, Lyon told him that they would be “carried out,” simply
by the natural process of electing new representatives. In Dana's own words:
In the course of this conversation, he spoke of the disagreeable reception
which we might expect on returning to Connecticut, and made other
observations of an irritating nature. I felt some disdain at what he said; and,
as his conversation was by no means pleasing to me, I believe that my
irritation was manifest from the manner in which I answered him. The Speaker
being near, and, addressing us with an air of civility, interposed the caution
which he has mentioned.65
When Nathaniel Chipman, a Senator from Vermont and a character witness for
Lyon, testified before the committee, he claimed that Lyon had allegedly said
sometime earlier that year that he would defend his military record and express his
dissatisfaction with anyone who brought up the wooden sword. Chipman began his
testimony by describing an occasion the summer before in which he had asked Lyon
for his side of the Jericho desertion incident, in which he had allegedly been cashiered
from the Army. Lyon freely provided his side of the story, but also added some
information which foretold the present situation. According to Chipman, Lyon referred
to the wooden sword, and said, “If anyone at Philadelphia, or if any member of
Congress should insult him with it, or pretend to mention it to him, it should not pass
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with impunity.”66 Lyon’s statement, if true, came to fruition. One need only ask
Roger Griswold.
During the free moments between testimony Lyon rose to defend himself. He
insisted that the House was not in session, or conducting official business when the
affront to Griswold occurred. Lyon believed that the members of the House were at
their amusement and recreation. He also pointed out that during actual business only
one speaker was allowed to speak at any one time. Lyon was not afforded such a
luxury. “How could I imagine that this House was sitting, when the Speaker suffered
me to be interrupted when speaking to him, by the remarks and jokes of four or five
gentlemen?”67 Also on the affairs of the House, Lyon stated:
Is it proper to say that the House was sitting, while half the members
were standing round the table, while two-thirds of the other half were
walking round the bar, the Speaker engaged in jocular conversation, and
the few who remained in their seats, either in private conversation or
writing letters?68
Lyon raised a relevant point; however there is little doubt, despite the cordial
atmosphere, that the House was indeed undertaking official business.
Lyon also defended his military record, which had been so seriously questioned
during the preceding testimony. Referring to the desertion incident, Lyon stated:
Had I reasonable opportunity, I could prove, by the Lieutenant Colonel,
who is now General Stafford, and several other officers of that regiment,
that when I left it, I left it with the regret of much the greater part of the
officers and all the soldiers.69
Lyon was not only attacked specifically for his behavior while a member of the House,
but for his military record which occurred before he was a member of Congress.
Clearly the Federalists were using every available piece of history with which to
embarrass Lyon, and to question his ability to function as a representative of his
state. Lyon responded to this latest charge by saying:
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By these things, and my standing in this House, I could prove that I have
always been respected in the country I represent . The free electors of
my district have given me a preference to a gentleman of very great
respectability, yet evidence has been adduced in order to show that I am a
person of disrepute.70
In a more defiant tone Lyon referred to his emotional disposition: “I never did receive
impunity; nor did I come here to do so. I would sooner leave the world.”71
Lyon brought up a constitutional issue during his defense, as he questioned the
authority of House members to hear and decide the situation between himself and
Griswold. “I must think that the House of Representatives ought never to have taken
up the matter of the difference between Mr. Griswold and myself.”72 Surely Lyon’s
last statement rested upon shaky constitutional ground. The United States
Constitution states, “Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings, punish
its Members for disorderly Behaviour, and, with the Concurrence of two-thirds, expel a
Member.”73 Despite the legal and personal opposition facing Lyon, he continued to
come up with novel ways of defending his behavior.74
As to Lyon’s being cashiered from the Army and forced to wear a wooden
sword, the Federalists ignored the fact that he had been found not guilty of the
charges of deserting his post. The real issue is not whether Lyon deserved to be
treated fairly concerning his military record, but whether the Federalists completely
ignored his being found not guilty in order to gain politically.75 In fairness to the
Federalists in Congress, they were not the only ones choosing to ignore Lyon’s
exoneration. Perhaps the most partisan Federalist newspaper, the Porcupine’s
Gazette, would not let the wooden sword issue rest, even before his fracas with
Griswold. The editor ridiculed Lyon as “the redoubtable hero who, a few years before
[he] was sold for his passage from Ireland, and for his cowardice in the American
War, was condemned by General Gates to wear a wooden sword.”76 The Gazette
seemingly would not settle for anything short of expulsion, perhaps prison, reporting
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that “it has been mentioned to cage him—as he has discovered much uneasiness at
going with the crowd.”77
A thorough reading of the nation's newspapers is not a reliable, non-partisan
source for gaining an accurate understanding of the public sentiment concerning
Lyon.78 Private letters proved more helpful. The mood conveyed in various private
letters is overwhelmingly critical of Lyon. The best example of this negative tone
originated in the letters of Abigail Adams. In a series of letters to her sister, Abigail
Adams discussed her horror and great dissatisfaction with Matthew Lyon’s behavior
and his continued presence in Congress. Abigail, believing more important business
was in need of attention, rather than the expulsion proceedings, wrote her sister,
“You will see much to your mortification, that Congress have been fitting [fighting]
not only the French, but the Lyon, not the Noble British Lyon, but the beastly
transported Lyon.”79
Abigail Adams did not mince her words. The true meaning of her remarks is
not difficult to ascertain. A few days later she expressed her profound frustration over
the clause of the U.S. Constitution which requires a two-thirds majority for expulsion:
This act so low, vulgar and base, which having been committed, could
only have [been] dignifiedly resented, by the expulsion of the Beast, has
been spun out, made the object of party, and rendered thus the disgrace of
the National Legislature, by an unfortunate clause in the Constitution which
gives the power into the hands of the minority, requiring two-thirds to
concur in an expulsion of a member. The circumstances were so fully proved
of Lyon’s being the base aggressor, that as Gentlemen I could not have
believed they could have got one third of the members to have consented
to his continuance with them. I know not where it will end. In the mean
time the business of the Nation is neglected, to the great mortification of the
federalists.80
Republicans of the day would have taken great issue with some of her remarks;
however Abigail Adams was at times one of the most ardent of Federalists. She was
not an elected official; therefore she she did not feel the need to temper her remarks.
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One thing is for certain; anyone studying Abigail Adams need not dig very deep in
order to discover her true feelings on a given topic. Her letters demonstrate the
sentiments of Lyons’ opposition. If all Federalists spoke like Abigail Adams, and
some came very close, one can definitely see the difficult position Matthew Lyon was
in.
Returning to the debate in the House over Lyon’s fate, the Breach of Privilege
Committee arrived at a decision, one that would profoundly affect Lyon’s political
career. After interviewing all of the eye-witnesses to the Lyon-Griswold spitting
incident, the Committee found Lyon’s behavior “highly indecorous, and unworthy a
member of [the] House.”81 The groundwork was now in place for debate on whether
or not Lyon ought to be expelled from the House. Had the Committee not found
Lyon’s behavior to be unworthy of his position, Lyon’s future in the House would no
longer be seriously questioned. Instead, the Committee’s decision opened up the
question to the whole House.
The debates on Lyon’s expulsion were completely partisan in nature.
Federalists demanded his expulsion, while Republicans, with equal vigor, demanded
his retention. Both sides conceded Lyon’s actions to be serious, but also chose to
ignore other factors. This becomes quite obvious with a thorough reading of the
debates.
The Federalists were aware of the results of expulsion—one less Republican
vote. Since there was near parity in the House, 52 Federalists and 44 Republicans,
the Federalists could not pass up the opportunity to gain a more secure numerical
advantage. The Lyon fiasco seemed like an ideal opportunity for the Federalists to
put their plan into action. They claimed the vulgar nature of Lyon’s behavior was
indefensible.

Federalists believed they were simply removing a disgraceful political

figure from an esteemed national position, rather than playing politics. Perhaps Lyon
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was a disgraceful figure, cheapening the new national government, but at its core the
Lyon debate was totally political. Those who supported Lyon, as well as those who
opposed Lyon, followed strict party lines. After all, Congressmen were under great
pressure to settle this matter. Josiah Parker, one of the few Virginia Federalist
representatives, quoted a citizen who stopped him on the way to Congress, and said,
“There is nothing to do in Congress today—there’s no Fighting going on!”82 Both
parties felt pressure to get the Lyon affair resolved, but the interests of party unity
prevailed over the interests of brevity.
Much of the legislative debate focused on the testimony of Matthew Lyon:
It appears, also, by the testimony, that Mr. Griswold, in Mr. Harper’s
seat, gave me a most cutting insult. The Speaker, who I was in
conversation with, heard it as well as the others; they testify that I did
not hear it. Why not hear it as well as they? For no other reason than to
keep up the prevailing good humor. But Mr. Griswold not satisfied with
the insult already given, says to one of the witnesses, ‘He does not hear
me,’ and removes himself to my side, pulls me by my arm to call my
attention, and then more particularly and more deliberately repeats the
insult, knowing it to be the most provoking abuse that one gentleman
could possibly offer another. Under all these circumstances, I cannot
but entertain the fullest assurance that I stand justified for the repulse of
that deliberate insult offered me by Mr. Griswold, in the view of the
Committee of the House of Representatives, and of every man of honor
or feelings who shall ever hear the story.8^
Most Federalists believed that Lyon was not a victim of vicious lies, and was
not in the least warranted to retaliate in the manner in which he did. Even a fellow
Republican, Robert Williams of North Carolina, expressed his belief that no language
could have possibly deserved the personal affront which Griswold endured, because
as a member of a civilized society, one does not behave in Lyon’s manner.84 A bit of
the elitist attitude of the Federalists presents itself at that point during the legislative
debate. The Federalists believed themselves to be the well-bred members of society,
never resorting to the low and vulgar tactics of Lyon. As William Shepard, a
Massachusetts Federalist, remarked, “If he must be a legislator, it should be in a part
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of the world where all decisions were made by spitting and scratching.”85 The
implication that Lyon was a socially inferior member of society hurt Lyon perhaps
more than any other accusation hurled by the Federalists. Since Lyon had been an
indentured servant, and did not value close ties with England, he was viewed as an
outcast, and tried valiantly all of his life to join the upper ranks of society. The
debates on his expulsion only brought his inferior social status into the open, and
worked to lower his standing in society even further.86
Some Federalist Congressmen claimed that Lyon’s behavior insulted the
sovereignty of the United States. Others likened his behavior to the “savage” nature
of the Six Nations. Lyon’s actions were described as “monstrous” and
“abominable.”88 Some Federalists went so far as to assert that the House was an
institution of “purity,” and they must all unite in expelling the impurity from their
environment. Federalists also asserted that Lyon’s public spitting in the face of
Griswold was only half of the damaging insult. The other, the moral insult, cut more
deeply into his hapless victim.89 The list of speeches against Lyon on the floor of the
House goes on and on. It seemed by mid-February, 1798, that Lyon did not have any
chance of survival. His only defense was the sheer numerical force of the Republican
party. If the forty-four Republicans held together, the Federalists would not be able to
muster the two-thirds vote necessary for expulsion.
The Republicans agreed that Lyon’s spitting in the face of Griswold was
unnecessary, but supported the defense of his honor against Griswold’s cutting
remarks. They did not believe his actions warranted expulsion, but many Republicans
supported censure. Albert Gallatin, a Republican representative from Pennsylvania,
was perhaps most supportive of Lyon when he defended his Republican colleague.
Gallatin gave a compelling speech on the House floor when he both questioned Lyon’s
manners as a member of society, but denied that those bad manners precluded him
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from making decisions in government. He asserted that spitting in Griswold’s face
was in poor taste, but that it did not show “corruption of heart.”90 He went on to
state that Lyon’s manners might not allow him to associate with every member of
Congress, but also stated that they were not members of Congress simply for the
sake of association. Gallatin, confident that the Federalists could not achieve the
two-thirds vote, wrote to an unknown recipient that
no man can blame Lyon for having resented the insult. All must agree in
reprobating the mode he selected to show his resentment, and the place
the act was committed. As two-thirds are necessary to expel, he will not, I
believe, be expelled.but probably be reprimanded at the bar by the Speaker.91
In another letter, Gallatin wrote that the expulsion proceedings were “indeed the
most unpleasant and unprofitable business that ever a respectable body did
pursue.”92
Other Republicans defended Lyon on constitutional grounds. William Findley,
a Republican representative from Pennsylvania, thought that Lyon’s behavior
constituted only an indecency. He went on to state that indecencies occurring in the
House were punishable, yet expulsion was the highest form of punishment, a
punishment in his estimation reserved only for high crimes, such as treason. Lyon’s
behavior may have been indecent, but it was not a high crime; therefore expulsion in
this case was not in accordance with the Constitution.93 Mr. Findley and his
Republican colleagues made a valid point. Did Lyon’s behavior deserve his
expulsion? Was not expulsion meant to be applied only in the most extreme cases?
The problem facing the Republicans was that no one really had the answer. The
Constitution was phrased in such loose, general terms, it is difficult to ascertain what
the framers had intended. Perhaps the framers themselves had not given it sufficient
thought either. Federalist William Shepard from Massachusetts responded to
Findley's constitutional defense, declaring that “if the member from Vermont were not
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expelled it would break up the entire session without doing any business; it would
divide the states against each other, and finally end in a civil war.”94 Mr. Shepard
was obviously exaggerating the importance of this issue, but he did demonstrate its
importance in the eyes of the Federalist party.
When Republican Robert Williams took the floor on February, 12, 1798, the
same day as the final roll-call vote on Lyon’s expulsion, he stated his belief that the
punishment of expulsion was disproportionate to the offense. Williams believed that
as long as order and decorum were reestablished in the House, no further action was
necessary. Williams moved to amend the Breach of Privilege resolution by striking
out the words, “be for disorderly behaviour expelled,” and replace them with, “is
highly censurable, and that he be reprimanded by the Speaker, in the presence of this
House.”95 A short debate occurred over Williams’ amendment, which for all practical
purposes would prevent Matthew Lyon from being expelled.96 As expected, the
Federalists cried foul, for they would accept nothing less than expulsion. For
Republicans, the Williams amendment provided the best hope of saving face. By
supporting the amendment they would both support some sort of punishment of Lyon,
while at the same time retaining his Republican vote. This amendment received the
full support of the Republican party. The outcome of the vote would depend upon the
following question: does a reprimand constitute a proper punishment of Lyon’s
behavior? If congressmen answered yes to this question, they would likely vote yea;
if not, they would likely vote nay.
Later that day Williams’s amendment was put to a vote, and failed passage 52
to 44.97 A few minutes later a motion was made to take a final vote on the expulsion
resolution. Matthew Lyon’s political fate hinged upon the support of his party. Surely
all of the Federalists were going to vote for his expulsion, and all of the Republicans
were expected to vote against. If this scenario played itself out, the Federalists
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would not be able to achieve the two-thirds majority needed in order to pass the
expulsion resolution. But if a number of Republicans crossed party lines to the
Federalist camp, Lyon’s fate would not be so certain. When the final vote was taken
the former scenario prevailed. Every voting Federalist favored Lyon’s expulsion, and
every voting Republican opposed expulsion. The final tally was 52 votes in favor of
expulsion , and 44 votes opposed.98 The Federalists failed to gamer the required twothirds majority, and Lyon managed to hold onto his House seat.
Judging by the partisan nature of the final vote one wonders how seriously the
congressmen, Federalist and Republican alike, took the expulsion proceeding. Did
they really think clearly, deliberately and impartially, when deciding how to cast their
votes? Or did the spirit of party politics win their allegiance, blinding them from
making the proper decision? The final outcome represented a strict party vote. The
debates too were utterly partisan in nature. Only a few congressmen, such as Albert
Gallatin, succeeded in removing themselves somewhat from the intense party
antagonisms present in the House chamber. Most Federalists could not make the
same claim. Albert Gallatin was extremely upset:
The affection of delicacy, the horror expressed against illiberal
imputations and vulgar language in the mouth of an Otis or a Brooks,
were sufficiently ridiculous; but when I saw the most modest, the most
decent, the most delicate man, I will not say in Congress, but that I have
ever met in private conversation, when I saw Mr. Nicholas alone dare to
extenuate the indecency of the act committed by Lyon, and when I saw at
the same time Colonel Parker, trembling alive to the least indelible and
vulgar expression at the Vermonter, vote in favor of his expulsion, I
thought the business went far beyond forbearance, and the whole of the
proceedings to be nothing more than an affected cant of pretended delicacy
or the offspring of bitter party spirit.99
In the end, Lyon was allowed to retain his seat, yet ominous storm clouds were
brewing on the horizon.
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The order of the House remained calm for only a short period of time, three
days to be exact. On February 15, 1798, still fuming over the failure to oust Lyon from
the House, Roger Griswold entered the House chamber, marched stoically to where
Matthew Lyon was sitting, lifted a hickory walking stick above his head, and
proceeded to beat Lyon in a violent manner.100 This was the second outbreak of
disorderly behavior in only three months between Lyon and Griswold. Again, a
thorough understanding of this latest fracas is necessary to understand the
subsequent expulsion proceedings against the two embattled politicians.

Lyon did

manage to partially free himself from his seat, and tried unsuccessfully to grab the
stick from Griswold’s clenched fists, suffering repeated blows from the vindictive
Griswold.101
Eventually Lyon was able to get behind the Speaker’s chair to avoid the
oncoming assault and grasped a pair of tongs from the fireplace. Lyon then had a
weapon of his own. With tongs and cane in hand the two came together and wrestled
to the floor with Griswold falling on top of Lyon. The congressmen who were present,
who until now stood in complete shock, unable or unwilling to stop the violence,
managed to separate Griswold and Lyon from one another. Speaker Dayton
eventually called the House to order; while doing so Griswold and Lyon again would
have renewed their combat if it were not for the doorkeeper keeping them
separated.102 The tables had suddenly turned. This time it was a Federalist acting in
an ill manner, with the Republican playing the part of the innocent victim. Some
Republican congressmen and historians have questioned Speaker Dayton’s timing in
calling the House to order, despite the shocking nature of the fracas. Many have
maintained that he did not begin calling the House to order until he saw Lyon grab the
pair of tongs from the fireplace. Tom Campbell, a Lyon biographer, claimed:
Jonathan Dayton, a rabid Federalist, had just taken the Speaker’s chair to
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call the House to order when Griswold made his assault on Colonel Lyon; but
he sat and watched the cowardly blows fall upon the head of the unsuspecting
member from Vermont, with great glee, until he saw Colonel Lyon seize
the tongs and knock the club from the hands of Griswold, and then Speaker
Dayton began to pound and loudly call for order.103
The next day, February 16, 1798, Thomas Davis, a Republican from Kentucky,
proposed the following resolution: “Resolved, That Roger Griswold and Matthew
Lyon, members of this House, for violent and disorderly behaviour committed in this
House, be expelled therefrom.” 104 The resolution of expulsion was again referred to
the Committee of Breach of Privileges. The House was again about to undertake a
debate revolving around the issue of the proper behavior of its members. Again,
expulsion was the intended remedy. Again testimonies were given by the eye
witnesses to ascertain whether or not the two should be expelled. Those providing
their personal accounts were Samuel Sitgreaves, a Pennsylvania Federalist, Peleg
Sprague, a New Hampshire Federalist, Thomas Claiborne, a Virginia Republican.,
James Imlay, a New Jersey Federalist, James Gillespie, a North Carolina Republican,
Samuel Sewall, a Massachusetts Federalist, William Shepard, a Massachusetts
Federalist, Jonathan Haven, a New York Republican, William Gordon, a New
Hampshire Federalist, Lucas C. Elmendorf, a New York Republican, and Richard
Stanford, a Republican from North Carolina. Again the Federalist outnumbered the
Republicans with six and five members respectively. Again the spirit of party
prevailed, influencing the decision-making processes of nearly all of the members.
The testimony concerning the caning incident demonstrated a high degree of
similarity between those who provided it.105 Some of the testimony was brief,
reflecting the Congressman’s belief that the issue was perhaps not as important as
others during the Fifth Congress, or perhaps because they felt it was an open and shut
case. Other testimony, such as that of Jonathan Haven, a New York Republican, and
Lucas Elmendorf, also a New York Republican, was more exhaustive, containing a

high degree of clarity and specificity. Most of the witnesses testified that Lyon did not
provoke the caning at the hands of Griswold. Each witness testified that Lyon was
sitting at his desk, writing personal letters, when Griswold attacked him. Lyon had
not seen nor spoken to Griswold on the morning of the caning.106
Each witness testified that in the opening moments of the caning Lyon was
merely a passive victim. Jonathan Haven referred to the alleged passive nature of
Lyon:
As soon as Mr. Griswold had come in front of Mr. Lyon, he struck
him with all his force over his head and shoulders, with the smallest end
of his cane, repeating his blows as fast as possible. Mr. Lyon, I think,
received three blows in this posture, before he rose to disengage himself
from the desk that was before him, and the chairs that were on either
side of him.107
Not until Lyon was able to free himself from his seat was he able to defend himself.
The testimony called into question the role of the Speaker during the caning
incident. Did Dayton allow the incident to proceed too far before calling for the House
to order? According to some of the witnesses, he did not call the House to order at
the first sign of violence. Lucas Elmendorph claimed:
Immediately, I myself, for one, rose in my seat, and loudly and repeatedly
called out to the Chair for order. I heard the same call from different parts
of the House; but I did not observe or hear any effort from the Speaker to
restore it.108
After Lyon had managed to extricate himself from his desk, and with the House still
not called to order, Lyon became an active member of the fracas. No longer simply
trying to defend himself from the rapid blows of Griswold, Lyon actively engaged in a
physical grudge match with his most ardent foe. Clearly both parties desired to inflict
bodily harm upon the other. Once Lyon had the tongs in hand Griswold lunged at him,
and both tumbled to the floor. Finally, after watching them wrestle on the floor for
some time, a number of Congressmen yelled loudly enough for them to act together as

a group to get the wrestling congressmen separated. “Thus, while some gentlemen
were disentangling their hands, others had Mr. Griswold by the legs, and were pulling
him away.” 109 According to the testimony of Richard Stanford, a North Carolina
Republican, after the members had manage to pull Griswold off of Lyon by pulling at
his legs, Dayton said that it was unfair and ungentlemanly of them to take a man by
his legs.110 It is obvious that Speaker Dayton, a devout Federalist, supported
Griswold in this latest fracas.
After reviewing the eye-witnesses testimony, the House proceeded to debate
the resolution to expel Griswold and Lyon. Many of the same arguments heard during
Lyon’s solo expulsion proceedings were recycled for the current dual expulsion
proceeding. Many congressmen believed that the House could not and would not
return to normal until Griswold and Lyon were removed. The dignity of the House
again had been insulted, and only by removing the aggressors would dignity and
civility return. “Such a transaction would certainly lower that House in the estimation
of their constituents.” 111 Other congressmen drew a distinction between the two
actors in the violent altercation. The Republican minority attempted to characterize
Matthew Lyon as an innocent, passive victim, and Roger Griswold as the vengeful,
violent aggressor. “He [Lyon] certainly received a severe beating,” said
Congressman George Thacher, “but he appeared to be passive from the beginning to
the end.” 112
No matter which side congressmen found themselves on, the violence within
the walls of the House was extremely embarrassing. Josiah Parker, a Virginia
Federalist, went so far as to suggest that if the resolution passed and the two
members were expelled, he would have the House Journals expunged of any entries
pertaining to the latest outbreak of violence. Again the congressmen were in a very
difficult position. They did not approve of the behavior of their colleagues, yet both

Griswold and Lyon were vital members of their respective parties. Since the
resolution contained a request that both Griswold and Lyon be expelled, instead of
two separate resolutions individually asking for their expulsions, the congressmen
needed to decide if it was worth getting rid of one of their own in the process of ridding
themselves of an enemy. Had two resolutions been made, one for the expulsion of
Griswold, and another calling for the expulsion of Lyon, their jobs would have been
easier. Yet some “Federalists were so bent on getting Lyon out of Congress that
some of them were willing to expel their own Griswold along with Lyon, if, by so
doing, they could get rid of Lyon.” 113
It is too easy to chalk the expulsion debates up to partisan politics. There
were, after all, other minor factors which helped congressmen make up their minds.
The most important contributing factor after party affiliation was class affiliation. The
caning incident had much to do with class conflict. The second act of violence would
not have occurred had not the elitist Griswold considered Lyon to be a second-class
citizen and sought revenge upon the Irish immigrant who insulted the upright New
England gentleman. This was not only an expulsion proceeding based upon political
realities alone; it was also an exercise in class warfare. One piece of evidence in both
testimony and debate was a double standard imposed by the Federalists. When
Lyon, a Republican, had spat in the face of Griswold, a Federalist, the Federalists
could not have expressed more strongly their offense at the act. However when the
tables were turned and a Federalist was accused of initiating the offensive act, the
Federalists did not react with horror as consistent with their earlier reaction. When
Griswold attacked Lyon many Federalists were particularly not offended. Perhaps
they thought that Griswold was only getting even with Lyon. There is no doubt that
the Republicans too had at one time or another acted with a double standard, but this
situation smacked of hypocrisy.

In order to save his fellow Federalist from expulsion, Samuel Sitgreaves, a
Pennsylvania Federalist, recommended that consideration of the expulsion resolution
be postponed until March 4, 1799. The upcoming vote on Sitgreaves’ postponement
motion constitutes the sixth relevant roll-call vote of this study, and the first roll-call
vote on the expulsion proceedings against Griswold and Lyon. After a short debate,
Sitgreaves’ motion to postpone any further discussion of expulsion was defeated by a
vote of 38 votes in favor to 53 votes opposed.114 Discussion on the matter would
continue.
The next pertinent roll-call vote included in the study is roll-call vote number
seven. By the time of the actual vote the Breach of Privilege Committee had
recommended, after reviewing the testimonies of the eye-witnesses, that the
expulsion of Lyon and Griswold ought to be opposed. The Committee arrived at this
conclusion because it could not agree that both members deserved to be expelled.
Since the resolution required that both Lyon and Griswold be expelled, the Committee
members who did not support both expulsions were opposed to the entire resolution.
Roll-call seven revolved around the question of agreeing to the report of the
Committee which contained a disagreement with the resolution of expulsion. When
the yeas and nays were taken, 73 Congressmen voted in agreement with the report,
and 21 were opposed to the report.115 It appeared at that point that neither Griswold
nor Lyon would be expelled.
As a result the the expulsion resolution’s failure to gain support in the House,
Robert Williams, Republican of North Carolina, proposed the following resolution:
“Resolved, That Roger Griswold and Matthew Lyon, for riotous and disorderly
behaviour in this House, are highly censurable, and that they be reprimanded by the
Speaker in the presence of this House.” 116 Although Lyon and Griswold had
managed to avoid expulsion, they still faced a vote on their reprimand.

The
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congressmen of the Fifth Congress again had to make an important decision: does a
reprimand constitute proper punishment for the behaviors of Lyon and Griswold?
Some congressmen believed that by failing to expel both members from Congress, the
esteem and the will of the House might forever be lost. A reprimand would only
embarrass the House further.117 Despite these fears the House proceeded to vote on
roll-call eight, which was whether the main question of putting the reprimand
resolution to a vote should go forward. By a vote of 47 in favor and 48 opposed, the
resolution failed.118 Lyon and Griswold would neither be expelled nor reprimanded for
their behavior.
In the end Matthew Lyon again succeeded in avoiding expulsion from
Congress. The reasons for this outcome vary. For the most part the fact that both
Lyon and Griswold were a part of the same expulsion resolution acted in favor of
Lyon. Had Lyon and Griswold’s behavior been the focus of two separate resolutions,
Lyon’s chances of expulsion would have been greater. However, it is debatable
whether the Federalists would have been able to garner the necessary two-thirds
vote of the House members needed for expulsion. More than likely if Lyon had been
the sole accused member on one resolution he at least would have been reprimanded.
In the end the Federalists were not willing to sacrifice Griswold just to rid themselves
of Lyon’s presence, although it did come perilously close for Griswold.
The final votes also demonstrated the difficult nature of expelling a member
from Congress. Gaining the necessary two-thirds majority demanded by the
Constitution is not a simple task, no matter what numerical advantage one party has
over the other. Had the Federalists controlled more seats perhaps they could have
mustered enough votes. But since the ranks of Federalists and Republicans were
nearly even, attaining the two-thirds majority was nearly impossible. The final
outcome of the two Lyon-Griswold affairs demonstrated the partisan atmosphere that
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prevailed during the Federalist Era. Whether or not such extreme instances of party
competition prevailed during other congresses is not the focus of this study; however
it is difficult to believe that party animosities would be inflamed only in the LyonGriswold affairs. In the end the Federalists saved one of their own and the
Republicans managed to do the same. Lyon and Griswold survived to fight another
day.
The final vote on Lyon and Griswold also demonstrated the belief of many
congressmen that the voters would have an opportunity to expel both men at the next
election. Throughout the debates, first concerning only Matthew Lyon, and then
involving both Lyon and Griswold, countless references were made to voter
accountability. The general belief was that if their constituents disapproved of Lyon
and Griswold’s behavior while members of the House, they could choose not to
reelect them. If voters believed that their behavior was unnecessary and even a bit
embarrassing, yet still considered them competent enough to make intelligent
governmental decisions, the voters could choose to retain their services, despite the
provocative behavior.
The final outcome of the Lyon-Griswold affairs shows that expulsion was
perhaps too extreme a punishment for their behavior. Was the House really a “pure’’
institution untouched by the hands of impure legislators? Probably not. The final
votes demonstrated that most congressmen believed that although the spitting and
caning incidents were avoidable and embarrassing, they did not constitute a high
enough crime to warrant an expulsion. Although each House of Congress is free to
make all rules and regulations for the behavior of its members, expulsion was viewed
as a punishment reserved for instances of more extreme concern.
The testimony given by the witnesses provided an enlightening avenue of
investigation. Through the eye-witness accounts the researcher is able to utilize the
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exact words of the congressmen. One does not need to rely upon secondary materials
which may prove to be inaccurate. The testimony also leads to a thorough
understanding of the congressmen's intent and political philosophy without relying on
secondary sources. It is interesting to note, however, that like the debates on the
House floor, so too the testimony exhibited numerous instances of partisan bias. For
example, concerning the first two expulsion proceedings against Lyon, the Republican
congressmen who supported him tended to overlook the fact that the House was
actually officially called to order when he spat in the face of Griswold. The Federalists
made certain to emphasize this point in their testimony. Another example of partisan
bias involves Lyon’s role in the caning incident. Was Lyon a passive victim or an
active participant? The testimony of the Republicans tried to paint Lyon as the
passive victim, while the Federalists attempted to present Lyon as a co-aggressor.
Finally, after all of the votes had been counted Lyon remained. Perhaps one
could argue that Lyon was simply lucky, lucky that his Republican colleagues were not
further outnumbered than they were by their Federalist foes. Lucky that his
constituents, after hearing of his behavior in the House, did not call for his resignation.
Lucky that his second round of expulsion proceedings found himself in the same
resolution as Griswold. Yet perhaps Matthew Lyon was not the passive player that
luck presumed him to be. Maybe his pro-active approach in defending his honor
proved to be the most important contributing factor? Perhaps the letter of apology he
wrote to Speaker Dayton, or the testimony he provided for the Breach of Privileges
Committee resulted in a more thorough understanding of the man by his peers. These
questions will probably never be fully answered, but for now it seems that Lyon’s
defense of his actions played little part in his avoiding expulsion on two separate
occasions. From the time Lyon spat in the face of Griswold to the final roll-call vote
on his expulsion, it is as if Lyon had set in motion a legislative machine, that once put
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in motion, would not stop until the situation was resolved. Lyon really became a non
player in determining his fate, for even Republicans who did not like him were acutely
conscious of the need to retain his vote in the House. Yet Lyon’s continued presence
in the House also demonstrated his resilient nature.119 He continually rose to meet
any challenge which faced him. He would need all of the resiliency he could get, for in
the next few months Matthew Lyon would again be the subject of controversy, and
again face expulsion from the U.S. House of Representatives.
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CHAPTER THREE
FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC POLICY DURING THE FEDERALIST ERA
Before proceeding immediately into the discussion of Matthew Lyon’s trial as
a result of his alleged violation of the Sedition Act of 1798, it is necessary to provide
some background concerning United States foreign policy, which was very uncertain.
There was no definite policy foundation upon which to build. In our own time
government officials and ordinary citizens regularly criticize the current administration
for not possessing a firm policy on a given subject. Although the foreign situation of
the new nation changed dramatically during the Federalist Era, it is still possible to
appreciate the basic direction of United States foreign relations at the time of the Lyon
affair and the Alien and Sedition Acts. This discussion of the status of U.S. foreign
policy will become relevant to Matthew Lyon’s expulsion proceedings and his trial
under the Sedition Act. Since Lyon was pro-French, foreign policy became a hot issue
in his political fate.
To simplify the discussion bear in mind the two major world powers, England
and France, during the late eighteenth century. The United States was not a strong
military power, although economically it was slowly becoming an important participant
on the world stage because of its domestic market for British goods and its large
merchant marine. France and England were in the middle of one of their seemingly
endless procession of wars. The United States was in the position of having to make
a fundamental foreign policy decision: either to ally itself with England, with France,
or neither. The most important person to attempt to answer this question was George
Washington, who issued a “Proclamation of Neutrality” in April of 1793.

Washington’s basic point was that the United States ought to treat England and
France equally. “The duty and interest of the United States require that they should
with sincerity and good faith adopt and pursue a conduct friendly and impartial toward
the belligerent powers.” 1 Washington warned citizens of the United States against
acting in such a manner that might disturb the neutrality of their country. What
Washington meant was that United States citizens ought to display no favoritism
towards England or France; both should be dealt with fairly and equally. How did U.S.
citizens know if they were acting in good faith towards both belligerents, and that they
were not in fact favoring one country at the expense of the other? Washington’s
neutrality proclamation made it clear that anyone found “aiding” or “abetting”
hostilities between England and France would be found in violation of the
proclamation. Also, if any citizen was found to be trading in contraband goods with
either of the countries, they too would would be guilty of violating his proclamation and
would not receive the protection of the U.S. government if either France or England
attempted to seize their property.
Discussion of Washington’s neutrality proclamation has led some scholars to
believe that it was a proclamation embracing absolute isolation. This assertion must
be presumed erroneous, since any sound reading of the document demonstrates that
Washington was not advocating total isolation, but a genuinely independent course of
U.S. foreign policy, free from European standards. As Samuel Flagg Bemis asserted,
“The proclamation of neutrality was a tangible expression of a sane American policy,
not of isolation but of diplomatic independence.”2 Although wary of the entangling
nature of foreign involvement, Washington realized that the United States could not,
and ought not, isolate itself from the rest of the world. In realizing this Washington
decided to make his own rules of foreign involvement, choosing not to act according to
European tradition.
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The second important statement concerning the proper role of the United
States in world politics is found in George Washington’s “Farewell Address” of
September of 1796, issued toward the end of his second term as president.3
Washington’s Farewell Address included a well-formulated, articulate explanation of
the political affairs of other nations, and the best course the United States should take
in accordance with those political realities. The Farewell Address was really a plea to
the nation to not allow itself to become either pro-French or pro-British. In 1796
Washington believed as he had in his 1793 neutrality proclamation that the U.S.
should not pick one country over the other, but should act amicably toward both.
Washington claimed that “a passionate attachment of one nation for another produces
a variety of evils,” and warned against the negative effects of foreign influence in the
affairs of the United States’ own republican government. If the citizens were not
careful, these outside influences could destroy their experiment.4 Above all,
Washington called for very limited political connection with foreign nations, but strong
commercial relations with as many countries as possible. Ironically, those economic
ties would draw the United States into the political affairs of Europe.
Washington’s Farewell Address expounded the belief that in terms of politics
the United States was fundamentally different, and that “Europe has a set of primary
interests to which we have only a remote relation.”5 Samuel Flag Bemis, an authority
on early U.S. foreign policy, said of Washington’s Farewell Address, “It was to
remove foreign interference in our domestic affairs, to preserve the nation and the
people from Europe’s distresses.”6 However, the Farewell Address did not
specifically abrogate the obligations of the United States under the French alliance. It
simply cautioned the French that the United States was an independent country, free
to make its own foreign policy decisions, and would not allow itself to become a pawn
of the French republic.

Washington’s Farewell Address is important to include in this study because
it also touched upon domestic concerns, especially the rise of the party system.
Washington believed that international relations and domestic concerns were
interrelated, with domestic issues the more important.7 Commenting upon the
potential hazards of faction, Washington contended that:
It serves always to distract the public councils and enfeeble the public
administration. It agitates the community with ill-founded jealousies
and false alarms; kindles the animosity of one part against another.
It opens the door to foreign influence and corruption, which find a
facilitated access to the government through the channels of party
passion. Thus the policy and the will of the country are subjected to
the policy and will of the other.8
Washington’s views on the problems associated with party passions were
demonstrated well during the debates on the expulsion of Matthew Lyon, as well as
during his sedition trial. Washington, however, said “This spirit, unfortunately, is
inseparable from our nature, having its root in the strongest passions of the human
mind. It exists under different shapes in all governments, more or less stifled,
controlled, or repressed; but in those of the popular form it is seen in its greatest
rankness and truly their worst enemy.”9 This intense spirit of faction certainly was a
great enemy of Matthew Lyon. The Farewell Address summed up Washington’s
foreign policy agenda, and since it bore his name, it was his policy, even though some
historians have questioned the authorship. In the words of Arthur Markowitz, “The
Address was probably a product of the combined powers of Washington, Hamilton,
and to a lesser extent, Madison, with the President serving as the editor-in-chief.” 10
George Washington provided the nation with a general course of foreign policy,
a foreign policy of what ought to be. But in reality the United States had not managed
to steer clear of entangling alliances and the political affairs of Europe. In terms of
relations between England and the United States anything that had to do with
maritime trade was bound to be an area of friction. The United States was becoming a
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significant and powerful maritime power, worrying the English to a certain degree.
Since losing her American colonies, England had never stopped her attempts at
remaining a major player in her former possessions’ political affairs.11 England
continued to insist upon maritime laws conforming to her needs.
International law at this time was not clearly established.12 Disagreements
over what constituted contraband, for example, continued to plague the United States,
England and France. The United States insisted on a short list of contraband goods,
whereas England and France insisted on a more exhaustive list. Search and seizure
practices too were in a state of flux. The sometimes forceful search and seizure of
American ships was perhaps the most serious issue between the United States and
its belligerent trading partners. U.S.-British relations became further defined with the
signing of Jay’s Treaty on November 19, 1794.13 Among other points Jay’s Treaty
included reciprocity and liberty of commerce between the two nations, British
hospitality in receiving U.S. vessels, a recognition of contraband as the only legitimate
seizable goods, and no acts of reprisals by either country. Jay’s Treaty was thought
to contain the idea that free ships make free goods, a definite plus for U.S. shippers.
Yet Jay’s Treaty increased the list of contraband goods as well as allowing paper
blockades, two aspects which would eventually frustrate the U.S.14 The United
States soon found that England was not willing to respect the neutral rights of its
sailors, causing tension between the two countries. However the Federalists
supported the Jay Treaty as well as continued good relations with England, because
they believed that England provided the nation’s best hope in support of its economic
development.
The relationship the United States had with France was not any better. Many
Frenchmen thought Jay’s Treaty was favorable to England at the expense of France,
thus worsening relations between the U.S. and France. During the Federalist Era

France had become ruled by the Directory, and the relationship between the United
States and the Directory was at times very tense.15 As with England, so too with
France; there were major problems over neutral rights.

The U.S. and France also

disagreed over the Franco-American Alliance of 1778. The French Revolution soured
relations between the French and the Americans, and one result was that two sides
emerged in the United States over the issue of whether or not the U.S. ought to
abrogate the Treaty of Alliance.

Alexander Hamilton and other influential Federalists

believed that the United States ought not, and need not respect the Treaty of 1778
because France had been fundamentally altered and now posed a danger to the
country. On the other side of the issue were Thomas Jefferson and Matthew Lyon,
who believed that the U.S. should not abrogate the treaty, because it was made
between the people of the two countries, not the governments.16 Vice-President
Jefferson, however, did believe that the United States could remove itself from the
treaty if France became dangerous to the safety of Americans. But Jefferson and Lyon
did not believe France posed a threat to the U.S. and believed that the U.S. was
obligated to uphold its treaty obligations. Referring to the debate over abrogation
Jefferson wrote:
The people who constitute a society or nation as the source of
all authority in that nation; as free to transact their common concerns by
agents they think proper; to change those agents individually or the
organization of them in form or function whenever they please; that all the acts
done by the agents under the authority of the nation, are obligatory on them
and ensure to their use, and in no wise be annulled or affected by any change
in the form of the government, or of the persons administering it.
Jefferson believed that if a nation changed the form of its government, as had been the
case with the American Revolution, it was not prevented from conducting its treaty
obligations, nor were its partners precluded from performing their duties.
Until 1798 the French supported the Republican party in the United States.
Thomas Jefferson and Matthew Lyon were both accused of extremely pro-French
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sympathies. Lyon did not embrace the union between France and the U.S. as
wholeheartedly as Jefferson did. but it was nonetheless very important to him. The
French Directory believed that the Federalist party was too pro-British to waste its
time on and accordingly opposed the presidencies of both George Washington and
John Adams. The Federalists possessed a valid fear that the French party in the
United States would effect a revolution within its borders similar to the one that had
taken place in France, and as a result destroy its republican institutions. Historian E.
Wilson Lyon feared that “the Directory proposed to win its point in America by
dividing the nation and seeking to separate the people from their government.” 18
France was quite upset over the main points of Jay’s Treaty. It did not like the
fact that the United States agreed to the British denial of the principle that free ships
make free goods, and the larger list of contraband goods.19 Yet French privateering
against U.S. ships was often more frequent and more outrageous than that of Britain.
In short, both countries violated the neutral rights of American vessels with impunity.
By 1796 French hostility took the form of seizure of American seamen and opposition
to the principle that free ships make free goods. The Quasi-War was well underway.
The XYZ Affair helped to inflame an already intense situation. After revelations that
the French Directory had asked for a bribe from U.S. envoys in France, the American
public was infuriated and began to view England as the proper ally for the United
States. The XYZ Affair provided the Federalists with a political weapon to wield
against the Republicans. One Federalist newspaper wrote after the affair became
public that Frenchmen threaten “your houses and farms with fire, plunder and pillage!
and your wives and sweethearts with ravishment and assassination.”211 Clearly
Matthew Lyon and Thomas Jefferson had some damage control to do, as well as to
justify their continued support of France.
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Yet many Americans during the Quasi-War sympathized with the French.
America had just gone through a revolution of its own, and many of the same political
ideologies were present in both countries. In addition, the French supplied valuable
assistance during the American Revolution, both in terms of military advice and the
blood of its soldiers. Some Americans believed that the United States owed the
French nation its support. However many other Americans eventually came to the
conclusion that the French Revolution, although having some similarities with the
American Revolution, went wrong somewhere along its path to freedom. One of the
reasons for this change of opinion was the awareness of the growing influence of the
Jacobin Societies in the United States.
Although the Jacobin Societies present in the United States enjoyed only a
small following from the citizenry, they did manage to attract the attention of some
politicians.21 For the most part Jacobin ideology attracted the lower echelons of
politicians, those at the most local level. American society generally condemned the
politicians who participated in the French party, as well as the political ideology it
upheld. The Jacobin ideology is difficult to explain, yet some historians have been able
to construct a basic framework. Marc Bouloiseau worded it most succinctly:
There was an element of mysticism in the Jacobin ideology, a
religious character that manifested itself in its tenets and practice. It
borrowed from Christianity its faith in the future and its striving for
moral regeneration. Its dogmatism stemmed not from a rigid system, but
from a handful of simple ideas that were commonly accepted and were
capable of inspiring mass action. A careful nurtured hatred of aristocracy
and despotism constituted the key argument and favourite theme of
Jacobinism.22
This attitude played into the hands of the Federalists and provided a weapon against
the Republicans in general, and Matthew Lyon in particular. James Madison’s modem
biographer concludes, “The game was to connect the Societies with the odium of the
insurrection, to connect the Republicans in Congress with those Societies.”23 After

learning with revulsion about the brutal September massacres in France and the
execution of Louis XVI, the Federalists resolved to link the Jacobin Societies and their
alleged penchant for violence with the Republicans in Congress. This linkage
succeeded only to a small extent. Although the American people were increasingly
worried over the French situation both at home and abroad, they also realized that the
same political conditions that caused the French Revolution had not surfaced in the
United States, and the power of the French party was exagerrated.24 Still, there was
a strong division between Federalists and Republicans over whether France or Great
Britain was the greater danger. This difference of opinion affected Lyon’s political
career, as the Federalists proposed the infamous Sedition Act of 1798 as a war
measure to be used in case of hostilities with France.
We will discuss the controversial passages of the Sedition Act and its specific
contents below, but first it is necessary to discuss the arguments used to place it atop
the political agenda. Some congressmen justified the need for a sedition act by the
threat of the French faction in the United States. They had been horrified at the
seditious violent nature of the French party and wanted to find a way to suppress their
activities. The Sedition Act was propelled along its political track largely due to
intense paranoia and the significant intolerance during the Federalist Era. Many
American people were afraid for the future of their country. John Allen, Federalist
congressman of Connecticut, demonstrated this fear well during the debate in the
House on the Sedition Act:
The hours of the most unsuspecting confidence, the intimacies of
friendship, or the recesses of domestic retirement, afford no security.
The companion you most trust, the friend in whom you most
confide, the domestic who waits in your chamber, are all tempted to
betray your imprudence or gaurdless follies, to misrepresent your
words, to convey them, distorted by calumny, and suspicion is the
only evidence that is heard.25
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Allen’s remarks were indicative of the fear and distrust in American society during the
late eighteenth century. With attitudes like this, many people viewed the Sedition Act
as essential.
The Federalists, who were responsible for pushing the Sedition Act through
Congress despite opposition from the Republicans, pointed to political affairs in
Europe as justification enough for the Sedition Act. Switzerland and Holland had just
experienced their own revolutions, and the Federalists based their opinions upon the
activities of numerous French aliens living there. They feared that the French
presence could create another revolution in the United States. The Federalists
believed that the United States was literally at war with the French, although no
formal declaration had been forthcoming. They utilized this war-like mentality in order
to defeat the French presence, with the Sedition Act serving as one of the most
formidable weapons. The Sedition Act was largely the result of Federalist desires to
prepare for war against France.26
Other Federalists maintained that the French had managed to infiltrate not
only New England, but the South as well. They believed the French were active in
winning the loyalties of the large black slave population in the South in order to create
an insurrection.27 Clearly the French, if at war with the United States, would have
benefited from a slave uprising; however there is no definitive proof to demonstrate
French meddling in slavery. On a more philosophic note, some Federalists believed
that the United States needed the Sedition Act because the French were instrumental
in lowering the moral code of Americans.

Their Anglo bias inspired some Federalists

to believe that the French and their supporters were somehow corrupting the morals
of the young nation.
Still, the main justification, and perhaps the most legitimate one, was the
seemingly certain conviction of many Federalists that the United States was about to
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go to war with France.28 After a substantial effort the Federalists lost their fight to
achieve a declaration of war against the French. They saw the Sedition Act as the
next best alternative in order to limit the effects of the French party in the United
States. The Federalists were divided, and the so-called high Federalists wanted war
with France because they thought that England would come to the aid of the United
States, thus alienating the Republicans even more.29 The Federalists did indeed look
to England as their savior, as well as a vital source of information. The information
they sought helped their cause for a sedition act. They realized that England had
enacted some laws of their own limiting the activities of the numerous French agents
in England. “Unless we follow their example,” declared Federalist Congressman
Robert Gooloe Harper, “ and crush the viper in our breast, we shall not, like them,
escape the scourge which awaits us.”30 To many Federalists the passage of the
Sedition Act was necessary for their own preservation.31
Although the Federalists did not come forward and announce it directly, one of
their justifications for the Sedition Act was their fear over the growing popularity of
the Republican party.32 They knew that the Republicans were making political inroads
throughout the country. At the end of the eighteenth century the South was almost
completely in the hands of the Republican party, and New England (although still
solidly Federalist) was concerned that the Federalists’ political grasp was beginning
to loosen. Northern Federalists believed that the proposed Sedition Act would
become a tool to use against their Republican enemies. They could label them as
disloyal, un-American, or untrustworthy Americans who failed to respect the
sovereignty of the nation. In many ways the Federalists were a nervous party,
resorting to repressive legislation in order to defeat their political rivals and remain
the dominant political party.
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The Federalists believed that without the Sedition Act not only would their
political careers potentially be in jeopardy, but that Federalist society too might very
well be ruined. They had worked too hard for too many years creating what, in their
estimation, was an ideal society. They viewed Republicans as people who would
enjoy nothing more than upsetting their established way of life, if not destroying it all
together. The Sedition Act was justifiable to them because it would help maintain
their current dominance. It is difficult to determine how valid the Federalist worries
actually were. Were they acting out of desperation, devoid of logic and reason, or
were they genuinely unaware that they had lost touch with the country and that their
days were numbered? Was the Sedition Act just a legislative remedy for their
political woes? More than likely the Federalist fears of rebellion and revolution at the
hands of the Republicans were without merit, but that does not mean that their fears
were not real. Republicans, although valuing the nation’s relationship with France,
valued their independence and liberties as much as their Federalist counterparts. But
Federalists were willing to salvage their future by persecuting their loyal opposition.
The roll-call analysis will demonstrate the level of support the Sedition Act of
1798 enjoyed among the Federalists, but a brief remark is necessary at this point to
explain where most of its support originated. The Sedition Act was initiated, and
mainly propelled through Congress, by the high Federalists, individuals like Robert
Goodloe Harper and Thomas Pinckney, both of South Carolina, as well as Roger
Griswold of Connecticut. The rest of the Federalist party, most of it moderate in
temperament, caved in to the high Federalists and supported their efforts. Yet the
atmosphere of nervousness and fright the Federalists exhibited would not be enough
to solve the nation’s problems. The Sedition Act, no matter how stringent and allencompassing, could not have been sufficient enough to quiet its various critics.

The Federalists had the Republican-controlled newspapers in mind when they
first proposed the Sedition Act. All of their preceding fears and complaints were due
in large part to the actions of the unbridled free, and sometimes irresponsible
Republican presses. The Federalists maintained that the Republican newspapers
were active in spreading dishonest and disloyal propaganda. Although the First
Amendment to the United States Constitution guaranteed that “Congress shall make
no law. . . abridging the freedom of speech,” Federalists maintained that their worries
over the libelous nature of the Republican presses warranted the Act.33 In an indirect
manner the Republican newspapers did, on more than one occasion, question the
loyalty of President Adams and his ability to govern. In fact, Benjamin Bache, the
editor of a rabid Republican newspaper, had just been charged with having libeled
President Adams and the Federalist-controlled government. Bache had accused
President Adams of altering the correspondence between Adams and Elbridge Gerry,
one of the U.S. representatives sent to make peace with France, to improve the
standing of the Adams administration. John Adams denied the accusations and
demanded that Bache be convicted for his libelous remarks. In truth, Bache and other
Republican editors did make questionable personal criticisms of President Adams and
his administration. In the same newspaper President Adams was called “the blind,
bald, toothless, querulous ADAMS,” and “the blasted tyrant of America.” In another
Republican newspaper President Adams was characterized as a “ruffian deserving of
the curses of mankind,” and “foremost in whatever is detestable.”34 Clearly the
Republican presses were actively participating in questionable journalism. The
partisan nature of many of the Republican-controlled newspapers helped to justify the
need for the Sedition Act in the minds of the Federalists.
During the Federalist Era most of the papers exhibiting this partisan nature
were produced in New England and the mid-Atlantic states, like New York,

Massachusetts, and Pennsylvania. Of course Matthew Lyon based his “Scourge of
Aristocracy” in New England, which served as another Federalist target of the
Sedition Act. The Federalists did not consider the publication of the newspapers in
question to be the work of independent editors seeking to make a literary splash.
Instead they believed strongly that they were the product of the Republican party bent
on destroying their existence.35 Referring to the Gazette of the United States.
Representative John Allen, a Connecticut Federalist, said, “This is the work of a
party; this paper is devoted to party; it is assiduously disseminated through the
country by a party; to that party all the credit is due; to that party it owes its
existence.” Since the newspapers were considered traitorous and the Republican
party was believed to be behind them, those members of the Republican party were to
be considered as disloyal as well.36 Whether or not the above statements from
Republican newspapers should have been considered as seditious libel was the
fundamental question during the congressional debate over the proposed Sedition Act
of 1798. Those who believed the statements by newspapers like the Gazette of the
United States and the Columbia Centinel were seditious would likely be in favor of
the Act. Those who did not think the newspapers engaged in seditious journalism
would likely vote against the Sedition Act.
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CHAPTER FOUR
THE PASSAGE OF THE SEDITION ACT OF 1798
The Sedition Act was not the only example of the distrust many people had of
the French, the pro-French sympathizers, and aliens in general. The Sedition Act was
one of four repressive laws enacted with the support of the Federalists in the Summer
of 1798, which were known collectively as the Alien and Sedition Acts. The first of
these, the Naturalization Act, was passed on June 18, 1798. It required an alien in the
United States to reside in the United States for fourteen years to become eligible for
U.S. citizenship. Previously, an alien needed to wait only five years. The
Naturalization Act also required that five of the fourteen years must be spent in the
state or territory in which an applicant planned to live, that the alien declare intent to
apply for U.S. citizenship five years in advance, and that all aliens register with the
clerk of a district court.1 The requirements of the Naturalization Act were designed to
slow the immigration of aliens and slow the growth of the Republican party. (The Law
was repealed in 1802 through the efforts of the Republicans).
The second act, known as the Alien Friends Act, was passed on June 25, 1798.
This law gave the president the power to deport any alien or group of aliens whom he
deemed “dangerous to the peace and safety of the United States.”2 The Alien
Friends Act. despite its hospitable title, placed almost all control in the hands of the
executive. The Alien Enemies Act, the third repressive measure of 1798, was passed
on July 6th. The Alien Enemies Act was the only one of the laws that received
Republican support, due in part to its defensive nature, and the fact that it was not
specifically aimed at any one country. It gave the president the power to restrain,
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arrest, and deport male citizens or subjects of hostile nations.3 The Alien Enemies
Act was viewed by the Republicans as a defensive measure.
The Sedition Act, officially known as. the “Act in Addition to the Act for the
Punishment of Certain Crimes,” or SR. 31, was passed by the House on July 14, 1798.
This act was the first sedition act in U.S. history. It consisted of two sections. The
first section met with little resistance. According to the law, anyone who unlawfully
combined or conspired to oppose the government of the United States, or who
interfered in the duty of a government officer, or took part in a riot or insurrection,
would be guilty of a high misdemeanor and faced up to a $5,000 fine and/or five years
in prison. The second section declared illegal any writing or printing of “false,
scandalous and malicious writing” with the intent to bring the government, Congress,
or the president “into contempt or disrepute, or to excite against them . . . the hatred
of the good people of the United States.”4 Anyone found guilty of violating the second
section was subject to a fine of up to $2,000 and/or a prison sentence of up to two
years. The Sedition Act, specifically the second section, enabled the Federalists to
trap their political opponents by making it illegal for them to criticize the government
and the majority party. Matthew Lyon would be one of the primary targets of the
Sedition Act.
Despite the Sedition Act’s repressive measures, it was actually a scaled-down
version of the original Senate proposal. If the second section of the Sedition Act
seems repressive to twentieth century readers, note that the original draft included
the death penalty for anyone convicted of aiding the French. As finally enacted, the
Sedition Act provided that the prosecution bore the responsibility of proving that
defendant(s) acted with malice and intent. This provision was in stark contrast to the
common law which did not require the prosecution to prove malice or intent. The
Federalists pointed this out to their opponents, characterizing it as a more responsible

and just law. one that included some semblance of due process. The Sedition Act
required the prosecution to prove the defendant(s) intended “to bring them
[government officials] into contempt or disrepute, or to excite against them the hatred
of the American people.”5 Matthew Lyon would soon be charged with intending to
bring President Adams into disrepute, and a sedition trial was undertaken to ascertain
whether or not he in fact had intended to do so. The Sedition Act also allowed the
truth of the statements as a defense, which was previously not allowed under the
common law. If anyone was charged under the Sedition Act with libeling a
government official, and could prove what he had said was true, the statements could
then be used as a defense. In addition, the Sedition Act allowed the president to
judge what constituted libel. Since the Act was designed to halt criticisms of the
president, the Act allowed the president to bring charges. Usually a court decided
what was considered libel, and whether or not charges and trial were warranted.
Ironically, the Sedition Act was signed on Matthew Lyon’s birthday. He would soon
find out that many of the safeguards within the Sedition Act, such as truth as a
defense, did not ensure him a fair trial.
The Alien and Sedition laws were not created in a vacuum. There were in fact
numerous English precedents which the Federalists supporters utilized to justify and
create their own repressive measures. For example, England began listing aliens
arriving in the country in 1793.6 This was intended to establish the number of aliens in
the country and to provide a way of monitoring them. This English practice was not
much different from the American Naturalization Act, which required the alien to
register with the clerk of court. In 1794 Britain passed a statute which, among other
things, allowed the British government to imprison anyone suspected of treasonous
activities. This statute was very similar to the first section of the Sedition Act, which
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made it illegal to oppose the government. In fact, the Alien Friends Act was merely
copied from previous British legislation.
The Alien and Sedition laws were federal laws aimed specifically at those who
threatened the nation’s safety; yet the common law of the various states already
contained regulations on seditious activity. Why did the national government feel the
need to enact federal legislation on the subject of sedition? It resulted from the war
psychosis that had gripped the nation; the national government was not exempt from
this hysteria. Those advocating the Sedition Act wanted one uniform national law for
prosecution of seditious activity. The supporters of the federal Sedition Act also
believed that the common law of the various states needed to be strengthened on the
subject of sedition. In the federal government’s estimation the laws of the states did
not go far enough to ensure the safety of the national government.
Despite the fact that most citizens believed the proposed Sedition Act
unconstitutional, they too were gripped with the same war hysteria that had gripped
the nation’s legislators. American citizens realized that the seditious nature of the
nation’s newspapers, mostly pro-French in ideology, were blown out of proportion.
However, they did fear the presence of many French sympathizers in their midst. The
national government, taking a cue from its citizens,

proceeded to debate the Sedition

Act of 1798. This study will only follow the debates as they occurred in the House.
The Senate had already passed the Sedition Act, and by the summer of 1798 it was in
the House, waiting to be accepted or rejected. The tone of the debates within the
House chamber were again very partisan. Both parties supported distinct theories on
either the acceptance or the rejection of the bill. This partisan atmosphere created a
very disorderly process of debate, with each side attempting to present its opinion at
the expense of the other.7 Since section I of the Sedition Act was not seriously
challenged in the House, the numerous instances of partisan bickering, which some
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congressmen and historians have called childish bickering, occurred during debate on
Section II of the Act. Often times congressmen resorted to personal insults. Lyon
biographer James F. McLaughlin had this to say concerning the behavior of the
Federalists: “When the alien and sedition bills were under discussion in the House,
the Federalists adopted their usual haughty tactics, and with insolent demeanor
answered the constitutional arguments of the Democrats against the measures by
coughs, laughter and personalities.”8
When debate commenced the first part of July, the Federalists wasted no time
in attacking the Republican presses. John Allen, a Federalist from Connecticut, said:
Let gentlemen look at certain newspapers printed in this city and
elsewhere, and ask themselves whether an unwarrantable and
dangerous combination does not exist to overturn and ruin the
Government by publishing the most shameful falsehoods against
the representatives of the people of all denominations, that they are
hostile to free Government and genuine liberty, and of course to the
welfare of this country; that they ought, therefore, to be displaced, and
that the people ought to raise an insurrection against the Government.9
Allen’s statement was in direct response to a passage he had read in the Aurora.
which he considered seditious. The passage, discussing the talks between the United
States and France, stated, “It is a curious fact, America is making war with France for
not treating, at the very moment the Minister of Foreign Affairs fixes upon the very
day for opening a negotiation with Mr. Gerry. What you think of this, Americans!” 10
Allen believed the Aurora to be guilty of sedition because, in his estimation, the
Aurora claimed the United States was unwilling to negotiate with France, and that
France was the only country which desired peace. He contended that the Aurora
expounded the belief that the Adams administration wanted nothing but war with
France, and that in turn reflected poorly upon the president and his administration.
According to Allen, this situation would breed distrust and resentment among the
American people, and perhaps lead to revolution. In order to prevent this from
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happening he believed the best course was to silence the Aurora,and other
newspapers like it.
John Allen was probably the most articulate Federalist in his advocacy of the
Sedition Act. Allen’s speeches embraced all of the Federalist arguments favoring the
Act.11 First, Allen discussed the dangerous political climate. Mindful of the foreign
espionage within the borders of the United States Allen said, “The country will swarm
with informers, spies, delators, and all that odious reptile tribe that breed in the
sunshine of despotic power.” 12 Allen illustrated the war hysteria that had gripped his
party and much of the nation. He attempted to link this hysteria with the need for the
Sedition Act, which potentially could put the minds of many Americans at ease. If the
Congress failed to pass the Sedition Act, Allen believed that the nation would be
overrun with spies and foreign intrigue.
Allen contended that the proper measures had in fact not been taken in order to
halt foreign intrigue, and that Congress needed to pass more stringent measures
controlling the people of the United States. “If there is, then, any necessity for the
system now proposed, it is more necessary to be enforced against our own citizens
than against strangers; and I have no doubt, that either in this, or some other shape,
this will be attempted.” 13 Wary of Congress’ constitutional limits, Allen moderated
his latest remark by saying that if Congress did overstep its constitutional bounds, the
people of the United States would not stand for it, and would return to their
revolutionary principles and rebel against their repressive government. But Allen
knew that the people of the young nation had no desire to return to the days of war
and bloodshed. Since the Sedition Act would be applied mostly to aliens and disloyal
Americans, its passage would negate the need for even more universal, repressive
measures sometime in the future. Allen played upon the fear and uncertainty of the
times to prove the Sedition Act’s necessity.

John Allen and his colleagues were fearful that the nation might again plunge
into revolution. Referring to the perceived rise in revolutionary tendencies, the Aurora
on June 22, 1798, stated, “The period is now at hand when it will be a question difficult
to determine, whether there is more safety and liberty to be enjoyed at Constantinople
or Philadelphia."14 He pointed to two passage as proof that there were individuals
and combinations who wished to effect a revolution. “Who can doubt the existence of
a combination against the real liberty, the real safety of the United States?” asked
Allen. “I say, sir, a combination, a conspiracy against the Constitution, the
Government, the peace and safety of this country, is formed, and is in full
operation.” 15
John Allen’s speech in the House posed the question whether the press had
the liberty to mock the president and knowingly print falsehoods about the
government. The Aurora certainly resorted to extreme journalistic practices when it
questioned the allegiance of President Adams, but did such writings increase the
likelihood of revolution? Allen and many other Federalists believed so. During the
debates on the Sedition Act Allen pointed out more examples of what he considered
disloyal, seditious journalism. Again the Aurora was Allen’s main target. On June
22, 1798, the Aurora stated, in reference to the Alien and Sedition laws: “Where a
law shall shall have been passed in violation of the Constitution, making it criminal to
expose the crimes, the official vices or abuses, or the attempts of men in power to
usurp a despotic authority, is there any alternative between an abandonment of the
Constitution and resistance?” 16 Allen attempted to draw a parallel between the
Aurora passage and the dissolution of the tenuous bonds of union between the
government and the people. Allen believed that the Jacobin sympathizers who
controlled the presses held immense power and would not find it difficult to effect a

revolution. With the Sedition Act the Federalists believed that they could gain the
upper hand and, in the process, preserve the union.
John Allen's remarks in June of 1798 on seditious activity were not his first.
He had also spoken on the subject in April of the same year. When Allen advocated
the necessity of the Alien and Sedition laws, he did not stop short of singling out his
Republican colleagues. Although he did not mention anyone by name, Allen’s remarks
were aimed at the Republicans, especially Matthew Lyon, as potential
revolutionaries. In reference to the French Revolution Allen stated, “I believe there
are men in this country, in this House, whose hatred and abhorrence of our
Government leads them to prefer another, profligate and ferocious as it is.” 17 The
Republicans were definitely on the defensive, as the Federalists were actively
questioning the allegiance of the opposition.
Other Federalists, while supporting Allen, emphasized other reasons why the
Sedition Act was necessary. They too believed that the United States government
had a perfect right to protect itself from the evils of society, especially the Jacobin
press. Robert Goodloe Harper, Federalist of South Carolina, declared that “it must be
allowed that every independent Government has a right to preserve and defend itself
against injuries and outrages which endangers its existence; for, unless it has this
power, it is unworthy the name of a free Government, and must either fall or be
subordinate to some other protection.” 18 This statement brings out the important
points the Federalists used to justify their proposals. First, the national government
had a perfect right to defend itself. Second, the national government could not, and
would not, depend upon the states to protect the nation from its evils. The national
government was attempting to assert its rights not only over its citizens but also over
the individual states as well. Again, the issue of federalism emerged. Who had the
right to prosecute sedition? The federal government? The states?
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The Federalists claimed that the Sedition Act was merely an attempt to make
the perpetrator of untruth answerable to the injured party.19 The Federalists asked
why speech, like many other daily activities, should not be questioned as to its
validity. They pointed out that merchants and other businessmen experienced
pressure to prove that the assertions they made about their products were true. Why
should people’s remarks about their government be any different? Should not the
citizenry be held just as accountable for their statements as merchants are for their
wares? The Federalists maintained that if people were speaking truthfully they had
nothing to fear. But. if they had been active in spreading falsehoods, then the Sedition
Act would be the ideal tool for prosecution. The Federalists understood that a man’s
reputation could be destroyed by false accusations. By design, the Sedition Act would
identify the falsehood, identify the perpetrator, and provide an avenue of punishment.
Federalists maintained that they simply wanted people to bear responsibility for their
remarks.
The Federalists believed that the punishment of seditious speech or writing did
not constitute an abridgement of the freedom of speech clause of the First
Amendment. They supported their position with precedents in both English law and
the common law of the various states. They pointed to the sedition laws that England
had adopted, as well as to an existing Virginia statute, to prove that sedition was not
protected under the First Amendment. In both England and in the United States, the
rights of the people to speak seditiously were never intended to be protected.
Harrison Gray Otis, a Federalist from Massachusetts, used the sedition statute of
Virginia to point out that if the U.S. government was guilty of abridging the freedom of
the press, so too was Virginia. Otis referred to a 1792 Virginia law which made it
illegal for anyone through writing or speaking to advocate the overthrow of the
existing state government, punishable by life imprisonment.

Federalists pointed out

that if the various states could pass laws on sedition without infringing freedom of
speech, so too could the national government.20 The national government, just like
the states, desired to hold people accountable for their remarks. In debate, Otis
asked, “How is society aided by the gross and monstrous outrages upon truth and
honor, and public character and private peace which inundate the country? Can there
be any necessity of allowing anonymous and irresponsible accusers to drag before the
tribunal of public opinion, magistrates, and men in office, upon false and groundless
charges?”21
In order to prove the necessity of the Sedition Act, Federalists needed to
demonstrate that the political climates in the United States and Europe had changed
for the worse. The United States had survived up to that point without a sedition law.
Again the Federalists pointed to France as their answer to the necessity of the
Sedition Act. Federalist Robert Goodloe Harper best expressed the threat the United
States faced from France, believing that an inevitable war with France necessitated
the Sedition Act: “Heretofore we had been at peace, and were now on the point of
being driven into a war with a nation which openly boasts of its party among us, and
its diplomatic skill, as the most effectual means of paralyzing our efforts, and bring us
to its own terms.”22 Harper went on to explain his remarks more fully. In terms of
“diplomatic skill,” Harper maintained that all Jacobin presses were instruments of the
French government, twisting its way into the American psyche. Harper believed that
the power of the press was in many ways more powerful than the power of the
military, because one could at least see an army advancing, whereas the political
ideologies spread by the newspapers were inanimate, and could not be seen or
touched. They were subversive and hidden in nature, and could only be brought out
into the open via the Sedition Act.
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Some Federalists argued that if the national government did not possess the
power to punish seditious libel, then it did not merit its title as a true government.23
The Constitution gave Congress the power “To make all Laws which shall be
necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing powers, and all other
Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any
Department or Officer thereof.”24 The Federalists claimed that the Sedition Act was
a “necessary and proper” device for the preservation and protection of the national
government, while Republicans maintained a different opinion of the necessary and
proper clause. It is interesting to note that the newspapers during the debate on the
Sedition Act increasingly became almost silent, more moderate in tone, wishing not to
antagonize the Federalists any further. “We do not wish to divide our property with
idlers, nor daily to tremble at the guillotine.”25 The Republican presses, wary of the
Sedition Act’s passage, remained tight-lipped throughout the debates.
Republicans in Congress, however, did not remain quiet during the debate over
the Sedition Act, and overwhelmingly opposed it. Just as the Federalists had a wide
range of justifications in support of the Act, so too did the Republicans have numerous
reasons for opposing it. Touching on all of the main Republican opposition points,
Gallatin spoke the most energetically on the role of the party.26 Gallatin believed that
the Sedition Act was meant to be a tool for the Federalists to destroy the
Republicans. Republicans believed that the Sedition Act was intended to equate the
party in power with the government and the Constitution, thus making the minority
party the enemy of the government. In short, Gallatin and his colleagues believed that
the Sedition Act was not proposed due to some urgent need, but resulted from the
intense partisan nature of the Federalist party. As Gallatin stated:
This bill and its supporters suppose, in fact, that whoever dislikes the
measures of the Administration and of the temporary majority in
Congress, shall, either by speaking or writing, express his

disapprobation and his want of confidence in the men now in
power, is seditious, is an enemy, not of Administration, but of the
Constitution and is liable to punishment. That principle is subversive
of the principles of the Constitution itself. If you put the press under
any restraint in respect to the measures of members of Government; if
you thus deprive the people of the means of obtaining information of
their conduct, you in fact render the right of electing nugatory; and this
bill must be considered only as a weapon used by a party now in power
in order to perpetuate their authority and preserve their present places.27
The Republicans believed the Federalists were trying to suffocate their
freedom of expression not only in the newspapers, but in the House as well. Since
debate often occurred on highly divisive issues, some legislators would inevitably
oppose administration. Those unfortunate congressmen, invariably Republicans, were
deemed enemies of the administration. Republicans made remarks in opposition to
the administration before the proposed Sedition Act went into effect, and the majority
party had little recourse. With the passage of the Sedition Act the Republicans would
have to be more careful about what they said about the administration, not only in
their newspapers, but during debate on the House floor. In the future the Federalists
would be looking for any example of seditious speech from the Republicans during
debate.
The Republicans also took a constitutional approach in their opposition to the
Sedition Act.

Gallatin again referred to the necessary and proper clause of the

Constitution, denying its general phrases were intended to be utilized recklessly. “In
order to claim any authority under this clause,” Gallatin stated, “the supporters of
this bill must show the specific power given to Congress or to the President, by some
other part of the Constitution, which would be carried into effect by a law against
libels. They must go further, they must show which of those Constitutional powers it
was which could not be carried into effect, unless this law was passed.”28 The
Republicans insisted upon the Federalists’ providing the nation with an explanation of
the specific constitutional powers they relied upon to initiate such legislation. They
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believed that the Federalists were not taking the Constitution’s system of checks and
balances seriously. To the Republicans the use of the necessary and proper clause, in
order to pass a law which would abridge the freedom of speech, was unconstitutional.
Numerous Republicans opposed the Sedition Act because freedom of speech
and of the press was considered sacred. According to the wording of the First
Amendment, no one, no matter what size majority, is allowed to limit freedom of
speech. The Republicans were truly speaking out of a genuine fear of any repressive
measures that might follow the Sedition Act. They believed that the Sedition Act
might possibly be only the First of a string of repressive measures limiting freedom of
the press and speech. Republican Nathaniel Macon expressed the fear that the
Sedition Act was “beginning to act upon forbidden ground, and no one can say to what
extent it may hereafter be carried.”29 Republicans believed that the Sedition Act
signaled a period of repression in America, a period which would result in “a total
annihilation of the press.”30 Other Republicans were less alarmed. John Nicholas
contended that the press should be left alone, not only because the Congress was
forbidden to legislate on the subject, but also because if the newspapers were active
in spreading falsehoods, the public would soon realize it and would cease to read the
publications. Nicholas believed that the only people the falsehoods of the press hurt
were those who ran the newspapers themselves. Nicholas took a more casual
approach in his argument, playing down the effects of the alleged falsehoods printed in
the nation’s newspapers when he said, “Falsehoods issued from a press, are not
calculated to do any lasting mischief. Falsehoods will always depreciate the press
from whence they proceed.”31
Nicholas questioned the abilities of his colleagues to determine what was and
was not sedition. Nicholas believed that seditious speech and writing was an everchanging form of expression, and nearly impossible to label. If the Federalists did try
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to label seditious speech. Nicholas believed that it might some day come back to
haunt them. That situation would result if the Republicans became the majority party,
with the Federalists in the minority. Federalists would then be in the position of
opposing the Republican majority, opening themselves up to criticism of the legality of
their speech. The Federalists would then be the target of their own legislation, to
Nicholas was opposed to the Sedition Act not only on constitutional grounds, but also
from fear that the nation's information sources would be controlled by despotic hands.
As Nicholas stated, “What was deemed licentiousness today by one set of men,
might, by another set, tomorrow, be enlarged, and thus the propriety of the information
to be given to the public would be arbitrarily controlled.”32
The Republicans countered the Federalists by attacking what they felt were
the true motivations behind the legislation. Republicans believed that Federalists
were not trying to stop malicious lies about the administration and the majority party,
but were attempting to stop those people whom they considered libelous. In other
words, the Federalists desired to be the sole judge and jury as to what might properly
be considered sedition. Albert Gallatin stated this position well when he stated, in
reference to John Allen’s support of the Act, “His idea was to punish men for stating
facts which he happened to disbelieve, or for enacting and avowing opinions, not
criminal, but perhaps erroneous.”33 Gallatin and the other Republicans would not
allow themselves to conduct their affairs according to Federalist opinions of what
ought to be considered sedition. The Republicans did not deny the fact that some
newspapers printed materials that were not totally factual; yet to consider them
criminal was an entirely different matter. Republicans knew that once the Sedition Act
passed they would be at the mercy of the Federalists and their broad notion of
sedition. Unfortunately for the Republicans, as the minority party, nearly everything
they said or supported could ultimately be labeled as seditious by the Federalists.
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Albert Gallatin and the Republicans also opposed the Sedition Act because
they honestly believed that the political climate did not necessitate its adoption.34
They repeatedly asked the Federalist supporters to identify events that necessitated
the proposed legislation. Federalists responded to the question by expressing their
opposition to the principles of the French Revolution, which they believed could worn
their way into the United States and topple the government. The Republicans in this
instance used a scare tactic of their own by perpetuating the fear that Federalists
were using the war as an excuse to strengthen their grip upon the nation, while in the
process eliminating the freedoms included within the Bill of Rights. According to
Republicans, the Federalists would eventually enjoy total domination of a quasi-police
state in which the people feared the possibility of being thrown into jail without due
process of law and convicted for a crime they had not realized they had committed.
The Republicans utilized this scenario to build public support in opposition to the Act;
yet the debate lasted only a short while. The Sedition Act bill moved through the
House at a rapid pace.
Republicans did not accept the Federalist argument that the sedition laws of
the states were not strong enough, and that the nation as a whole needed one uniform
sedition law. Republicans believed that the states were the most appropriate level of
government to punish sedition. They resented the national government’s effort to
encroach upon powers reserved to the states. Edward Livingston summed up the
Republican position best when he stated, “There is remedy for offenses of this kind in
the laws of every state in the Union. Every man’s character is protected by law, and
every man who shall publish a libel on any part of the Government, is liable to
punishment.”35 Livingston believed that the proposed national Sedition Act was First
of all unnecessary, because each state had already passed sedition laws of its own.
Second, Livingston noted that just because they were state laws did not mean that
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the state would not offer the victim of seditious libel a legal remedy. Livingston
expressed the Republican belief that anyone who libeled the United States
government and its officers would not go unpunished. In short, Livingston and the
Republicans tried to assert that the states were just as interested as the national
government was in maintaining the stability of the national government.
Ironically, Matthew Lyon had very little to say during the House debates on
the proposed Sedition Act, but managed to vote in opposition on all of the roll-call
votes relating to the Act. Lyon did write a letter to the Spooner’s Vermont Journal in
which he expressed his dissatisfaction with the Federalist legislation. Lyon wrote:
A Sedition Bill is talked of in Congress. Its advocates say it is calculated
to suppress the villainous falsehoods which men of base principles are
circulating against the constituted authorities. However, it might tend
to check the fulminations of such wretches as attack me. I do not
propose to vote for it, as it will tend to prevent due investigation; nor
shall I fear after it is passed, to expose the truth in my usual way to
my constituents.36
This letter was published after the Sedition Act had passed the House, and Lyon
ironically believed that it might be helpful to him if it passed, since it could be used
against his most insulting enemies. Lyon also demonstrated his lack of confidence in
the Act’s mechanics, believing that it would diminish the right of due process of those
accused. Also, Lyon expressed his usual attitude in his letter, stating that he
intended to proceed in his defiant manner, not allowing a new law to stand in the way
of representing his constituents. In effect Lyon was thumbing his nose at his
Federalist enemies. This letter is very important because Lyon would soon become
the main target of the Federalists in bringing someone to trial for violation of the
Sedition Act. Lyon himself thus prophesized that due to his controversial nature he
would be convicted of violating the Sedition Act simply for actively representing his
constituents. Also, Lyon’s belief that the Sedition Act would eliminate the due
process of law for the accused became frighteningly true during his trial.
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Due process was definitely a major concern for the Republicans. They believed
the proposed Sedition Act would not provide the accused with a fair trial.37 They
feared most of all a biased jury, since most of the potential jurors involved in the
sedition trials would be chosen by marshals who were appointed by Federalists.
They also feared the judges, who were mainly Federalists, and their potential inability
to remain impartial. They feared that the judges’ party animosities would follow them
into the courtroom. Of course the judges of the Federalist Era claimed to be
nonpartisan; yet many of them were in fact involved in party politics.
One positive result of the Sedition Act for the Republicans was that it resulted
in a more cohesive, unified party. The Republicans, alarmed at the repressive
legislation of the Federalists, rallied their troops in opposition. Although the Sedition
Act passed both Houses, and not all Republicans could agree on what constituted free
speech, they became a more stable, more aggressive party. Thomas Jefferson and the
rest of the Republican party took the high road during most of the debate on the
Sedition Act. They portrayed themselves as the defenders of liberty.38 Many
scholars have characterized the political climate in which the Alien and Sedition laws
were passed as a period of witchcraft hysteria; yet the Republicans emerged as the
more moderate, sensible party, the party that would lead America into the nineteenth
century.
The Republicans still had to debate the often irrational, paranoid Federalists.
During the proceedings on the expulsion of Matthew Lyon from Congress, for
example, the Federalists proved a formidable foe. Just as Abigail Adams had spoken
in support of the Federalist desire to rid Congress of Lyon, so too did she speak out in
favor of the Sedition Act. Speaking on the need to halt the libelous and seditious
activities of the Republicans, Abigail Adams wrote her sister:
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It was formerly considered as leveled against the Government, but now
it is contrary to their declared sentiments daily manifested, so that it
insults the Majesty of the Sovereign People. But nothing will have an
Effect until congress pass a Sedition Bill, which I presume they will do
before they rise- Not a paper from Bache press issues nor from Adams
Chronical, but what might have been prosecuted as libels upon the
President and Congress. For a long time they seem as if they were not
desperate- The wrath of the public ought to fall upon their devoted heads.39
Abigail Adams believed that the Jacobin presses were diminishing the important work
being done by her husband and his administration. She believed that the Sedition Act
would prevent her husband’s enemies from destroying his accomplishments.
The debate in Congress over the passage of the Sedition Act provided a good
idea of the Federalist and Republican positions. More detailed investigation of the
party leaders is necessary, however, to gauge the support they received from their
party. The most important person to investigate is John Adams. Adams believed that
libelous and seditious speech had gone too far, and the need for a sedition law had
never been greater. In a letter to one of the nation’s newspapers. Adams wrote, “I
trust with you, that the spirit of disunion is much diminished; more however by an
event which no man could have foreseen, than by our own wisdom-but unless the
spirit of libeling and sedition shall be controlled by an execution of the laws, that spirit
will again increase.”40 In another letter John Adams wrote, “I ought not forget the
worst enemy we have-That obloquy, which you have deserved, is the worst enemy to
virtue, and the best friend to vice; it strives to destroy all distinction between right and
wrong, it leads to divisions, sedition, civil war, and military despotism.”41 Also, John
Adams provided the readers of the Gazette of the U.S. this dire warning;
Republics are always divided in opinion concerning forms of
government, and plans and details of administration—these divisions
are generally harmless, often salutary, and seldom very hurtful, except
when foreign nations interfere and by their acts and agents excite and
ferment them into parties and faction: Such interference and influence
must be resisted and exterminated or it will end in America, as it did
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anciently in Greece, and in our own time in Europe, in our total
destruction as a republican government and independent power.42
Although President Adams did not call for the Sedition Act, nor encourage its
course through Congress, he did, by his inaction, support the legislation. Judging by
the preceding statements, it becomes apparent that he believed that the situation of
libel and sedition had gotten out of hand. He himself had been the target of much of
the questionable journalism.

Adams also believed that the proper way of dealing with

problems of libel was through national legislation. Adams never officially
corresponded with the House during the debate on the Sedition Act in order to rally
his troops. Adams was unsure as to the legality of the Act. and he did not desire to be
associated with an unconstitutional piece of repressive legislation.
John Adams, like many other Federalists, exaggerated the consequences of not
passing the Sedition Act. Adams claimed that if Congress did not pass the law the
spirit of libel and sedition might eventually lead to a civil war. John Adams’ concerns
for preserving the infant union from destruction were noble; however the reality of his
fears were unwarranted. It is true that many of the nation’s Republican-controlled
newspapers were active in spreading misinformation about the Adams administration,
and many of the same newspaper perhaps even wished that Adams be replaced by
someone more sympathetic to their ideas. Despite this reality, the Federalists did not
have to fear a Republican overthrow of the government and civil war. The response of
Adams and the Federalist party was exaggerated, alarmist, and demonstrative of
their weakened political position throughout the country.
The fears of Adams and the Federalists concerning a foreign threat were also
out of proportion to reality. It was true that the French party was active within the
United States, and for the most part conducted a successful battle in opposition to the
agenda of the Adams administration. Yet the Jacobin Societies, perhaps not

consisting of an entirely loyal opposition, should not have been viewed as such a
considerable threat to the stability of the government. Again, Federalist fears over
their waning political power fueled an agenda of exclusion, rejecting all those who did
not support the Federalist agenda, especially Republicans. The Sedition Act was
designed to allow the Federalists a few more years atop the political pyramid, by
labeling their opposition as libelous, treacherous, and un-American.
John Adams was not the only well-known Federalist to support the Sedition
Act; George Washington and Alexander Hamilton accepted its passage as well. Like
Adams, Washington’s support of the Sedition Act may best be described as passive
acceptance. Like Adams, Washington wrote very little on the controversial subject,
neither supporting nor rejecting the legislation outright. Despite Washington’s
relative silence, it is apparent that he did not oppose its passage.43 Because
Washington did not actively work to defeat the measure and acquiesced in its
passage, he may properly be labeled as a supporter of the Act.
Alexander Hamilton actually supported a strengthened Sedition Act.44
Hamilton believed that the nation was in dire need of protection from the Republican
newspapers who so freely disseminated falsehoods about the administration. He
believed that the nation needed a Sedition Act in order to curb the devious activities of
foreigners in the United States. Hamilton was the most supportive non-member of
Congress of the Sedition Act. He believed that the United States ought to look to
England for its legal precedents. The English laws at the time were much more
restrictive in nature than the proposed Sedition Act, and Hamilton thought that
English precedents ought to be incorporated into the Act. Of course Hamilton did not
achieve his desire to make the Sedition Act more repressive yet he won by the fact
that the Act, although more lenient than he had hoped, passed in 1798,
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Besides Adams, Washington, and Hamilton, one other influential politician’s
position on the Sedition Act needs to be investigated further, that of Thomas Jefferson.
Jefferson’s opposition to the Sedition Act took two forms. The first rested entirely
upon the question of constitutionality.

Jefferson believed that the Act violated the

First Amendment right of freedom of speech. In a letter to James Madison, Jefferson
discussed the constitutionality of the Act:
They [Federalists] have brought into the lower house a sedition bill, which
among other enormities, undertakes to make printing certain matters
criminal, tho’ one of the amendments to the Constitution has so expressly
taken religion, printing presses & c. out of their coercion. Indeed this
bill and the alien bill both are so palpably in the teeth of the Constitution
as to show they mean to pay no respect to it.45
The passage indicates clearly that Jefferson believed that freedom of the press was a
question expressly placed outside congressional jurisdiction. Jefferson accused the
Federalists of not respecting the Constitution, believing them to be taking
considerable liberty with its sacred provisions. Later it will become apparent that
Jefferson did not always believe in a literal construction of the Constitution; once in
power the Republicans took their own liberties where the Constitution was concerned,
amid calls of unconstitutionality by the Federalists.
Thomas Jefferson’s second prong of attack on the Sedition Act took the form of
a states’ rights argument. Jefferson believed that the states were the proper organs
of government for punishing libel and sedition. In a letter to John Taylor, Jefferson
wrote:
For the present, I should be for resolving the Alien and Sedition laws
to be against the Constitution and namely void for addressing the
other States to obtain similar declarations, and I would do anything
at this moment which should commit us further but reserve
ourselves to shape our future measures or no measures by the
events which may happen. It is a singular phenomenon that, while
our State governments are the very best in the world without
exception or comparison, our General Government has, in the
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rapid course of nine or ten years, become more arbitrary and has
swallowed more of the public liberty than ever that of England.46
This letter sums up Jefferson's opinion about which level of government was best
capable of punishing seditious activities. In his estimation the states were the most
capable of instituting the necessary measures, based of course upon each state’s
unique situation. Jefferson believed that the states were in the best position to
protect the civil rights of its citizens, and that the national government was actively
engaged in a process whereby the basic rights of its citizens were arbitrarily being
taken away.
The various positions of Adams, Jefferson, Hamilton, Madison, and
Washington are necessary to understand because they were the leaders of their
respective parties. Perhaps they were not active in the day-to-day activities on the
House floor, but their influence was felt nonetheless. Perhaps each of these four
influential politicians did less than they could have in either supporting or opposing the
Sedition Act; yet it is important to realize that without their basic support or
opposition, the Sedition Act would not have been such a controversial piece of
legislation.
The first relevant roll-call vote on the Sedition Act occurred on July 5, 1798.
Roll-call number one was submitted by Edward Livingston, a Republican of New York.
It called for rejection of the Sedition Act Bill, or S.R. 31. Representative Livingston
and his fellow Republican supporters moved to reject S.R. 31 because of the varied
objections already expressed on the House floor. The motion failed, with 36 votes in
favor of rejecting S.R. 31, and 47 votes opposed. As a result of this vote. Federalists
managed with their numerical advantage to keep S.R. 31 on the table.48
Roll-call number two was submitted by William C.C. Claiborne, a Republican
from Tennessee. The motion was made on July 9, 1798, calling for the general right of
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juries hearing cases brought about by the Sedition Act to be advised by the courts as
to what properly constituted libel. The motion read as follows: “That the jury should
have a right to determine the law and the fact, under the direction of the Court, as in
other cases.”49 This motion was submitted by a Republican because the Sedition Act
placed the decision as to what would properly be considered libel largely in the hands
of the president. Believing that this power was too great for the Executive, Claiborne
moved that the judges presiding over sedition trials should educate the jury on the
proper understanding of libel, not the president. The motion was approved, 67 to 15.50
After the motion passed, the Executive no longer was permitted to be the sole judge
of defining libel, leaving the task instead in the hands of the judiciary. Federalists
were willing to moderate the bill at this point, and Republicans won an important vote,
ensuring a fair and impartial trial without meddling by the Executive.
The third relevant roll-call concerning the Sedition Act occurred on July 9, 1798.
This was a motion submitted by Samuel Smith, a Republican of Maryland, which called
for striking out the words in S.R. 31, “by any writing, printing, speaking, shall threaten
such office or person in public trust, with any damage to his character, person, or
estate, or shall.”51 This motion would effectively eliminate one section of the Sedition
Act, with the result that most of the teeth of the Act would be taken out, because it
would remove the actions of writing, printing, and speaking in a libelous manner about
anyone in the public trust, whether it be the president or Congress. Since it is rather
difficult to libel a governmental official other than through words or print, the motion
would effectively allow people to question public officials through those mediums. The
Federalists were opposed to this resolution because it would defeat their efforts at
prosecuting libel. The Republicans supported it because, if eliminated from the bill,
they could proceed with their criticisms of the government without having to worry
about being prosecuted for libel. If the motion passed the Federalists would probably
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have to forfeit their attempts at passing the Act. The motion was defeated by a vote
of 39 votes in favor of striking out this key section of S.R. 31, and 40 opposed.52 The
Republicans lost their effort to limit the scope of the Sedition Act. As a result the
Federalists became more confident that they could pass the Sedition Act without anv
further amendments.
Roll-call four, a motion calling for the Final vote on the Sedition Act, was made
on July 10, 1798. At that point the Federalists and Republicans had to make an
important decision, of whether or not to pass the Sedition Act in its current form.
After the votes were taken the act of 1798 was narrowly passed by a vote of 44 to
41.53 The Sedition Act of 1798 had become law.
Just like the votes on the political fate of Matthew Lyon, so too did the roll-call
votes on the Sedition Act follow strict party lines, minus roll-call vote number two in
which a number of Federalists crossed party lines. Despite the amendments
proposed by the Republicans, the Federalists managed to muster enough votes to
defeat attempts to water down the Act.54 In the end the Republicans held Firm to
their convictions that the Sedition Act was not constitutional and was unfairly aimed
at the Republicans. The Federalists, due largely to their numerical advantage, and
belief that the nation had gotten out of hand due to the libelous and seditious speech of
many of its citizens, managed to squeak one by the House. The high Federalists had
succeeded in convincing the American people as well as the other Federalists in
Congress that anyone other than Federalists ought to be feared. Referring to this
Federalist mentality, historian Arthur A. Markowitz wrote that the Federalists were
attempting to identify “the administration with the government, and the government
with the Constitution, [and] the Federalists concluded that criticism of their
administration was an attempt to subvert the Constitution and to overthrow the
government.”55 Because the Federalists were successful, the American people

began to support the efforts at strengthening the stability of the national government,
even through a possibly unconstitutional piece of legislation.
The reasons underlying the passage of the Sedition Act of 1798 are varied.
Five main reasons need to be identified and explained at this juncture. Like the votes
on the expulsion of Matthew Lyon, the Federalist numbers helped keep the legislation
alive. Had the Republicans controlled more seats in the House perhaps they would
have been able to kill the Sedition Act. Also, the Republicans were lucky during the
expulsion proceedings because the Federalists needed to garner a two-thirds majority
to expel Lyon. The Federalists were not encumbered by this constitutional
requirement on the votes concerning the Sedition Act. The Federalists only needed to
muster the usual simple majority in order to pass the Act, a far simpler task than
gaining a two-thirds majority voting block to expel Lyon.
The second reason for the passage of the Sedition Act concerns the lack of
agreement among Republicans as to what constituted free speech.

Republicans were

not entirely speaking from the same page. They had varying beliefs as to what
constituted free speech, and how far the the national government might proceed before
it unconstitutionally restricted freedom of expression. This problem of agreeing on
what was considered libel, and what was merely a freedom to speak one’s mind,
continues to this day. Still, even if all of the Republicans of the Fifth Congress had
been able to agree on this question, the Federalists would still have outnumbered
them. Yet if they had constituted a cohesive, unified front, perhaps they would have
been able to win the public over to their side, and perhaps even have succeeded in
eliminating the most highly objectionable potions of the Act. All of this is simply
conjecture, an effort at playing “what if?”
The third reason why the Sedition Act of 1798 was eventually passed was
because much of the nation was in the throes of war hysteria. Many American

citizens saw the French party lurking around every corner, plotting the overthrow of
the American government. The Federalists emerged as the party with a weapon, an
entirely necessary weapon, which could be used to stop the progress of the
treacherous people in their midst. The Republican party, opposed to the Sedition Act,
was viewed as sympathetic to the cause of disunion and revolution. The Federalists
were able to win enough popular support among the citizens of the United States to
pass the Sedition Act.
The fourth reason why the Sedition Act was passed included the widespread
belief that the national government had a perfect right and responsibility to pass the
legislation. For most Federalists the power to pass the Sedition Act was a logical
extension of the growing powers of the national government. Since the adoption of the
U.S. Constitution after the Articles of Confederation failed to create a strong national
government, the powers of the national government had slowly been increasing at the
expense of the states. Those congressmen who voted in favor of the Sedition Act did
so because they believed that the national government ought to reign supreme over
the state governments. The passageof the national Sedition Act was a result of the
growing supremacy of the national government.
The final significant reason involves the role of England as a precedent-setter.
Because the United States had emerged from the British empire it had retained many
English social, cultural, and intellectual ideas. For example, the United States’ legal
system was borrowed almost completely from England, along with many of its
underlying principles. Because England served as a model for so much that had
become known as American, the Sedition Act was a piece of legislation that had
largely been copied from English law. Those who supported the Sedition Act looked
to those English laws as legal precedents for their own legislation in the United
States. England had suffered many challenges throughout its history and had
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managed to survive, due in part to its legislative precautions. The United States, in
order to survive, followed the lead of England and passed legislation of its own.
The Republicans had been defeated by a Federalist majority with the passage
of the Sedition Act. Although they disagreed over the true meaning of free speech and
the question of what speech should be protected, they did agree that the passage of
the Sedition Act was unconstitutional. They questioned the right of government
officials to label the speech of American citizens as libelous and seditious.
Constitutional scholar Lamar T. Beman summed up the opposition arguments: “To
give any set of officials-legislative, executive, or judicial—the power of censoring,
controlling, or suppressing the opinions of the people would be to place the servants
above the masters, defeat the first principles of the government, and restore a regime
of special privilege.”56 Its passage left a bad taste in Republican mouths, a taste that
would not go away unless the repressive legislation was either challenged in the
United States Supreme Court, or repealed by an act of Congress.
Despite repeated accusations of unconstitutionality the Sedition Act was never
brought before the Supreme Court, mainly because no appeals had been able to
progress that far.57 This fact however did not dampen the spirits of those who sought
its repeal. The attempt at its repeal will be covered in chapter six, but it is relevant to
provide an example of the calls for repeal. John Dawson, a Virginia Republican and an
opponent of the Sedition Act, wrote to his constituents about the unconstitutional
nature of the Act and a possible repeal effort:
Many laws have been passed, a list of which I enclose to you. and send a
copy of those which are printed to your court for the use of the country—Some
of these are highly important, and claim your particular attention: especially
the law entitled ‘an act in addition to the act for the punishment of
certain crimes against the United States’. This law, in my
judgment, is an open violation of that amendment, now a part of the
Constitution, which declares, That ‘Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
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exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press, or
the right of the people to peaceably to assemble, and to petition the
government for a redress of grievances;’ And this, I trust, will be the
opinion of the Courts. Should it not, it behooves you and every citizen to
endeavour, in the mode prescribed by the Constitution, to obtain its
repeal, as it will have a tendency to curtail one of the first and dearest
privileges which we enjoy; that of freely expressing our sentiments on
all public men and measures.58
The repeal effort in the U.S. House failed during the third session of the Fifth
Congress. The specific details of its failure will be discussed in chapter six. The
Sedition Act eventually expired after the conclusion of the Sixth Congress.
Before moving to chapter five and the sedition trial of Matthew Lyon, a couple
points must be clarified. First of all, the Sedition Act did not make a clear distinction
between a person’s stating his own personal opinions and someone’s blatantly
engaging in malicious libel. The fact that many of the newspapers of the day came
perilously close to malicious libel must be recognized. However most people,
including Matthew Lyon, were only expressing their opinions. Those who were
prosecuted for violating the Sedition Act were prosecuted merely for expressing their
personal opinions, opinions that did not support the national government. Also, the
legal foundation upon which the Sedition Act was passed was fragile. The Sedition
Act, along with the other acts which composed the Alien and Sedition laws, was an
exercise by Congress of its implied powers.59 The power to restrict speech and the
press is expressly prohibited by the Constitution; yet the Federalists relied upon
implied powers, because in their estimation the nation was in considerable jeopardy.
The supporters of the Sedition Act stretched the principles of the Constitution to
embrace their political agenda.
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CHAPTER 5

TRIED, CONVICTED, AND SENTENCED
Chapter five deals with the effects of the passage of the Sedition Act of 1798,
specifically as it affected Matthew Lyon, who will serve as a case study. Although
Lyon is the primary focus of this study, he was not the only citizen to be charged with
violating the Act. In total, 17 people were tried, with 14 being found guilty and
sentenced.1 The idea that the Sedition Act might someday be applied to one of the
members of Congress was anathema to most congressmen, and Matthew Lyon was
the only member charged with violating the Act.
Matthew Lyon became a target for the Federalists because he appeared to be
so pro-French that his loyalty to the United States became questionable. To the
Federalists Lyon was a complete Jacobin, lacking any semblance of allegiance to
President Adams or his country. The indictment of Lyon included three charges. The
first count charged Lyon with writing and publishing a seditious letter in Spooner’s
Vermont Journal. The second count charged Lyon with publishing a letter written by
Joel Barlow, a known Jacobin and foe of the Adams administration. The final count
charged Lyon with “assisting, aiding, and abetting of the publication of Barlow’s
letter.”2 The first count involved a letter written by Lyon discussing Adams’
supposed “continual grasp of power.” The letter read as follows:
As to the Executive, when I shall see the efforts of that power bent on
the promotion of the comfort, the happiness, and accommodation of the
people, that Executive shall have my zealous uniform support. But when
I see every consideration of the public welfare swallowed up in a
continual grasp for power, in an unbounded thirst for ridiculous pomp,
foolish adulation, or selfish avarice; when I shall behold men of real merit
daily turned out of office for no other cause but independence of sentiment;
when I shall see men of firmness, merit, years, abilities and experience,
113
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discarded on their application for office, for fear they possess that
independence; and men of meanness preferred for the ease with which
they take up and advocate opinions, the consequence of which they know
but little of; when I shall see the sacred name of religion employed as a
state engine to make mankind hate and persecute one another, I shall not
be their humble advocate.3
This letter touched on many different subjects. First, Lyon pledged his support to the
administration of John Adams, as long as it conducted its business for the sole benefit
of the American people. Lyon, believing that the Federalists were elitist, demanded
that they promote the interests of the whole of American society. Lyon also
discussed his belief that the Adams administration was involved in a power struggle
with the Republican party, and that the Federalists would stop at nothing to retain as
much power for themselves as possible. Lyon also attacked the ceremonial and
traditional nature of the Adams presidency. He opposed the practice of continuing the
many outmoded English traditions America had adopted, such as delivering a reply to
the president’s speech to congress. In Lyon's estimation America needed to start
anew, discarding the monarchal traditions of Europe. Lyon indirectly discussed the
state of affairs between the Federalists and Republicans by accusing the Adams
administration of purposely excluding qualified Republicans from participation in the
national government. This last assertion was a bit ironic, because once the
Republicans gained the presidency with the election of Thomas Jefferson, the
Federalists were largely excluded from participation in the national government by the
Republicans.
Count one of Lyon’s indictment was the least controversial of the three
charges. The Federalists believed that the letter was seditious because it accused
President Adams of grasping for power, as if he were a political despot consolidating
all of the nation’s political powers into his own hands. Yet the first count was a hotly
contested issue. Did Lyon’s letter contain elements of sedition as punishable by the
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Sedition Act? It did discuss President Adams and his administration, but did Lyon
intentionally bring Adams and his government into disrepute? The answer to this
question and others like it would not be answered until Lyon was brought to trial, with
a jury providing the response.
The second and third counts, the most controversial of the indictment, included
a letter written by Joel Barlow, a Connecticut revolutionary. Barlow, among other
things, asserted that President Adams was insane and ought to be admitted into a
madhouse.4 Lyon was accused of publishing Barlow’s letter, which contained a
passage pertaining to Adams’ mental state, and then using the letter himself on the
campaign trail for the election of 1798. These activities constituted counts two and
three of the indictment. Barlow's letter declared:
This misunderstanding between the two Governments has become
extremely alarming, confidence is completely destroyed, mistrusts,
jealousy, and a disposition to a wrong attribution of motives, are so
apparent as to require the utmost caution in every word and action
that are to come before your Executive—I mean if your object is to
avoid hostilities. Had this truth been understood with you before
the recall of Monroe, before the coming and second coming of
Pinckney; had it guided the pens that the bullying Speech of your
President, and stupid answer of your Senate, at the opening of
Congress in November last, I should probably have had no occasion
to address you this letter. But when we found him borrowing the
language of Edmund Burke, and telling the world that, although he
should succeed in treating with the French, there was no dependence
to be placed on any of their engagements; that their religion and
morality were not an end; that they had turned pirates and plunderers;
and it would be necessary to be perpetually armed against them, though
they are at peace; we wondered that the answer of both Houses had
not been an order to send him to a mad house. Instead of this, the
Senate have echoed the speech with more servility than ever George III
experienced [in the] elite Houses of Parliament.5
Barlow’s letter, like the letter written by Lyon, questioned Adams’s policy towards
France. Barlow believed that Adams was not sincerely interested in peace with
France, but desired hostility instead. Barlow blamed the mistrust and tensions
between the two countries on Adams’s failure to negotiate with France, and his
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continued support of England. Barlow also accused President Adams of not
respecting the Treaty of Alliance, and of believing that the French were nothing but
thieves, about to collapse into ruin. Barlow accused President Adams of advocating
that the United States ought to remain permanently armed against France. Because
of this, Barlow believed that Adams ought to be committed to a madhouse. In the end,
Barlow hyperbolically likened the administration of John Adams and the Federalist
dominated Congress to the English Parliament and the reign of George III.
Again the question is posed, did the letter of Joel Barlow, like the letter written
by Lyon, warrant prosecution under the Sedition Act? The reason Barlow was not
indicted was because he had left the country and established residence in France. The
reason Lyon was involved in Barlow’s letter was because he had it published, and had
read it on numerous occasions on various campaign stops. Apparently Lyon embraced
the contents of Barlow's letter, or else he would not have read it during his campaign.
Without a doubt Barlow’s letter did question the foreign policy of the Adams
administration, especially as it pertained to its relations with France. Barlow directly,
and Lyon indirectly, questioned President Adams’ decisions to recall minister James
Monroe from negotiating with France, and replacing him with Charles Cotesworth
Pinckney. Certainly American citizens and members of Congress ought to have a right
to question the foreign policy of the current administration. Nothing in Barlow’s letter,
and subsequently repeated by Lyon, should have been considered seditious under the
Sedition Act of 1798. The only questionable portion of Barlow’s letter was his
statement that President Adams ought to be sent to a madhouse. The Sedition Act
did state that if anyone shall “defame the President of the United States . . by
declarations tending to criminate their motives in any official transaction, the persons
so offending, being convicted, shall be punished by a fine not exceeding $2,000, and
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imprisonment not exceeding two years.” Perhaps this statement constituted sedition
in the minds of the Federalists; yet the indictment of Lyon was a complete farce.
In defense of Lyon it is apparent that he was only conducting loyal (if extreme)
opposition to the Adams administration. Lyon had, after all, pledged his support to
President Adams on more than one occasion. Lyon was in no way advocating a
general opposition to the Adams administration. He was simply questioning the
foreign policy of his country, and offering an alternative in its place. Lyon was
definitely not happy with the status quo and wished to shake things up a bit at the
expense of the current administration. Lyon’s own words explain it best when he
said, “Everyone who is not in favor of this mad war is branded with the epithet of
Opposers of Government, Disorganizers, Jacobins,

It is quite a new kind of

jargon to call a Representative of the People an opposer of Government, because he
does not, as a Legislator, advocate and acquiesce in every proposition that comes
from the Executive.”6 Despite Lyon’s attempts to defend his opinion of U.S. foreign
policy, many people believed that his letter, and the letter he adopted from Joel
Barlow, constituted a violation of the second section of the Sedition Act of 1798. The
trial that followed Lyon’s indictment would determine whether or not Lyon’s
publication of the letters amounted to sedition.
Lyon’s trial took place in Rutland, Vermont. Unfortunately for Lyon the town of
Rutland was a Federalist stronghold, opposed to the various policies of the
Republicans.7 Before the actual trial began Lyon had pled not guilty to the three
charges contained in the indictment. Lyon was able to post bond, but was forced to
sell portions of his property to garner the required $1,000.8 After posting his bond
Lyon's first task was to seek legal counsel. For reasons that are not entirely known,
Lyon found it difficult to find a lawyer willing to defend him. Lyon was simply too
controversial, and excepting his home district, had suffered from very low public
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approval throughout the rest of Vermont. A lawyer deciding to take the case ran the
risk of being associated with the likes of Lyon. Perhaps no lawyers were willing to
take the risk of negative publicity. The issue may also have been too explosive for the
lawyers to handle. Perhaps the idea of defending a United States Representative
against charges of sedition did not appeal to lawyers in New England. After a futile
effort at finding a lawyer, Lyon decided to defend himself.9
Because of the Federalist nature of the community of Rutland, it is not
surprising that Lyon expressed deep concern over the possibility of receiving a fair
trial. Since John Adams was president he had the opportunity to appoint many judges,
and naturally chose those men whom he believed shared his political ideology. Adams
appointed Federalists to all of the open districts during his presidency. The judge who
presided over Lyon’s trial was Federalist Samuel Chase, Associate Justice of the
United States Supreme Court. Judge Chase was the primary judge in most of the
cases arising under the Sedition Act.10 The conduct of Chase during the sedition trials
has frequently come under attack by many historians and legal scholars who have
cited him for acting in an unprofessional manner and demonstrating a bias in favor of
the Federalist position; at various sedition trials Chase has been accused of allowing
“court-packing” and providing misleading instructions to the jury.11 Lyon would come
face to face with these questionable legal procedures during his trial in Judge Chase’s
courtroom. It was such behavior that eventually led to Chase’s impeachment during
the Jefferson administration, though he was not convicted.
The jurors who served at the trial of Lyon, and of other individuals charged with
violating the Sedition Act, were chosen by federal marshals. The marshals too were
appointed by John Adams, who again attempted to fill the positions with as many
Federalists as possible. The result was a highly partisan courtroom. Lyon would not
only have to face a Federalist judge, but a jury too, composed primarily of Federalists.
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Although the practice of court-packing was highly questionable, it was not illegal.
During the Federalist Era no national law existed which provided the proper
guidelines for selecting an impartial jury.12 The defendant was literally at the mercy of
the judge and jury, hoping that they possessed the ability to act in an impartial
manner. But Lyon did not have faith in the ability of his jurors to remain impartial. In
fact, Lyon claimed that many of the jurors were his political adversaries. Under the
direction of Judge Chase, however, Lyon was not allowed to challenge any of the
jurors during the selection process. The practice of challenging potential jurors was
intended to ensure a fair trial.13 The result of Judge Chase’s order prohibiting
challenges was a jury composed mainly of Federalists entirely unsympathetic to
Lyon’s plight. Referring to Lyon’s “packed court,” Lyon biographer Aleine Austin
noted, “Twelve of the fourteen selected had opposed Lyon in the last election.” 14 The
question whether or not Lyon could achieve a fair trial was quite clear. According to
the Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, “In all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the
State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed; . . . and to have the
assistance of counsel for his defense.” 15 Whether or not due process was achieved in
the sedition trial of Matthew Lyon depended upon these questions: Was Lyon’s jury
composed of impartial members? Did Lyon’s inability to retain legal counsel result in
an unfair trial? The full answers to these question remain to be seen.
Another, perhaps more important, question confronting the jury in Lyon’s trial
was whether Lyon intentionally defamed the president and his administration and
stirred up sedition.16 The jury would base its decisions on this question upon the
issues and evidence brought out during the trial. The most important issue during the
trial revolved around the date Lyon published hrs letter in Spooner’s Vermont Journal.
The letter was published in the July 31st issue, seventeen days after the Sedition Act
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became law. Lyon claimed that the letter was dated June 20th, 1798, and postmarked
July 7th, one week before the Sedition Act was passed. Lyon tried to claim that he
was being unfairly prosecuted for a letter he had written twenty days before the
Sedition Act became law. The District Attorney prosecuting Lyon needed to prove
that, first of all, Lyon had published the letter, and second, that he had done so after
the 14th of July.17 The question for the jury to decide was whether the fact that Lyon
had written the letter before the Sedition Act was passed was more important than
the fact that the letter was published after the Act became law.
Lyon attempted to defend himself on a number of pertinent issues. According
to Aleine Austin:
The defendant stated his defense to consist of three points: first, that
the Court had no jurisdiction to the offense, the act of Congress being
unconstitutional and void, if not so generally, at least as to writings
composed before its passage; second, that the publication was
innocent; and third, that the contents were true. The defendant
addressed the jury at great length, insisting on the unconstitutionality
of the law, and the insufficiency of the evidence to show anything
more than legitimate opposition.18
Lyon’s claim that the Sedition Act was unconstitutional provided him with little
defense. Its passage was a controversial piece of legislation; yet it had not been
challenged in a court of law. Unfortunately for Lyon no case had yet been accepted for
review by the Supreme Court, the least powerful branch of government. In fact no
laws passed by Congress had yet been declared unconstitutional by the courts, and
there was considerable doubt whether the courts had the power to do so. Thus he did
not have any legal precedents upon which to bolster his claim of unconstitutionality.19
It was simply Lyon’s personal opinion that the Sedition Act was unconstitutional.
The only bright spot within Lyon’s claim of unconstitutionality was when his letter in
Spooner’s Vermont Journal had been written. According to Lyon he had written the
letter before the Sedition Act had become law. The Sedition Act, in effect, made
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people retroactively accountable for their actions, a highly questionable practice
throughout American legislative history. Still, despite the fact that the letter had been
composed before the passage of the Sedition Act, the publication occurred after the
Act became law, a direct violation of the second section.
Lyon also believed that the Sedition Act was unconstitutional because the
prosecution of seditious libel was best handled by the individual states, not the
national government.20 Lyon was following the official position of the Republican
party on the issue of federalism. Lyon claimed that the court did not have any
jurisdiction in the case because the national government had no right to legislate on
the subject of sedition in the first place. Had it been a state charge, Lyon perhaps
would not have challenged the court’s jurisdiction. Lyon also towed the Republican
line with his claims of unconstitutionality, by asserting that the Act infringed upon the
First Amendment rights of American citizens. Lyon believed that he had a perfect
right to state his opinions of President Adams and his administration. He did not
believe that the national government had a right to punish speech consisting of opinion
and speculation.21
Although Lyon based his defense on a number of issues, including the
unconstitutionality of the Sedition Act, in his instructions Judge Chase told the jury
that the real question they had to decide did not involve the constitutionality of the
Act. Judge Chase’s instructions to the jury included this statement: “You have
nothing whatever to do with the constitutionality or unconstitutionality of the Sedition
law . . . . The only question you are to determine,” instructed Chase, is whether “Mr.
Lyon published] the writings given in the indictment? Did he do so seditiously? On
the first point the evidence is undisputed, and in fact, he himself concedes the fact of
publication as to a large portion of libelous matter.”22 Chase’s remarks to the jury
were highly questionable. He acted in an improper manner by not sticking to the legal
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questions involved in the case. Instead he strayed into his own personal opinions.
Judge Chase actually answered the questions he posed to the jury before it
deliberated by stating that the letter published by Lyon did contain libelous passages.
Judge Chase prejudiced the jury by inserting his own opinions of Lyon’s publication, a
decision that should have been made by the jurors alone.
Judge Chase did improve at the end of his instructions to the jury when he
expanded upon the question of whether or not Lyon had published and read the letter
of Joel Barlow in a seditious manner, instructing the jury: “As to the second point you
will have to consider whether language such as that here complained of could have
been uttered with any other intent than that of making odious and contemptible the
President and the government, and bringing them both into disrepute.”22 The jury
was faced with the decision of whether Lyon intend to bring President Adams and the
government into disrepute? If it decided that Lyon had indeed intended to bring
contempt upon the president and government, he would be found guilty of violating the
Sedition Act. If the jury did not find that Lyon had intended to bring the president and
the government into disrepute, he would be found not guilty. In the end the jury was
convinced that Lyon intended to bring contempt upon Adams and the national
government.24 Accepting the jury’s findings, Judge Chase delivered its decision to
Lyon and the rest of the courtroom, then pronounced sentence “that you stand
imprisoned four months, pay the costs of prosecution, and a fine of one thousand
dollars, and stand committed until this sentence be complied with.”25
Because of the vigor with which Lyon had been tried, convicted, and sentenced,
he did not believe that he had deserved the jail sentence. Lyon questioned the validity
of the court’s decision, asserting that members of Congress ought to be immune from
being charged with certain crimes while undertaking their official duties.26 Despite his
objections, Lyon was jailed in the town of Vergennes, placed in a crude jail usually
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reserved for horse thieves and escaped slaves.27 Lyon’s cell was very sparse and
unsophisticated, with the toilet emitting a choking stench. During his four months in
prison Lyon instructed his family to raffle off portions of his property in order to pay the
$1,000 fine imposed by the court.28 Despite his many successful business ventures,
however, he found it difficult to raise the amount required of him. In the end Lyon
relied upon his fellow Republican supporters to help pay the large fine.29 Aware of the
harsh decision handed down by Judge Chase and Lyon’s meager surroundings, many
of his most loyal supporters signed a petition calling for his release and a remittance of
the imposed fine, sending it to President Adams.30 Because Adams refused to pardon
Lyon and remit his fine, the Green Mountain Boys threatened to tear down the jail, but
after pleas from Lyon to respect his sentence the Green Mountain Boys desisted.
The Federalists enjoyed immensely the fact that one of their most ardent foes
had been placed behind bars in violation of a law which they had sponsored. It
provided them with great satisfaction to see Lyon, a Jacobin, and a publisher of
outright lies, imprisoned for four months. According to the noted historian of the
Federalist Era, John C. Miller, “Lyon’s conviction was seen as the destroyer of an
unbridled, seditious press, and a victory of the law.”31 Yet Lyon’s conviction must be
seen for what it was, an exercise in political revenge on a Republican by the
Federalists. Lyon’s publications were not seditious in nature, even by the standards
of the Federalist Era. In reality Lyon was punished by the Federalists for acting as a
roadblock, inhibiting the legislative agenda of the Federalists. Lyon’s conviction had
little to do with the rule of law, and a lot to do with revenge.32
Lyon spent most of his time in prison writing articles about his situation and
receiving considerable attention and sympathy throughout much of New England. In
some ways Lyon was a martyred figure, persecuted for a belief in freedom of speech.
“Contrary to Federalist opinion, Lyon’s most formidable weapon was not a pair of fire
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tongs but his pen,” commented John C. Miller.33 Lyon became such a hero to the
Republican party that he was actually re-elected to his House seat in 1798 by a
significant margin of 4576 to 2444 votes, the only candidate to be elected while in jail.
After serving his time Lyon again became a free man in America, and planned to take
his seat.34 Only one obstacle stood in Lyon’s way, state charges of violating a
Vermont state sedition statute. Lyon made the claim of congressional immunity and
utilized the sixth section of Article I of the United States Constitution, which states
that members of Congress “Shall in all cases, except treason, felony and breach of the
peace, be privileged from arrest during their attendance at the session of their
respective Houses, and in going to and returning from the same.”35 Lyon decided to
get out of Vermont as quickly as possible and return to the nation’s capital,
Philadelphia. Lyon biographer Tom Campbell notes that since Lyon “had been re
elected to Congress while in jail and Congress was then in session, the moment he
entered his sleigh and started en route to Congress, he was, by the express mandate
of the Constitution, privileged from arrest, since the indictment pending against him
did not charge him with treason, felony, or breach of the peace.”36 Once in the
nation's capital Lyon was free to go about his legislative business without fear of
further arrest.
As Lyon conducted his official business no doubt he had occasion to reflect
upon his trial. No doubt he believed that he had not received fair treatment.37 One of
the most difficult aspects of the trial revolved around his utilization of the truth of his
statements as part of his defense. Ideally the American judicial system is supposed
to consider the defendant to be innocent until proven guilty. Lyon enjoyed no such
luxury, for he had been forced to prove his innocence to those who were convinced of
his guilt.38 Under the Sedition Act the defendant had to prove his statements were
true. In legal terms this practice is called “presumptive guilt.”39 Presumptive guilt
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stands in direct opposition to the Fifth Amendment, which states that no person
“Shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.”40 One
other aspect that no doubt bothered Lyon and the scholars who have since studied the
sedition trials, was the fact that most defendants were allowed to call on only one
witness, and in the case of Lyon, he was his one and only witness.41 Such practices
called into question the issues of due process and the right to a fair trial.
The concerns Lyon may have had relating to his trial were dwarfed by the
worries he encountered when he was again targeted by the Federalists for expulsion
upon the grounds that he was not a fit member of Congress. This was due to his
violation of the Sedition Act and subsequent conviction. James Bayard, a Federalist
from the state of Delaware, believed Lyon to be unfit, effectively disqualifying him from
serving in Congress. Bayard drafted a resolution and introduced it onto the House
floor on February 20, 1799, demanding his expulsion. The resolution read as follows:
Resolved, That Matthew Lyon, a member of this House, having
been convicted of being a notorious and seditious person, and of a
depraved mind, and wicked and diabolical disposition; and of
wickedly deceitfully, and maliciously, contriving to defame the
Government of the United States, and to bring the said Government
and the President, the hatred of the good people of the United Sates—
wickedly, knowingly, and maliciously, written and published certain
scandalous and seditious writings or libels, be therefore expelled
from this House.42
The resolution sponsored by Bayard continued the political rollercoaster ride Lyon had
been experiencing since his first altercation with Roger Griswold. Bayard’s resolution
was very strongly worded and left little room for compromise. Bayard and many other
Federalists wanted to rid themselves of Lyon’s presence once and for all, and this
time they were not faced with having to expel one of their own members to get rid of
him.
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Debate took place on the House floor over Bayard’s resolution. The main
question the Congressmen faced was the same question the jury had considered
before convicting Lyon of violating the Sedition Act: Did Lyon intentionally attempt to
defame President Adams in a scandalous, malicious manner, with the goal of stirring
up sedition?4^ For the Federalists the most outspoken member on this question was
the resolution’s sponsor, James Bayard. Bayard believed that Lyon was an unfit
member of Congress, because he actively participated in disseminating gross
falsehoods, which in turn bred hostility among the American people. Bayard believed
that Lyon posed a threat to the stability of the national government because he was
thought to be a leader of a disloyal faction that desired to reign supreme in the United
States. Referring to his own resolution, Bayard said, “However upright the
Government, or however correct the first magistrate may be, the hatred of the people
may be excited against them by means of false information; and when a foreign foe, or
domestic traitors join the standard of rebellion, the best Constitution and Government
may be subverted.”44 Bayard believed Lyon to be a threat to the stability of the
United States House of Representatives, but to the nation as well.
Other Federalists attacked Lyon on the grounds that, as an elected official, and
one who had served during the passage of the Sedition Act, there was no excuse for
his not knowing what the laws of the United States allowed and disallowed. The
Federalists maintained that Lyon should have known better than anyone that his
actions and publications might possibly be interpreted as seditious.45 The Federalists
believed that Lyon was fully aware of the consequences of his actions, yet chose to
challenge the law, diminishing the esteem of the House and the President. In short,
Lyon threatened the existence of the national government. Because of Lyon’s
knowledge of the possible consequences of his actions, the Federalists believed that
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he ought to be held fully accountable. The honor and the esteem of the House
depended upon Lyon’s being punished for his actions.
The Federalists also demanded Lyon’s expulsion in the belief that anyone who
knowingly and recklessly breaks the laws of the nation, ought not be in the business
of making them.46 Lyon’s opponents believed that they had no right to expect citizens
to abide by the laws enacted by Congress if Congress did not expect its own members
to abide by them as well. The Congress would be setting a double standard if it
allowed Lyon to remain. It did not wish the country to think that the Congress had
one set of rules which applied to it, and another set of rules which applied to the rest
of the nation. Like the debates earlier in this study, the discussions of Lyon’s Final
expulsion proceedings contained a high degree of politics and hypocrisy. The
Federalists would probably not have worried about what the nation might have
thought had one of their own members violated the Sedition Act, but since it was a
Republican, they pulled no punches.
The final major point the Federalists utilized in support of Lyon’s expulsion
concerned the issue of the publication of Lyon’s letter in Spooner’s Vermont Journal.
Some Federalists maintained that it was not so much the fact that Lyon had written
the letter, but the fact that he had it published, knowing that it was a violation of the
Sedition Act. Bayard also had a comment on this point saying, “The crime consisted,
not in the wickedness of his own heart, but the intention to corrupt others; the design
to scatter Firebrands through the community, with a view of exciting insurrections.”47
According to Bayard, the fact that an insurrection as a result of Lyon’s publication had
not yet taken place was not the most important point, since he believed that Lyon’s
publication resulted in numerous embers throughout the nation, which had the
potential of erupting into flames sometime in the future. Bayard believed that the
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national government had an interest in limiting Lyon’s choice of expression, as well as
expelling him from Congress.48
However, the Republicans had good reasons for opposing Lyon’s expulsion.
The first point they tried to make was that Lyon’s letter was written before the
passage of the Sedition Act. They did not believe that Lyon ought to be held
accountable for actions which had occurred before the Act became law. Republican
John Nicholas of Virginia expressed his feelings on this point during the debates when
he said, “No evidence was adduced in court to show that Mr. Lyon did any act
subsequent to the writing of his letter in the publication, and that though the thing
appeared in print after the law took its effects, all that was done by the writer was
done before the law was passed.”49 Nicholas and other Republicans chose to ignore
the fact that the letter was published after the Act took effect, even though it had been
written before its passage. Another avenue of Republican argument was that an
opinion cannot be considered libel.50 Republicans asserted that Lyon was merely
speaking his opinion on the subject of John Adams, and had not intentionally sought to
defame the president. Republicans sympathetic to Lyon maintained that the Sedition
Act was not intended to apply to expressions of opinion; therefore Lyon was falsely
accused and wrongly convicted, making their discussion of Lyon’s fate unnecessary.
The Republicans were really questioning the ability of the jury to determine accurately
whether or not Lyon’s opinion of Adams was correct. John Nicholas claimed, “Juries
cannot possibly say whether an opinion be true or false. They can only determine
whether or not it is their own opinion.”51 What the Congressmen of the Fifth
Congress were really involved in during Lyon’s latest expulsion proceeding was a
debate not so much on Lyon’s expulsion, but about the results of his trial, and whether
or not the Sedition Act resulted in a workable, realistic law. John Nicholas again
spoke on the subject saying, “The member from Vermont ought not to have been
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inquired into under the sedition law; since two of the counts contained in the
indictment are matters of opinion, not containing the least suggestion of facts; and the
third rests so much on matter of opinion, that it is impossible, according to a sound
construction of the law, for any guilt to be incurred by the act.”52 Republicans still
maintained their belief in the unconstitutionality of the Act, and believed that they had
real proof with Lyon in its inability to be applied in a non-partisan manner.
Republicans believed they were involved in a party battle, a battle likely to be decided
by sheer numbers. Many thought that it was too political an issue to undertake.
Albert Gallatin spoke to this point, asking whether, if “the law [be] constitutional, is
the crime an infamous one? Certainly not. It is a political crime, and will always be
determined according to the situation of the parties at the time.”53
The final roll-call vote of this study pertaining to the expulsion of Matthew
Lyon, roll-call nine, occurred on February 22, 1799, fifteen months after his first
altercation with Griswold. The motion introduced by James Bayard, if passed, would
have expelled Lyon from the House. Again the Federalists were faced with the need
to achieve a two-thirds majority to expel him. Again they were unable to garner
enough votes, as the vote to expel Lyon from the House failed with 49 votes in favor
of the resolution, and 45 votes opposed.54 Of all the congressmen who voted, every
Federalist voted in favor of expulsion, and every Republican voted in opposition to
expulsion.

Lyon again succeeded in retaining his House seat. One important

question remains, did Lyon retain his seat because Republicans successfully
persuaded Federalists that the law could be used against them, or because enough
Congressmen valued freedom of speech enough to keep Lyon in Congress? Whatever
the answer to this question may be, the fact remains that the Federalist Era had been
a less than honorable period of American history, since one of the most important
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rights within the Bill of Rights, freedom of speech, had been placed in considerable
jeopardy.
One of America's most noted scholars on this issue was Zecharian Chafee, Jr.
In one of his most enlightening publications. Free Speech in the United States. Chafee
presents his reader with a fundamental issue, the same issue faced in this study, of
attempting to analyze the status of free speech in Federalist America. As Chafee
stated, “The real issue in every free speech controversy is this: whether the state
can punish all words which have some tendency, however remote, to bring about acts
in violation of law.”55 In short, Chafee was posing the following questions: Can the
government repress speech only if a violation of the law is imminent? May it restrict
speech because it is believed that it might possibly lead to a violation sometime in the
future? The answer to these questions may be found by investigating the roots of the
American legal system, which invariably leads to England. The American colonists,
and the citizens of the newly independent United States, believed themselves to be
fundamentally different from the English on many issues, including freedom of speech.
Americans believed that freedom of speech was important because it allowed them to
speak freely about their government without fear or reprisal. The English could not
say the same, for in England, as Chafee stated, “The people could not make adverse
comments in conversation, in clandestine pamphlets, or later in newspapers. The only
lawful method of presenting grievances was through their lawful representatives in the
legislature, who might be petitioned in an orderly and dignified manner.”56 Inherent in
this English practice was the belief that the government was never wrong, and that
public criticisms were unnecessary and improper. In America the citizens believed
that they had a perfect right to call attention to the actions of officials; hence Matthew
Lyon.57
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The problem faced by Lyon and many others during the Federalist Era over the
issue of free speech involved the extent to which the ideas inherent in freedom of
expression had evolved since the adoption of the federal Constitution and the Bill of
Rights just a few years before.58 Lyon believed that the nation had evolved in such
manner that created an ever-broadening right of American citizens to discuss openly
the nature of government, and if need be, to criticize individuals in positions of power.
Others, mainly Federalists, disagreed, believing that the nation had not evolved to the
extent envisioned by Lyon, instead retaining the English tradition of opposing citizen
criticisms of government. In English tradition no prior restraints ought to be placed on
speech before being communicated, which was better known as the “Blackstonian
Theory.” According to Chafee’s interpretation of this theory, “The government cannot
interfere by a censorship or injunction before the words are spoken or printed, but can
punish them as much as it pleases after publication, no matter how harmless or
essential to the public welfare the discussion may be.”59 The Sedition Act, a law
which did not place any prior restraints on the press, instead punishing those involved
after the fact, fit nicely into the Federalists’ Blackstonian definition of freedom of
speech. Chafee went on to state that the supporters of the Sedition Act believed that
“liberty of the press meant the observance of no prior restraints of licensing and
censorship, not the right to publish writings which would undermine authority.”60
Unfortunately for Lyon and the Republicans, American legal thought had not evolved
enough to embrace the theory that, just as prior restraint on speech is
unconstitutional, so too is punishment after the fact.
Although not violating the Blackstonian Theory of no prior restraint, the
Sedition Act must be questioned, as it touched upon the First Amendment ‘s right of
freedom of speech.61 The Federalists benefited from the debate over the exact
meaning of the First Amendment, and Lyon and the American people became victims
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of the Federalist belief that the press ought not to be completely free. It is difficult to
believe that anyone could deny that the framers of the Constitution believed freedom
of speech to be at the pinnacle of all basic rights. Still, during the Federalist Era, and
continuing to the present, Congressmen and citizens alike have disagreed over the
true meaning of free speech.62 Most people of the Federalist Era did not believe that
the press should be completely free of governmental restrictions. Limited and
necessary regulations were tolerated. Most Americans, including Lyon, did not
believe that the First Amendment’s right of freedom of speech was an absolute right
to say or print whatever one liked.65 They believed in the right to speak their minds
openly and without fear of retribution, while at the same time not seeking to
undermine the authority of the government.
The right to speak out, and at the same time to accept the consequences of
what was said, involved a balancing act. The First Amendment involves not only an
individual interest, but a social interest as well.64 The individual interest, the interest
Lyon believed to be of the utmost importance, is the belief that as an American citizen
one has the right to express his opinion. The social interest involves the government.
Its purpose involves respecting the rights of citizens to freely express their opinions,
yet at the same time protecting the rights of all of society. The question remains, how
does a government balance its right to intervene, and a citizen’s right to express
himself? The Federalists believed that they had struck a proper balance with the
Sedition Act. They believed that the government had been assaulted by the opinions
of Lyon, and had a perfect right to protect the government and its officials from any
further onslaught.65 The Republicans did not believe that a proper balance had been
achieved. Instead they believed that it had tilted radically in favor of government, at
the expense of the freedom of expression.
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In defense of Lyon’s right to freely express himself, it must be pointed out that
much of what he said about President Adams was basically true. It was true that
Adams approved the pomp and ceremony of his position. If Lyon’s remarks were true,
should they have been considered libelous? Also, the remarks made by Lyon were not
in any way designed to call people to rebellion. He was not creating an atmosphere
whereby the nation was placed in imminent danger of rebellion; therefore the
government did not have a legitimate interest in further upsetting the balance between
freedom of speech and the general welfare of the country.66 Because of this, his
indictment, conviction, and sentence were politically motivated, and has left the
Federalist Era with an unfortunate legacy.
The claims of the Federalists that the Sedition Act was necessary, and that
violators of the Act ought to be punished because of tense foreign relations, are
questionable. The effect of the Federalist position was the interpretation of the United
States Constitution as a peacetime document only, that only during times of peace
would its contents be upheld. In times of war or increased tensions the basic rights
within the Constitution could be discarded, including freedom of speech. This belief
was very dangerous, one that calls into question whether or not Americans during the
Federalist Era actually enjoyed the fundamental rights included within the
Constitution. Of course the debate over whether or not the Constitution is a
peacetime document has surfaced on numerous occasions throughout the history of the
United States. For all practical purposes this issue has not been settled.67
In retrospect. Federalist attempts to invoke the necessary and proper clause of
the Constitution to bolster their position failed. The Federalists believed that the
necessary and proper clause lent validity to their cause because they believed that
they had a constitutional right to do anything which the U.S. Constitution did not
expressly forbid. Thomas F. Carroll in the Michigan Law Review went so far as to
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assert that the use of the necessary and proper clause smacked “of the McCulloch v.
Maryland decision in which chief Justice John Marshall said, ‘Let the end be
legitimate, let it be within the scope of the Constitution, and all means which are
plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consistent with the letter and
spirit of the Constitution is constitutional.” ’68 Most historians of the period however
have rejected this assumption. Yet some Federalists embraced the idea that the ends
justify the means, even if it involved a serious breach in a fundamental right of
American citizens.
Finally, with the passage of the Sedition Act and its subsequent trials,
Matthew Lyon and the rest of Federalist America became victims of repression.
Freedom of speech and of the press was violated, if only for a few years. Thomas
Jefferson said it most succinctly when he wrote to Charles Yancy:
If a nation expects to be ignorant and free in a state of civilization, it
expects what never was and never will be. The functionaries of every
government have propensities to command at will the liberty and
property of their constituents. There is no safe deposit for these but
within the people themselves, nor can they be safe with them without
information. Where the press is free and every man able to read, all is
safe.69
Without freedom of speech and of the press the American people have been victimized
by its government, and will no doubt again be victimized in the future if they fail to
keep freedom of expression completely free. Not until 1964 did the Supreme Court
declare sedition acts and seditious libel unconstitutional with its decision in New York
Times Company v. Sullivan.70
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CHAPTER SIX
AFTERWORD
The Sedition Act of 1798 affected the country in a number of ways. The most
significant effect was the Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions.1 These resolutions
were drafted in direct response to the perceived threat to the civil liberties of the
American people. The Resolutions resulted from a feeling, mainly experienced by
Republicans, that the Acts ought to be declared unconstitutional. The Kentucky and
Virginia Resolutions began with a declaration of loyalty, as they embraced upholding
the U.S. Constitution against domestic and foreign aggressors. The Resolutions listed
the perceived abuses of the federal government at the expense of the state
governments. The major abuse listed was the fact that Congress had
unconstitutionally passed the Alien and Sedition laws.
The Kentucky Resolution, written by Thomas Jefferson, was printed on
November 10, 1798.2 Although the Kentucky Resolution was written by Jefferson, it
was introduced into the Kentucky legislature by John Breckenridge. Jefferson’s desire
to remain secretive about his authorship resulted from his desire to have the
resolution gain as much support as possible, even if that included leaving off his name.
In its most basic form, the Kentucky Resolution declared the Alien and Sedition Acts
void, unconstitutional, and ripe for repeal. Jefferson believed that the Resolution
would divide the supporters and the enemies of the Acts more definitively, which in
turn would make the issue of the repeal a top priority. The Kentucky Resolution was
approved by the Kentucky legislature almost unanimously, and then distributed to the
people of Kentucky. Jefferson called on other states in the union to follow Kentucky’s
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lead, but only Virginia followed suit. James Madison was responsible for authoring
the Virginia Resolution, which was introduced into the Virginia legislature by John
Taylor of Caroline.3 The Virginia Resolution was for the most part more moderate in
tone that the Kentucky Resolution, but received less support from the Virginia
constituents.
The Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions reflected a states’ rights interpretation
of the Constitution. This included the idea that the states were sovereign, with the
national government being of secondary importance. The Resolutions also included
the belief that the states and the national government were partners in a general
compact, an agreement of sorts, with the states reigning supreme. The states were
responsible for protecting the rights of their citizens. This responsibility also would
have included a protection from the evils associated with the Sedition Act.4 Referring
to this compact the Virginia Resolution states:
In a case of a deliberate, palpable, and dangerous exercise of other
powers not granted by the said compact, the States, who are the parties
thereto, have the right, and are in duty bound, to interpose for arresting
the progress of evil, and for maintaining within their respective limits,
the authorities, rights and liberties pertaining to them.5
In short, as the supreme parties to the U.S. Constitution, the states had the right to
stop any perceived evil perpetrated by the national government. Bear in mind that this
particular states’ rights interpretation was not well received by the Federalists. They
maintained that the national government was supreme, and that the states had no
constitutional right to pass judgment on its actions.
The Resolutions also supported the perceived notion that the national
government was fast becoming too powerful with its utilization of implied powers.
This situation could conceivably have led to despotism. The Virginia Resolution
states:
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A spirit in sundry instances been manifested by the Federal Government,
to enlarge its powers by forced constructions of the constitutional
charter which defines them; and that indications have appeared of a
design to expound certain general phrases so as to destroy the meaning
and effect of the particular enumeration, which necessarily explains and
limits the general phrases, and so as to consolidate the States by degrees
into one sovereignty, the obvious tendency and inevitable result of
which would be to transform the present republican system of the United
States into an absolute, or at best, a mixed monarchy.6
Whether Jefferson’s fears of absolutism were warranted or not, the fact is that a fear
of an all-powerful central government was common during the latter half of the
Federalist Era. The “forced constructions” were not only feared by Jefferson and
Madison, but by Lyon and others as well.
The Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions were very direct when it came to the
subject of the Alien and Sedition Acts:
The other of which acts [Sedition Act] exercises in a like manner a
power not delegated by the Constitution, but on the contrary
expressly and positively forbidden by one of the amendments
thereto; a power which more than any other ought to produce
universal alarm, because it is leveled against the right of freely
examining public characters and measures, and of free
communication among the people thereon, which has ever been
justly deemed the only effectual guardian of every other right.7
The Kentucky Resolution declared that the Sedition Act directly violated the First
Amendment, that it significantly diminished the ability of the citizens to monitor its
public officials, and that
the act of Congress of the United States, passed on the
14th day of July, 1798, entitled, ‘an act in addition to the act for the
punishment of certain crimes against the United States,’ which does
abridge the freedom of the press, is not law, but is all together void
and of no effect.8
The Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions were an attempt to establish the right of the
states to identify when the national government had overstepped its bounds, and
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declare the actions of the national government void. According to the Resolutions, the
Sedition Act was not law.
The Resolutions forwarded the concept of dual federalism, whereby the
national government was given relatively few powers. This fact scared Federalists,
many of whom believed that the next step taken by the states might possibly be
insurrection and civil war.9 Some Federalists maintained that the Resolutions were a
part of a French plot to forcibly remove Virginia from the union. Others, like
Alexander Hamilton, believed that the Resolutions amounted to a plot to overthrow
the national government.10 Federalist fears over the Resolutions were unfounded,
and were mainly due to their fears over the increasing popularity of the Republican
party.
Not only did the Federalists have doubts about the Resolutions’ true meaning,
but so too did one of their authors, James Madison. Like the Federalists, Madison
had significant concerns about the act of “nullification,” the practice of the states’
passing judgment upon the various laws of the national government. Jefferson
probably did believe that the states had the right to nullify national laws, but Madison
had his doubts. Perhaps neither of the authors had expressly intended to establish
the practice of nullification. Historians still argue today over what Jefferson and
Madison really had intended with the Resolutions, as well as how much of their
contents they had embraced.11
Speaking on the effects of the Resolution, historian Adrienne Koch has stated:
Although the effect of the Resolutions is almost impossible to evaluate
in quantitative terms, there is no doubt that they served as efficient
rallying devices for Republicans from Vermont to Georgia. As
campaign documents, the Resolutions are of unusual significance: for
they overtly condemned the suppression of the public opinion in any
form and provided powerful precedent against future attempts to
destroy the sound status of civil liberties in the United States.12
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The Sedition Act would be a hot topic in the election of 1800, but before the election
took place, a repeal effort was started in the House of Representatives.
Since the passage of the Sedition Act in July of 1798, Republicans in the House
had vowed to repeal the law they believed to be unconstitutional. Briefly, they
underlined their demands for repeal by rehashing the objections they had made when it
was initially introduced. First, they reasserted their claim that the prosecution of
seditious libel was an activity best left to the various states. Second, the Republicans
believed that the necessary and proper clause of the U.S. Constitution did not apply to
the Sedition Act. The Republicans asserted that the Sedition Act was not necessary
in order to stop seditious activities, nor was it a proper avenue of prosecution.
Finally, the Republicans reasserted their earlier claims that the Act violated the
protections guaranteed by the First Amendment.13 The main impetus behind the
repeal attempt was the belief that the United States national government had
overstepped its legal limits, infringing upon the rights of the various states. During
the repeal process the Republicans used the Tenth Amendment to support their
position, which states that “The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States
respectively, or to the people.” 14 Since the U.S. Constitution had not specifically
given to the national government the power to pass a law on sedition, Republicans
thought it was therefore a power reserved to the states.
The debate over the proposed repeal of the Sedition Act was both brief and
philosophical in nature. The philosophical aspect of the debate concerned the following
question posed here by Republican John Nicholas:
The question, then, whether the government ought to have control
over the persons who alone can give information throughout the
country, is nothing more than this, whether men interested in
suppressing information necessary for the people to have, ought to
be entrusted with the power, or whether they ought to have the
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power which their personal interests leads to the abuse of.15
The debate took place in an atmosphere of scholarly curiosity, as if Congressmen were
primarily interested in arriving at a formal understanding of what the effects of the
Sedition Act might be. Urgency was not a critical factor. However, the need for
Congressmen to have a final word on the subject was very important. Republicans, no
doubt realizing that their numbers were not great enough to affect a repeal, simply
desired to go on record one more time expressing their profound dissatisfaction with
the law. Federalists, responding to the repeal effort, tried to limit the debate to two
members on each side of the aisle.16 The Federalists believed that by limiting the
debate the chances of its repeal would be minimal.17
The Federalists were successful in opposing the repeal effort not only by
limiting debate, but upon legal and constitutional grounds as well. The Federalists
opposed the repeal effort because, in their estimation, seditious libel did not enjoy
First Amendment protection; hence it was not a restriction on freedom of speech. The
Federalists maintained their earlier claim that those who speak about their
government must do so in a responsible manner, and not recklessly espousing
inaccuracies. The Federalists also claimed that the Sedition Act was merely an act
educating the American public on the common law, an attempt to clarify the existing
laws of the states for all to understand. Finally, the Federalists made a distinction
between the freedom of religion clause and the freedom of speech clause of the
Constitution.

The religion clause of the First Amendment expressly bars Congress

from legislating on religion, while the press clause only prohibits Congress from
passing laws “abridging the freedom of the speech, or of the press.” 18 According to
constitutional law scholar David M. O’Brien, “From that language, the committee [of
the House] surmised that Congress was not precluded from passing legislation
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respecting speech and the press.”19 Largely as a result of these Federalist claims,
little support was generated to repeal the Sedition Act.
As a result of the lack of firm support for the repeal, the Federalists submitted
the following resolution: "Resolved, That it is inexpedient to repeal the act passed
the last session, entitled, ‘An act in addition to the act, entitled An act for the
punishment of certain crimes against the United States.”20 A vote was taken on the
resolution, 52 in favor, 48 opposed.21 Again, of those congressmen who voted, not
one crossed party lines. Those who found the repeal of the Act to be inexpedient
outnumbered those who thought it expedient, thus killing repeal. The Republicans’
only hope of ridding themselves of the Act would be in its expiration, which would
occur at the end of the Sixth Congress. Thomas Cooley, another constitutional
scholar, stated well the status of the First Amendment after the failure of repeal,
when he said that the First Amendment guaranteed “a right to freely utter and publish
whatever the citizen may please, and to be protected against any responsibility for so
doing, except so as far as such publications, from their blasphemy, obscenity, or
scandalous character, may be a public offense, or as by their falsehood and malice they
may injuriously affect the standing, reputation, or pecuniary interests of individuals.”22
This was the reality of freedom of speech in Federalist America, which would continue
until the Republicans came to power.
Yet the Federalist Era was not the only period of American history which
witnessed attempts at limiting freedom of speech. The next instance of the national
government’s attempting to limit freedom of speech by congressional legislation was
in the passage of the Espionage Act of 1917. The Espionage Act was in response to a
growing distrust of aliens and political extremists who were sympathetic to the
Bolshevik Revolution in Russia. The parallels between the Espionage Act of 1917
and the Sedition Act of 1798 are strikingly familiar. Both were based on the mistrust
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of a particular group, largely resulting from a revolution abroad. Both Acts also
included the idea that the nation would not be safe until it limited the subject group’s
freedom of speech. In short “the Espionage Act of 1917 penalized circulation of false
statements made with the intent to interfere with military success, or attempts to
cause insubordination in the military and naval forces of the United States, or
obstruction of the recruiting and enlistment service of the United States.”23 Although
the Espionage Act of 1917 was aimed mainly at the obstruction of the military, the fact
remains that the Act penalized those who were believed to have spoken falsely about
the U.S. military, a definite attempt to limit free speech.
The next act, the Sedition Act of 1918, was also in response to the Bolshevik
Revolution, as well as economic dislocation due to World War I.24 The Sedition Act of
1918
prohibited speeches or acts obstructing the sale of government bonds, or
speaking or writing anything intended to cause contempt for the American form
of government, the Constitution, the flag, or the military uniform, or urging any
curtailment of production of things necessary to the prosecution of the war with
intent to hinder its prosecution, or supporting the cause of any country at war
with U.S., or opposing the cause of the U.S. therein.25
Again, like the Sedition Act of 1798, the Sedition Act of 1918 made it illegal to speak
or write anything that might bring the government and its officials into contempt.
Anyone found guilty of violating the Sedition Act of 1918 was subject to a $10,000 fine,
twenty years in prison, or both. Both sedition acts resulted from increased foreign
policy tensions, with the intended remedy being a curtailment on freedom of speech.
Approximately 2,000 cases resulted from the Espionage Act of 1917 and the Sedition
Act of 1918, with 1,000 defendants being found guilty.26 Unlike the Sedition Act of
1798, the constitutionality of the Espionage Act of 1917 and the Sedition Act of 1918
were upheld by the United States Supreme Court in the cases of Schenck v. U.S.. and
Abrams v. U.S.27
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In 1940 the United States Congress passed the Smith Act, another law aimed
at aliens and those sympathetic to Communism. Most people tried in violation of the
Smith Act of 1940 were tried because they were accused of conspiring to overthrow
the government of the United States. The Smith Act was upheld by the Supreme
Court in Dennis v. U.S.28 The Smith Act was followed by the McCarren Act, or the
Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950. The McCarren Act declared “the
Communist movement to be dedicated to the overthrow of the United States
Government, orders that all Communist-action organizations must register data about
their activities, officers, and membership with the department of justice, and subjects
persons so registered to certain disabilities, such as the denial of the opportunity for
government employment.”29 The McCarren Act sounded very similar to the Alien
Registration Act of 1798. Finally, during World War II, the House Committee on unAmerican Activities (HUAC), was an attempt by Congress to label certain American
citizens disloyal and seditious. Many historians have contended that the
investigation of un-American activities was perhaps the most serious threat to civil
liberties in U.S. history. That contention must be recognized as valid, since despite a
string of repressive legislation from the Sedition Act of 1798, to the McCarren Act, the
HUAC was the most feared of all.30 It is important to note that the Sedition Act of
1798 was not the only instance of a curtailment of free speech, and Matthew Lyon was
not the only person to have been convicted of sedition or espionage, or similar activity.
The United States has enacted a number of repressive national laws, and will no doubt
continue to do so until the First Amendment becomes a more sacred principle of the
American people. If this fails to happen, which will likely be the case, attempts at a
whittling away of American’s most basic freedoms will continue.
The Sedition Act of 1798 does, however, overshadow the others simply for the
fact that it was the first national law targeting sedition—a precedent . It had other
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very tangible results besides those already mentioned. The Alien and Sedition laws
affected the legacy of John Adams. The presidency of John Adams has become
synonymous with the passage of the Alien and Sedition Acts, diminishing more
positive achievements of his presidency, such as preventing war between the U.S. and
France. The criticism of John Adams for his support of the Alien and Sedition laws is
to a certain extent warranted. Adams did possess the power to veto the legislation.
Yet Adams neither initiated the Acts, nor forcefully advocated their passage, nor
forcefully enforced them.31
Furthermore, Adams’ approval of the Acts, and Federalist support for their
passage, caused a political backlash. The party went into a downward spiral, as it
lost its grip upon the country to the Republicans. By the election of 1800 the
Federalist party was no longer a strong, unified organization. Instead it was beset by
internal power struggles and a general lack of a political agenda. The Alien and
Sedition Acts were designed to entrench the Federalists firmly at the helm of
American government. Instead, “they failed, leaving a party whose philosophy was
outmoded and whose peculiarity was destroyed.”32 Ironically the Republican party
was the main benefactor of the Alien and Sedition laws, as it grew to be extremely
unified in its opposition to the repressive measures of the Federalists. It was able to
develop its own philosophy of government, one that received significant support
throughout the country.
The true test of the increasing strength of the Republican party was the
presidential election of 1800. The voters decided between the tickets of John Adams
and Charles Cotesworth Pinckney for the Federalists, and Thomas Jefferson and
Aaron Burr for the Republicans The Federalists, despite the notoriety they had
achieved as a result of the Alien and Sedition laws, actively sought to retain their
control over the country. An article in the Maryland Gazette on September 11, 1800,
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portrays well the position and the tone of the Federalists at the dawn of the
democratic republic, 1801-1815:
Much has been said and written to prevail on you to prefer Mr. Jefferson to him
[Adams]. The principle objections made against Mr. Adams, and on which a
very great clamor has been excited against him are the following: That he
approved and assented to the sedition act, the alien act, and the act to raise a
provisional army; and that he is the friend and advocate of monarchy I shall
endeavour, my fellow citizens, to convince you that the objects of these laws
were just, reasonable, and proper, and that Mr. Adams, in assenting to them,
acted under impulse of duty .33
In maintaining that the Acts were justified, the Federalists had blinded themselves to
political realities. They still held firmly to the belief that only the rich and elite were
capable of government. They characterized Jefferson as a radical southerner who
represented the fringes of southern society.34 They would be sadly mistaken when
the votes were counted, for Jefferson was elected the third president of the United
States.35
Interestingly enough Matthew Lyon played an important part in the election of
1800, casting one of the deciding votes in Jefferson’s favor in the House. Prior to 1804
and the ratification of the Twelfth Amendment, electors did not vote for president and
vice-president individually. Instead they voted for two people. The one who received
the most votes became president, and the one who achieved the next highest number
of votes became vice-president. This situation potentially allowed a president and a
vice-president to be from different parties, such as John Adams and Thomas Jefferson
had been after the election of 1796. If no candidate received a majority of votes in the
Electoral College, the election went to the House of Representatives, where each
state cast one vote. Such was the case in 1800, when Jefferson and Aaron Burr each
received 73 electoral votes.36 After 36 ballots, and poor weather which precluded a
number of Federalists from reaching the House, Lyon cast the vote for the Vermont
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delegation which broke the tie with Burr.37 Thanks to Lyon’s timely vote, Thomas
Jefferson had become president.
After the election of 1800 it became even more apparent that the statements
made on the House floor during the debate over the Sedition Act were highly political.
Once the Federalists lost their grip on the nation and their majority in Congress, they
amazingly became advocates of free speech and champions of the Bill of Rights.38
After 1800 the Federalists were no longer the most powerful party; they had instead
become the minority party, fearful of the potential reprisals from the Republicans. In
all fairness, the Republicans too conveniently changed their spots after the election of
1800. Once in the majority, they became less tolerant of freedom of speech, as they
had become the target of Federalist criticisms.
After taking office Jefferson immediately pardoned those convicted of violating
the Sedition Act and remitted their fines. This action on Jefferson’s part seems very
compassionate at first glance, but the true reason for pardoning those convicted was
not that he felt an acute sense of sympathy for those involved, but because he
believed that it was not the national government’s duty to punish seditious libel.39
During Jefferson’s presidency the function of punishing seditious libel was left to state
courts. As a result, the federal courts would not officially be involved in deciding
cases of seditious libel again until the Espionage Act of 1917. Explaining why he
pardoned those convicted of violating the Sedition Act, Jefferson wrote to John Adams:
The judges, believing the law constitutional, had a right to pass a sentence of
fine and imprisonment; because that power was placed in their hands by the
Constitution! But the Executive, believing the law to be unconstitutional, was
bound to remit the the execution of it; because that power has been confided
to him by the Constitution. The instrument meant that its coordinate branches
should be checks on each other. But the opinion which gives to the Judges the
right to decide what Laws are constitutional, and what not, not only for
themselves in their own spheres, would make the Judiciary a despotic
branch.40
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This last statement of Jefferson’s demonstrated his feeling that the federal judiciary
was intended to be a co-equal branch of government, and that it had the potential of
becoming a “despotic branch.” Jefferson was advocating not only a states’ rights
position, but also a position rejecting the concept of judicial review, which had just
stung him in Marburv v. Madison.41
As for Lyon, he did not run in the election of 1800, due primarily to the hostile
nature of his opposition and bitter partisan strife. Because Lyon would lose his
congressional immunity after his term, and aware that state charges awaited his
return to Vermont, he decided to move to Eddyville, Kentucky, in 1801.42 There Lyon
resumed business pursuits similar to the ones he had undertaken in Fair Haven,
including a saw mill, a paper mill, and a tannery.43 As a result of his successful
business ventures he again became important in frontier politics. In 1802 he was
elected to the U.S. House from the state of Kentucky, and served until 1810.44
When the War of 1812 arrived Lyon’s entrepreneurial nature surfaced once
again, and he undertook a shipbuilding operation in support of his country.45 Most of
the funding came from Lyon himself. He in fact did not even have a government
contract. He simply realized that the nation lacked a sufficient navy, and contributed
accordingly. Lyon eventually incurred a large debt from his shipbuilding operation, but
did not ask the national government for reimbursement. In 1820 Lyon was appointed
by President James Monroe as United States Factor to the Cherokee Nation in the
Arkansas Territory.46 This appointment would be Lyon’s last public role, and he died
on August 1, 1822, in Sparda Bluffs, Arkansas Territory.47 In 1839 Lyon’s body was
moved to the side of his wife, who had died in Eddyville.48 Lyon’s life after Congress
was in many ways very similar to his life before Congress. As Aleine Austin put it,
“Thus in 1800 Lyon was repeating an old pattern: following the dream promised by a
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new land of opportunity. His was the eternal quest for perfection—ever restless, ever
ambitious, ever driven.”49
But Lyon’s story was not over. The refund of his fine was not paid to his heirs
until 1840, forty-one years after the Sedition Act took effect. Although Jefferson had
pardoned Lyon, for unknown reasons Lyon had not received his remittance. In 1839 a
bill was introduced into Congress intended to refund the money paid by Lyon, plus
interest, for his violation of the Sedition Act. The Act read as follows:
‘An Act to refund a fine imposed on the late Matthew Lyon, under the Sedition
law, to his legal heirs and representatives’ . . . . Be it enacted that the
Secretary of the Treasury, and is hereby, authorized and directed to pay the
legal heirs and representatives of Matthew Lyon, out of any money in the
treasury not otherwise appropriated, to the sum of one thousand and sixty
dollars and ninety-six cents, with interest thereon from the day of February,
seventeen hundred and ninety-one, to the passing of this Act.50
Matthew Lyon’s estate was fully reimbursed for the payment of his fine in violation of
the Sedition Act of 1798. Matthew Lyon was finally vindicated.
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CHAPTER SEVEN

CLUSTER BLOC
Like the rest of American society, the legislators of the Fifth Congress
possessed divided opinions on the issues of Matthew Lyon and the passage of the
Sedition Act of 1798. Those with similar opinions either consciously or unconsciously
joined with one another and formed voting blocs. This chapter will deal with the blocs
that emerged during the Fifth Congress concerning Matthew Lyon's political fate and
the passage of the Sedition Act. Both issues were highly divisive and extremely
partisan, with sectionalism playing only a minor coincidental role. Because the Lyon
and Sedition Act issues were very divisive, significant groupings occurred. As a
result of Rice-Beyle Cluster Bloc analysis these voting groups became clearly
recognizable.1 Legislators who made no comment in debate that might have indicated
their opinions usually left a sufficient voting record that is just as eloquent as any
speech, and allows us to determine their positions quite precisely. This is especially
important in the late 1790’s, when there were still a few legislators whose party
affiliations were uncertain.
Voting blocs can educate the historian in many ways. First, they can originate
within and between parties. Naturally, if a particular issue is profoundly partisan the
voting blocs will be identified specifically along party lines. The degree of factionalism
within and between parties may also be gauged through cluster bloc analysis. For
example, a number of congressmen may cross party lines and vote with those of
another party on certain roil call votes. Cluster bloc analysis is a good tool with which
to judge the level of factionalism on a given issue. Congressmen who do not vote on a
156

157

particular issue may be just as important as those who do. This is so because by the
simple act of not voting the legislator may be demonstrating his sense of
dissatisfaction with the issues, or even with the legislation before him.2 Other
reasons may also apply, such as the avoidance of a controversial subject, or chance
absence of the congressmen at the time of the vote. Such a group is important enough
on some occasions to form a distinct bloc.
Cluster bloc analysis provides the researcher with a tool with which to
understand the positions of those congressmen who did not speak during debate.
Often times when historians undertake legislative studies they limit themselves to
the congressmen who spoke on the subject, when in fact on most issues only a small
number of legislators will actually speak, either in support of or in opposition to
proposed legislation. Limiting information only to those congressmen who spoke on
an issue handicaps research conclusions, as historians may possibly have studied
only the speeches of the leadership. With cluster bloc analysis the researcher has the
ability to find out the opinion of the legislator even if he did not speak during debate.
This provides a more thorough understanding of the issue.
Rice-Beyle Cluster Bloc analysis was used in this study because it added a
dimension that had not been utilized by past historians, at least to the extent used in
this study. Lyon’s fate and the Sedition Act of 1798 are important issues that have
already been studied by a number of noted historians. Yet this study is unique and
relevant due to the use of cluster bloc analysis. It will provide quantitative results
that past historians have not been able to muster because cluster bloc analysis was
not a part of their methodology. The method provides us a more precise understanding
of Lyon and the Sedition Act than was formerly possible.
The first task in cluster block analysis is the selection of the relevant roll call
votes to be used in the study.3 There were nine votes on Matthew Lyon, and four on
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the Sedition Act. These thirteen roll calls constitute the foundation upon which this
study was based. The second step is to establish the extent of agreement between
the representatives by running the computer program. This “running” of the program
will provide the researcher with the percent of times that two representatives voted
the same way on the selected relevant roll calls.4 These indices of numbers are then
placed in a matrix that resembles a mileage chart. For example, instead of the reader
locating two cities such as Minneapolis and Denver, the reader would line up two
congressmen, like Edward Livingston and Hezekiah Hosmer. Where the two
congressmen meet in the chart a number would be found. Instead of identifying how
many miles between two cities, the number would demonstrate the percent of votes
on which the two congressmen cast their roll calls the same way.5 For example, if the
number was 100, the two congressmen voted the same on 100 percent of the roll calls.
Their interests were likely the same. If the number was only 30 or 40, they agreed on
only 30 or 40 percent of the votes, and likely had quite different interests.
The blocs are formed by locating those congressmen on the matrix who
demonstrate the highest level of agreement. Those with the most agreement,
invariably 100 percent, are placed in one corner of the matrix. Those in the group with
the highest level of agreement are called the “core” group. Those demonstrating the
lowest levels of agreement are placed at the opposite corner.6 One question remains,
what thresholds are used to differentiate the various levels of support? Those used in
this study are arbitrary, but fall within the customary 70-80 percent threshold. If the
threshold is set too high it may appear as if no blocs existed, and if set too low the
reader may think that the level of disagreement was insignificant. If a member does
not meet the established threshold, but comes close, he may become a “fringe”
member. If the index of agreement between the two congressmen is less than the
established criteria, a zero is placed in the matrix for the index of agreement. This
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does not mean that the two did not ever agree. Instead it shows that the level of
agreement did not meet the minimum threshold and does not provide enough
information to permit reliable judgments.
Although sectionalism played only a minor role in this study it is important to
note the particular groupings of states into their respective regions. Those in the New
England group included the states of Connecticut, Massachusetts, New Hampshire,
Rhode Island, and Vermont. The mid-Atlantic states included Delaware, New Jersey,
New York, and Pennsylvania. The Southern states included Georgia, Maryland,
North Carolina, South Carolina, and Virginia.7 With this background into the workings
of cluster bloc analysis and the parameters used in this study, the reader can achieve
a sound understanding of the relevant issues. The rest of this chapter will deal
exclusively with the analysis of Lyon’s roll calls, followed by the analysis of the
Sedition Act. Finally, the two sets will be combined in order to prove the hypothesis
that the congressmen who voted to expel Lyon from the House are the same ones
who voted in favor of the Sedition Act of 1798.
Analyzing the nine relevant Lyon-related roll calls of the Fifth Congress using
Rice-Beyle Cluster Bloc analysis at a minimum index of agreement of seventy percent,
two blocs emerge, each with a fringe. The first bloc is a core bloc of Lyon’s
opposition.8 This bloc will be called the anti-Lyon bloc from this point on. This group
consisted of 35 Federalist congressmen, eighteen of whom demonstrated 100 percent
opposition to Lyon, as shown by the relevant matrix. This amounted to stiff
opposition to Lyon. What is most significant about this group is that all members of
the core group were Federalists. Not one Republican voted often enough with the
Federalists to qualify for membership in the core. This solid core of Federalists
demonstrates well the partisan nature of Lyon’s expulsion proceedings. It was
relatively easy to identify instances of party animosities over this issue when reading
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the debates in Congress, yet cluster bloc analysis provides an added dimension
through the utilization of the legislators’ votes, instead of just their voices.
Table 1
Blocks Represented by Party on Lvon-Related Roll Calls

Pro-Lyon

Anti-Lyon

Total

Federalist Core

0

35

35

Federalist Fringe

0

15

15

Republican Core

34

0

34

Republican Fringe
Total

11
45

0
50

11
95

Beside the core anti-Lyon group other congressmen also opposed Lyon, but not quite
to the same degree as the core opposition. This anti-Lyon fringe consisted of fifteen
Federalist congressmen. Again, not one Republican voted with the anti-Lyon voters
enough to be considered even a fringe member. It really boiled down to either
opposing Lyon or supporting him. The only difference revolved around the degree to
which each congressman suported or opposed him.
Any discussion of sectionalism over the Lyon issue can be tricky since it was
so partisan in nature. Because the sections of the country were basically dominated
by one party or the other, differences between the sections were obvious, but not
significant. This situation is a bit like the question, which came first, the chicken or
the egg? Did sectionalism play a significant part in deciding which party the people
would support? Did the party come first, with little importance being placed on
section? It is difficult to place much importance on sectionalism because most
Federalists came from New England, with a scattering throughout the mid-Atlantic
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states, and South Carolina in the South. Out of the 35 congressmen within the
Federalist core group, 29 came from New England, four from the mid-Atlantic states,
and two from the South.9 It seems that the issue demonstrated clear sectional lines,
but the lines were of little significance because they were based upon party, and not
upon geographical uniqueness. Those congressmen from outside New England who
voted in this core group were Henry Glen of New York, Thomas Hartley of
Pennsylvania, William Hindman of Maryland, James Imlay of New Jersey, John
Rutledge Jr. of South Carolina, and Richard Thomas of Pennsylvania. Note that only
two of them were from the South.
Table 2
Blocks Represented bv Section on Lvon-Related Roll Calls

Pro-Lyon
Core

Pro-Lyon
Fringe

Anti-Lyon
Core

Anti-Lyon
Fringe

Total

New England

2

0

29

3

34

Middle Atlantic

7

3

4

2

16

South

25

8

2

10

45

Total

34

11

35

15

95

Sectionalism was more interesting for the Federalist fringe than the Federalist
core. Of the fifteen members of the fringe, ten came from the south, three from New
England, and only two from the mid-Atlantic states. Realizing this, one can say with
relative certainty that the New England Federalists exhibited a very strong opposition
to Lyon’s presence in the House, while the southern Federalists were not quite as
adamant in their opposition. They were more moderate than their northern
counterparts, at least as far as the roll call record is concerned. This could be due to
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the aristocratic nature of New England, and the fact that Lyon was always viewed as
an outsider. The South was perhaps more accepting of Lyon, despite his repeated
challenges to the government. Perhaps southern Federalists saw a little bit of a
southerner in Lyon. Still, whether fringe or not, this group opposed Lyon’s presence in
the House, if slightly less so than the core group. The only non-southern fringe
members were Samuel Sitgreaves of Pennsylvania, John Williams of New York, Peleg
Wadsworth of Massachusetts, Thomas Tillinghast of Rhode Island, and Nathaniel
Freeman, Jr. of Massachusetts.
Even though Lyon had his enemies he too had his friends. As Table 1
indicates, his supporters all came from within the Republican ranks. Not one
Federalist voted enough in support of Lyon to become a member of the core or fringe of
the pro-Lyon bloc. The core of the pro-Lyon bloc consisted of 34 Republican
congressmen. It is obvious that the Republicans could be just as partisan as the
Federalists when it came to the issues surrounding Lyon. Whether one supported
Lyon or not can be reduced to party affiliation. The pro-Lyon core group, although
having roughly the same number of members as the core anti-Lyon group, exhibited
100 percent agreement, whereas the core of the anti-Lyon bloc only had 18 of the 34
members demonstrating 100 percent agreement. The pro-Lyon camp was much more
unified than the anti-Lyon camp. This is due mainly to the fact that Lyon and Griswold
were both on the same expulsion resolution, with many Federalists unable or
unwilling to decide if it was worth ridding themselves of Lyon if it meant getting rid of
one of their own in the process.

The pro-Lyon fringe consisted of eleven

congressmen. Again, a majority came from the Republican-fertile south. Seven of the
eleven fringe bloc members came from the South, three from the mid-Atlantic states,
and one from the frontier state of Kentucky. Those non-southerners voting with the
fringe bloc in support of Lyon were Joseph Hiester of Pennsylvania, Edward
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Livingston of New York, and David Bard of Pennsylvania. Thomas T. Davis was the
frontiersman from Kentucky. This fringe group was smaller than the fringe group of the
anti-Lyon voters which points to a more cohesive Republican party. The Republicans
were a much more disciplined, organized party at the turn of the century than were the
Federalists.
In short, Lyon survived the attempts of his Federalist enemies to oust him
from Congress because the Republican party had enough members to prevent the
Federalists from achieving the two-thirds vote needed for expulsion. Because the
Republican party was so unified on this issue, Lyon remained a representative from
the state of Vermont. In terms of sectionalism the 34 members of the pro-Lyon bloc
included 25 southerners: only two were from New England: Thomas Skinner and
Joseph B. Varnum of Massachusetts. Lyon received the majority of his support from
the South simply because that was where most Republicans called home.
Sectionalism came into the equation only because most Federalists were from the
North, and most Republicans were from the South. The only reason sectionalism
seemed to be an issue was because of the geographical uniqueness of the Federalist
and Republican parties during the Federalist Era. Through cluster bloc analysis, and
despite the extreme political nature of Lyon’s expulsion proceedings, Lyon’s fate may
safely be determined to have been decided along strict party lines, with sectionalism
only playing a coincidental, relatively minor role.
Switching gears now to the four relevant Sedition Act roll calls, and using a
minimum index of agreement of 75 percent, two blocs emerge.10 The core of the first
bloc, the pro-Sedition Act bloc, consisted of 37 Federalist congressmen, with 22 of
them demonstrating 100 percent support on the relevant roll calls. Again, like the roll
call votes on Lyon, the votes on the passage of the Sedition Act exhibited a large
degree of partisanship. In general, the Federalists supported the Sedition Act with
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open arms. Again, Rice-Beyle Cluster Bloc analysis allows the researcher to
demonstrate the opinions of the congressmen on a given subject through their voting
records. The pro-Sedition Act fringe consisted of only seven Federalist congressmen,
demonstrating how strongly the Federalist party desired the Sedition Act. Like the
Lyon fringe, the Sedition Act fringe shows a relative southern dominance, with four of
the seven fringe members from the South. This may be explained by southern
skepticism of the central government.
Table 3
Blocks Represented bv Party on Sedition Act-Related Roll Calls

Pro-Sedition Act

Anti-Sedition Act

Total

Federalist Core

37

0

37

Federalist Fringe

7

0

7

Republican Core

0

37

37

Republican Fringe

0

0

0

Total

44

37

81

The second voting bloc is the anti-Sedition Act group.11 This group consisted
of 37 Republican congressmen. Republican opposition to the proposed Sedition Act
was so strong that no fringe members emerged from this group. All of the members of
this core group were southern Republicans, except for two frontiersmen, a midAtlantic congressman, and only two New Englandmen, Lyon of Vermont and Joseph
B. Vamum of Massachusetts. Like the frontiersmen of the Lyon roll calls, the
frontiersmen of the Sedition Act can also be considered southerners. No significant
East/West differences emerged as a result of cluster bloc analysis.
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Table 4 indicates the vague relationship of the Sedition Act to sectionalism.11
Of the 37 Federalist core legislators, 23 were from New England, 12 from the midAtlantic states, and two from the South. These two were William Hindman of
Maryland and John Rutledge, Jr. of South Carolina. Clearly the main impetus behind
the passage of the Sedition Act originated in Federalist New England, and to a lesser
degree from the mid-Atlantic states. The seven fringe members demonstrated a
reverse pattern, for four of them came from the South, only two from New England, and
only one from the mid-Atlantic states.
Table 4
Blocks Represented bv Section on Sedition Act-Related Roll Calls

Pro-Sedition Pro-Sedition
Act Fringe
Act Core

Anti-Sedition
Act Core

Anti-Sedition
Act Fringe

Total

New England

23

2

2

0

27

Middle Atlantic

12

1

11

0

24

South

2

4

26

0

32

Total

37

7

29

0

73

Again, the passage of the Sedition Act was a highly partisan affair, with the
Federalists strongly in support of it, along with a handful of fringe members, and the
Republicans even more strongly opposed. This was largely a result of the
considerable fears the Republicans held that someone in their ranks would be targeted
by the Federalist legislation. Their fears proved true as Lyon was charged with its
violation. After cluster bloc analysis is used it becomes apparent that partisan voting
is not unique to the modern day, but has plagued government from its infancy.
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Turning now to the combination of the two sets of roll calls, two blocs
emerge.12 The first is a core of congressmen who are in both the core anti-Lyon and
core pro-Sedition Act groups, or at least in one core group and one fringe group. This
combined bloc consisted of 23 Federalist congressmen, and no Republicans. The
fringe became members of the group by being fringe members on both sets of roll calls,
or who found themselves in only one fringe group, whether it be on the roll calls of
Matthew Lyon or the Sedition Act. This fringe group consisted of 18 congressmen.
The core group is quite important as it proves the hypothesis that almost all of the
congressmen who voted in favor of expelling Lyon from Congress voted in favor of the
Sedition Act (given a voting record sufficiently complete for reliable analysis). Twenty
three congressmen in fact voted both for Lyon’s expulsion and in favor of the Sedition
Act. This is a considerable sized voting bloc, and helps to demonstrate how
partisanship transcended both of the issues. It now appears through the use of cluster
bloc analysis that the two issues of the expulsion of Matthew Lyon and the passage
of the Sedition Act of 1798 were quite interrelated. Cluster bloc analysis allowed me
specifically to identify each congressman who is in both core groups. This task could
not have been accomplished just by reading the debates in Congress. Once again, it
appears through the use of Rice-Beyle Cluster Bloc analysis that two blocs may be
formed from the matrix using the combination of Lyon and Sedition Act roll calls. One
Federalist core group emerged, consisting of those who voted both in favor of Lyon’s
expulsion and in favor of the Sedition Act. The fringe group voted in one fringe group
or both. The opposite is true for those who supported Lyon’s retention and opposed
the Sedition Act. No member of the Fifth Congress crossed over. That is, no
congressman both proposed to expel Lyon and opposed the Sedition Act. or sought to
retain Lyon and favored the Sedition Act.
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Table 5
Combined Blocs on Lvon Expulsion and Sedition Act by Party

Anti-Lyon
Pro-Sedition

Pro-Lyon
Anti-Sedition

Federalist Core

23

0

Federalist Fringe

18

0

Federalist Total

41

0

Republican Core

0

34

Republican Fringe

0

11

Republican Total

0

45

The reasons why the congressmen of the Fifth House voted the way they did
have been dealt with at great length in previous chapters, yet the main reason bears
mentioning once again. Both issues were highly partisan in nature. From the very
beginning both the Lyon and Sedition Act issues divided the Federalists and the
Republicans. Many congressmen looked no further than their party affiliation when
coming to a decision on either of the two important decisions. They blindly went along
with their party’s position.
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NOTES
I.
See Appendix E for a complete listing of the core and fringe voting blocs
concerning Matthew Lyon, and for the core and fringe voting blocs on the Sedition Act
of 1798.
2. The discussion of the Rice-Beyle Cluster Bloc Analysis is taken from Lee F.
Anderson, Meredith W. Watts, Jr., and Allen R. V/ilcox, Legislative Roll Call
Analysis. 56-74; Richard Beringer, Historical Analysis. 287-293; Charles M. Dollar
and Richard J. Jensen, Historian’s Guide to Statistics. 106-109, 214-23.
3. See Appendix B for a complete listing of the congressmen whose voting
records were not sufficient for the purposes of this study.
4. The computer program utilized in this paper is found in Cluster Bloc
Analysis, unpublished computer program by Jarvis Ehart and Richard Beringer,
University of North Dakota, 1972. The Ehart and Beringer program is a modification of
the Cluster Bloc program found in Anderson, Watts, and Wilcox, chapter 4.
5. For the roll call data relating to the Fifth House, see the Inter-University
Consortium for Political and Social Research, United States Congressional Roll Call
Voting Records. 5 House. 1797-1799. machine readable records, ICPSR 0004.
6. A matrix was not included in the text due to space constraints; instead a full
listing of the core and fringe concerning Matthew Lyon as well as the core and fringe
on the Sedition Act may be found in Appendix E.
7. See Table 1 for the regional groupings used in this study.
8. See Table 1 for breakdown along party lines on Lyon-related roll calls.
9. See Table 2 for breakdown on Lyon-related roll calls sectional lines.
10. See Table 3 for breakdown along party lines on Sedition Act-related roll
calls.
II. See Table 4 for breakdown along sectional lines on Sedition Act-related roll
calls.
12.
See table 5 for breakdown along party lines on Lyon and Sedition Actrelated roll calls. Also see Appendix E for a complete listing of the congressmen who
were members of the core group as well as the fringe group after combining all
relevant roll calls for this study.

CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSION

From the preceding chapters it should be apparent that Matthew Lyon and the
Sedition Act of 1798 created considerable controversy during the Fifth Congress.
Lyon was viewed by his Federalist adversaries as such an embarrassment to the U.S.
House of Representatives that they tried to remove him on more than one occasion.
They failed at every opportunity because Lyon’s Republican friends came to his
rescue. The Sedition Act also demonstrated the volatile partisan nature of Congress
during the Federalist Era. The Federalists strong-armed the Alien and Sedition laws
through Congress, while the Republicans were helpless to do anything significant
about it, as they were the minority party. At first glance these two issues of Matthew
Lyon and the Sedition Act might have seemed completely unique, but with Cluster
Bloc analysis a clear and strong relationship emerged, as a bloc of Federalist
congressmen was identified that voted in favor of both Lyon’s expulsion and the
passage of the Sedition Act. These results were instrumental in proving the
hypothesis.
There have been a number of politicians throughout American history who have
exhibited a feisty, argumentative disposition. Matthew Lyon is only one of them, and
was by no means the most controversial. Yet his behavior did produce reactions in
others, both positive and negative in nature. For the most part what one thought of
Lyon really came down to party affiliation. Lyon received considerable support from
his Republican party, while the Federalists were often foaming at the mouth in the
hope of expelling him from the House. Lyon was one of many American politicians
who has challenged the status quo, and because of this his story ought to be told.
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Lyon’s expulsion proceedings can best be described as a political sham. In
general each side. Federalist and Republican alike, adopted a position that included
neither any sense of individual decision making nor challenge to the party position.
Most congressmen were quite comfortable with simply going along with the official
position of their party. It was almost as if each congressman was a drone of the party
leaders, doing exactly as they were told in fear of being stung. Of course votes are
conducted today in Congress that are largely based on party lines, except at least
today there are more congressmen willing to defy their party. Maybe the importance
of Matthew Lyon has been misinterpreted. Perhaps the congressmen voted the way
they did because they really did not think enough of the issue to challenge their
superiors. Whatever the case may be, the expulsion proceedings that engulfed Lyon
and Roger Griswold were completely partisan and an embarrassing part of legislative
history.
The expulsion proceedings did demonstrate Lyon’s innate ability to emerge
victorious. From the first days he spent as an Irish immigrant in New England, to his
expulsion proceedings, to his sedition trial, to his life after Congress, Lyon somehow
was able to land on his feet and live to fight another day. Lyon’s Irish ancestry and
his argumentative disposition immediately offended many in aristocratic New England,
yet he did not choose to live a life of obscurity. Instead, he served his country during
the Revolutionary War, as well as the state of Vermont in the U.S. House of
Representatives. Lyon’s entire life seemed to be one challenge after another. Some
he won and some he lost, but he never once surrendered when the going got tough.
Matthew Lyon reflected his times and the new nation he helped to form. Of
course there were others who played a larger part in this formative process from
young republic to mature nation, but Lyon’s contributions should not be overlooked. In
most respects Lyon represented what we call today a true American. These qualities
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included individualism, hard work, determination, ingenuity, and bravery. All of these
qualities were possessed by Lyon, and some say characterize the American people of
today.

Lyon was a true American, despite his Irish ancestry. Historians should start

writing about Lyon not as an outsider but as an insider. In short, Lyon accomplished
many things throughout his lifetime as an American with Irish ancestry, not as an Irish
immigrant who desired to become a true American some day.
Yet Lyon did have his faults. He was not perfect by any stretch of the
imagination. Some of his shortcomings included his extreme stubbornness,
argumentative behavior, provocative nature towards his political adversaries, and
deep ignorance about when to let an issue rest. Some may argue that these negative
qualities were merely the flip side of Lyon’s positive qualities, making him a true
American character. Perhaps so, yet it is accurate to say that even though his
positive qualities have endeared him to many people who have read about him, so too
have they repulsed others. Again, Lyon had a way of either attracting or repelling
those with whom he came into contact. It was a rare occurrence when someone had a
hard time making up his mind whether or not to accept Lyon. One either loved him or
hated him.
The Sedition Act of 1798 also presents the reader of American history with a
confusing array of questions and explanations. For example, was the Sedition Act
necessary? Why did the Federalists push the legislation through Congress so
forcefully? Were the Republicans the intended target of the legislation? Of course
many questions remain to be answered, yet we can at least partially answer some of
them. It is apparent that many Federalists enjoyed immensely the status quo that
existed in Federalist America. When news spread of the French Revolution, many
worried that the status quo might be destroyed at the hands of French sympathizers,
Jacobins, and even those in the Republican party. In general, Federalists believed
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that in order for the new nation to survive proper precautions had to be put in place.
The Sedition Act was to be one barrier to violent insurrection.
Of course America did not plunge into another revolution. Instead, it remained
a symbol of freedom and liberty, although to a lesser extent after the passage of the
Alien and Sedition laws than before. Taken as a whole these laws represented a very
unfortunate time in American history. The Sedition Act, especially with its issue of
free speech, has served as an example of how even the most free of governments can
act in a repressive manner. The First Amendment was placed in considerable
jeopardy during the Federalist Era, and the Act itself ought to serve as a reminder of
the dangers associated with any curtailment of freedom of speech.
Like the Lyon issue, the Sedition Act was entirely political. It was pushed
through Congress by a strong bloc of Federalists, and opposed by a strong bloc of
Republicans. Unfortunately for the Republicans and the American people, the
Federalist bloc was somewhat the stronger of the two. Federalists held the majority
in Congress and were able to pass the legislation despite repeated calls of
unconstitutionality.
As with any research project, more unanswered questions remain at the end of
this study than existed when it began. A few of these need more detailed attention.
The first question that presents itself is whether or not Matthew Lyon really deserved
to be removed from his position. Obviously when one congressman spits in the face of
another the situation ought to be dealt with in an appropriate, official manner, but his
affront to Griswold should not have been grounds for expulsion. The Federalists
simply saw an opportunity to rid themselves of a cranky Irish legislator who dared to
challenge their traditional ways. When the first attempt failed they tried again to
expel him, this time with one of their own, Roger Griswold, included in the resolution.
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In the end the Federalists failed to expel Lyon, and rightly so, since the behavior he
exhibited was not so extreme as to have constituted grounds for expulsion.
Another unanswered question revolves around the necessity of the Sedition
Act. Did the nation need it? Of course the rhetoric of the day points to both yes and
no, and will probably do the same today. Still, although the nation was still young and
underdeveloped, America was in no serious danger of collapse at the hands of the
French and their American sympathizers. Although not the only instance of free
speech curtailment, the Sedition Act of 1798 was the first and one of the most serious
threats to the civil liberties the American people have ever witnessed.
There is also the question of Lyon’s trial after being charged with violating the
Sedition Act. Did he receive a fair trial? The answer may never be known, but judging
from the available sources it seems that Lyon did not receive a fair trial. First of all,
he was not allowed to challenge any of his potential jurors. Many of them were his
political enemies. Second, Lyon was not able to obtain legal counsel and was forced
to defend himself. Finally, Judge Chase acted improperly when he provided his biased
opinions to the jury when instructing them in their deliberations. Many issues of due
process surfaced at Lyon’s sedition trial. Unfortunately for Lyon he was found guilty
and was forced to serve out his sentence in a makeshift jail. Lyon became a martyr to
many of his followers after his conviction, yet overcame one more challenge when he
won reelection to the House from his jail cell.
The methodology employed in this study created some unanswered questions
as well. Anyone reading this study and taking the time to learn the process of RiceBeyle Cluster Bloc analysis would no doubt be able to challenge many of the
judgments and conclusions. The parameters and formats used in this study were
arbitrary, albeit conventional. There are of course traditional parameters to be used in
a study of this sort, and for the most part they were followed. Through the use of
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cluster bloc analysis historians are able to add an entirely new dimension to their
research. No longer do they have to rely solely on what legislators said during
debate, if they said anything at all. Historians can also find out legislators’ opinions
through the votes they cast. Cluster bloc analysis is an ideal tool forjudging their
positions by showing with whom they voted and with whom they did not vote. No
doubt someone utilizing a slightly altered set of criteria than those that were used in
this study would get somewhat different results. That, fortunately or unfortunately, is
the nature of this business. But in this instance the results are so striking that
assumptions and criteria would have to be wildly different from those that were used.
Finally, while conducting a study like this, one is bound to encounter both
peaks and valleys along the way. The application of cluster block analysis provided
its own valley of frustration. Identifying the proper parameters involved making
judgment calls. There were uncertainties in placement of congressmen within the
matrix that would most clearly delineate a bloc. When the computer refused to
execute its program, the author experienced feelings of being in a deep valley from
which one could not extricate onself. But along the way many peaks were enjoyed,
such as when it first appeared that my hypothesis was indeed correct. If this study
provides the reader with a better understanding of Matthew Lyon’s controversial
political career, the passage of the Sedition Act of 1798, and how they were
interrelated, then my effort will have succeeded; that would be the highest peak
encountered.
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NOTES
1. The parameters used concerning Matthew Lyon included 9 relevant roll calls,
95 voting legislators, with indices of less than 65 or more than 100 not considered.
Indices based on less than 6 mutual votes were also omitted. The format for Matthew
Lyon was as follows: (14X,I5,13X.39X,5I1,2X,2I1/32X,1I1,47X/79X, 1I1/44X). The
parameters used concerning the Sedition Act included 4 relevant roll calls, 81 voting
legislators, and indices of less than 75 or more than 100. Indices based on less than 3
mutual votes were also omitted. The format for the Sedition Act was as follows:
(14X,I5,61X/80X/36X,1I1,3X,3I1,37X/44X). The parameters used concerning the
combination of Lyon and the Sedition Act included 13 relevant roll calls, 117 voting
congressmen, with indices of less than 75 or more than 100 not considered. Indices
based on less than 11 mutual votes were also omitted. The format for the combined
set of roll calls was as follows: (14XJ5, 13X.39X, 5I1,2X,2I1/32X,1I1,47X/36X,
1I1,3X,3I1,36X,1I1/44X).

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

Representatives of the Fifth Congress of the U.S. House of Representatives
REPRESENTATIVE
John Allen
George Baer Jr.
Abraham Baldwin
David Bard
Bailey Bartlett
James A. Bayard
Lemuel Benton
Thomas Blount
Jonathan Brace
Theophilus Bradbury
Richard Brent
David Brooks
Robert Brown
Nathan Bryan
Stephen Bullock
Dempsey Burges
Samuel J. Cabell
Christopher G. Champlin
John Chapman
Thomas Claiborne
William C.C. Claiborne
Matthew Clay
John Clopton
James Cochran
Joshua Coit
William Craik
Samuel W. Dana
James Davenport
Thomas T. Davis
John Dawson
Jonathan Dayton
John Dennis
George Dent
William Edmond
George Ege
Joseph Eggleston
Lucas C. Elmendorf

STATE
Connecticut
Maryland
Georgia
Pennsylvania
M assachusetts
Delaware
South Carolina
North Carolina
Connecticut
Massachusetts
Virginia
New York
Pennsylvania
North Carolina
Massachusetts
North Carolina
Virginia
Rhode Island
Pennsylvania
Virginia
Tennessee
Virginia
Virginia
New York
Connecticut
Maryland
Connecticut
Connecticut
Kentucky
Virginia
New Jersey
Maryland
Maryland
Connecticut
Pennsylvania
Virginia
New York
177

PARTY
Federalist
Federalist
Republican
Republican
Federalist
Federalist
Republican
Republican
Federalist
Federalist
Republican
Federalist
Republican
Republican
Federalist
Republican
Republican
Federalist
Federalist
Republican
Republican
Republican
Republican
Federalist
Federalist
Federalist
Federalist
Federalist
Republican
Republican
Federalist
Federalist
Federalist
Federalist
Federalist
Republican
Republican
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Thomas Evans
William Findley
Abiel Foster
Dwight Foster
John Fowler
Jonathan Freeman
Nathaniel Freeman Jr.
Albert Gallatin
William B. Giles
James Gillespie
Henry Glen
Chauncey Goodrich
William Gordon
Andrew Gregg
Roger Griswold
William Barry Grove
John A. Hanna
Robert Goodloe Harper
Carter B. Harrison
Thomas Hartley
Jonathan N. Havens
Joseph Hiester
William Hindman
David Holmes
Hezekiah L. Hosmer
James H. Imlay
Walter Jones
John Wilkes Kittera
Edward Livingston
Matthew Locke
Samuel Lyman
Matthew Lyon
James Machir
Nathaniel Macon
William Matthews
Blair McClenehan
Joseph McDowell
John Milledge
Daniel Morgan
Lewis R. Morris
Anthony New
John Nicholas
Harrison Gray Otis
Isaac Parker
Josiah Parker
Thomas Pinckney
Elisha R. Potter

Virginia
Pennsylvania
New Hampshire
M assachusetts
Kentucky
New Hampshire
M assachusetts
Pennsylvania
Virginia
North Carolina
New York
Connecticut
New Hampshire
Pennsylvania
Connecticut
North Carolina
Pennsylvania
South Carolina
Virginia
Pennsylvania
New York
Pennsylvania
Maryland
Virginia
New York
New Jersey
Virginia
Pennsylvania
New York
North Carolina
M assachusetts
Vermont
Virginia
North Carolina
Maryland
Pennsylvania
North Carolina
Georgia
Virginia
Vermont
Virginia
Virginia
M assachusetts
Massachusetts
Virginia
South Carolina
Rhode Island

Federalist
Republican
Federalist
Federalist
Republican
Federalist
Federalist
Republican
Republican
Republican
Federalist
Federalist
Federalist
Republican
Federalist
Federalist
Republican
Federalist
Republican
Federalist
Republican
Republican
Federalist
Republican
Federalist
Federalist
Republican
Federalist
Republican
Republican
Federalist
Republican
Federalist
Republican
Federalist
Republican
Republican
Republican
Federalist
Federalist
Republican
Republican
Federalist
Federalist
Federalist
Federalist
Federalist
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John Reed
John Rutledge Jr.
James Shureman
Samuel Sewall
William Shepard
Thomas Sinnickson
Samuel Sitgreaves
Thomas J. Skinner
Jeremiah Smith
Nathaniel Smith
Samuel Smith
William Smith
William L. Smith
Richard Dobbs Spaight
Peleg Sprague
Richard Sprigg Jr.
Richard Stanford
Thomas Sumter
John Swanwick
George Thacher
Richard Thomas
Mark Thomson
Thomas Tillinghast
Abraham Trigg
John Trigg
John E. Van Alen
Philip Van Cortland
Joseph Bradley Varnum
Abraham B. Venable
Peleg Wadsworth
Robert Wain
John Williams
Robert Williams

M assachusetts
South Carolina
New Jersey
M assachusetts
M assachusetts
New Jersey
Pennsylvania
M assachusetts
New Hampshire
Connecticut
Maryland
South Carolina
South Carolina
North Carolina
New Hampshire
Maryland
North Carolina
South Carolina
Pennsylvania
M assachusetts
Pennsylvania
New Jersey
Rhode Island
Virginia
Virginia
New York
New York
M assachusetts
Virginia
M assachusetts
Pennsylvania
New York
North Carolina

Federalist
Federalist
Federalist
Federalist
Federalist
Federalist
Federalist
Republican
Federalist
Federalist
Republican
Republican
Republican
Republican
Federalist
Republican
Republican
Republican
Republican
Federalist
Federalist
Federalist
Federalist
Republican
Republican
Federalist
Republican
Republican
Republican
Federalist
Federalist
Federalist
Republican

APPENDIX B

The following 22 members of the House of Representatives have not been
included in the roll-call analysis concerning the expulsion of Matthew Lyon
because their voting records were not sufficient.
John Allen (F)
Jonathan Brace (F)
Theophilus Bradbury (F)
Robert Brown (R)
James Davenport (F)
Jonathan Dayton (F)
William Edmond (F)
George Ege (F)
Joseph Eggleston (R)
William B. Giles (R)
Roger Griswold (F)
Matthew Lyon (R)
Daniel Morgan (F)
Thomas Pinckney (F)
Elisha R. Potter (F)
James Schureman (F)
Jeremiah Smith (F)
William L. Smith (R)
Richard Dobbs Spaight (R)
John Swanwick (R)
Philip Van Cortland (R)
Robert Wain (F)
The following 37 members of the House of Representatives have not been
included in the roll-call analysis concerning the passage of the Sedition Act
because their voting records were not sufficient.
Jonathan Brace (F)
Theophilus Bradbury (F)
Robert Brown (R)
Nathan Bryan (R)
Samuel J. Cabell (R)
William C.C. Claiborne (R)
Matthew Clay (R)
- William Craik (F)
James Davenport (F)
Thomas T. Davis (R)
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Jonathan Dayton (F)
John Dennis (F)
George Dent (F)
George Ege (F)
Joseph Eggleston (R)
Lucas C. Elmendorf (R)
William Findley (R)
Nathaniel Freeman Jr. (F)
William B. Giles (R)
James Machir (F)
John Milledge (R)
Daniel Morgan (F)
Lewis R. Morris (F)
Josiah Parker (F)
Thomas Pinckney (F)
Elisha R. Potter (F)
Thomas Sinnickson (F)
Samuel Sitgreaves (F)
Thomas J. Skinner (R)
Jeremiah Smith (F)
William L. Smith (R)
Richard Dobbs Spaight (R)
John Swanwick (R)
Abraham Trigg (R)
Robert Wain (F)
John Williams (F)
Robert Williams (R)
The following 15 members of the House of Representatives have not been included
in the roll-call analysis concerning both Matthew Lyon’s expulsion as well as
the passage of the Sedition Act because their voting records were not sufficient.
Theophilus Bradbury (F)
Robert Brown (R)
James Davenport (F)
Jonathan Dayton (F)
George Ege (F)
Joseph Eggleston (R)
William B. Giles (R)
Daniel Morgan (F)
Thomas Pinckney (F)
Elisha R. Potter (F)
Jeremiah Smith (F)
William L. Smith (R)
Richard Dobbs Spaight (R)
John Swanwick (R)
Robert Wain (F)

APPENDIX C
The following is a list of the roll calls used in the analysis of the motion to expel Matthew Lyon.
R oll C all 1
Date:
Measure:

Issue:
Vote:
Result:
Location:
ICPSR var. number:
ICPSR location:
Attitudinai position:

Roll Call 2
Date:
Measure:

Issue:
Vote:
Result:
Location:
ICPSR var. number:
ICPSR location:
Attitudinai position:

Roll Call 3
Date:
Measure:

Issue:

January 30, 1798
A motion submitted by Samuel Sewall, Massachusetts Federalist,
to refer the Breach of Privileges Resolution, that Matthew Lyon
committed a violent attack on Roger Griswold, while sitting in the
presence of the House, to a Committee of Privileges.
The motion would require a committee inquiry into the attack, and
a report to the House.
Yea 49, Nay 44. The motion is passed.
The effort to create a Committee of Privileges is successful.
Annals, d . 955.
H052006
Card 2, column 72.
Anti-Lyon representatives would likely vote yea. because refemng
the Breach of Privileges Resolution to a Committee of Privileges
could lead to House action against Lyon.

January 30, 1798
A motion by the House to pass a Resolution declaring it a high
breach of privilege if either Lyon or Griswold entered into any
personal contest until a decision of the House shall be had, and
that Lyon be considered in the custody of the Sergeant-at-arms
until further order of the House.
The motion considers any other instances of conflict between Lyon
and Griswoid intolerable, and that Lyon is in effect under arrest.
Yea 29, Nay 62. The motion is defeated.
Neither Lyon nor Griswold will be bound by any extra-legal
constraints imposed by the House.
Annals, d . 956.
H052007.
Card 2, column 3.
Anti-Lyon representatives would likely vote yea, because the
motion would require Lyon to be in the custody of the
Sergeant-at-arms, and prohibited from committing any further
indecencies.

February 5, 1798
A motion submitted by John Nicholas, Virginia Republican,
authorizing the Committee of the Whole to examine the testimony
of the report of the Committee of Privileges relating to the Breach
of Privileges Resolution.
The motion would deem testimony of the various witnesses to the
Lyon-Griswold altercation important, as they will base their future
votes on a review of the testimony.
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Vote:
Result:
Location:
ICPSR var. number:
ICPSR location:
Altitudinal position:

Roll Call 4
Date:
Measure:

Issue:
Vote:
Result:
Location:
ICPSR var. number:
ICPSR location:
Attitudinal position:

Roll Call 5
Date:
Measure:
Issue:
Vote:
Result:
Location:
ICPSR var. number:
ICPSR location:
Attitudinal position:

Roll Call 6
Date:
Measure:

Issue:
Vote:
Result:
Location:
ICPSR var. number:
ICPSR location:
Attitudinal position:

Yea 88. Nay 4. The motion is passed.
The testimonv of the eve-witnesses to the altercation will be
provided to the Whole house.
Annals, p. 964.
H052008
Card 2, column 74.
Anti-Lyon representatives would likely vote yea, because they
would be very eager to gain access to the testimony available to the
Whole House.

February 12, 1798.
A motion submitted by Robert Williams. North Carolina
Republican, to amend the Breach of Privileges Resolution, to
limit Lyon’s punishment to a reprimand, rather that expulsion.
The measure would prevent expulsion of Lyon.
Yea 52, Nay 44. The motion is defeated, as it required a
two-thirds majority.
The effort to limit Lyon's punishment to a reprimand failed.
Annals, d . 1008.
H052009
Card 2, column 7.
Anti-Lyon representatives would likely vote nay, because a simple
reprimand would allow Lyon to remain a member of the House.
February 12, 1798.
A motion submitted by Abraham B. Venable, Virginia Republican,
to pass the Breach of Privileges Resolution.
The motion would decide whether or not Lyon would be
expelled from the House.
Yea 52, nay 44. the motion is defeated.
The United States Constitution requires two-thirds of the members
present to carry a vote of expulsion; the motion was not carried.
Annals, p. 1008.
H052010
Card 2, column 76.
Anti-Lyon representatives would likely vote yea, since the motion,
if carried, would expel Lyon from the House.

February 23. 1798
A motion submitted by Samuel Sitgreaves, Pennsylvania
Federalist, to postpone consideration of the Report of the
Committee of Privileges relating to the Resolution to expel Lyon
and Griswold.
The motion would delay any further consideration of the expulsion
of Lyon and Griswold until March 4, 1799.
Yea 38, nay 53. The motion is defeated.
The postponement being lost, the question of agreeing to the
report of the committee remained under consideration.
Annals, p. 1063.
HO52013
Card 2, column 79.
Anti-Lyon representatives would likely vote nay, by doing so they
would prevent any postponement on the discussion of his
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status in the House. Pro-Griswold representatives would be
troubled by their decision, as they wanted Lyon expelled, yet not
at the expense of Griswold.
Roll Call 7
Date:
Measure:

Issue:
Vote:
Result:
Location:
ICPSR var. number:
ICPSR location:
Attitudinal position:

Roll Call 8
Date:
Measure:

Issue:
Vote:
Result:
Location:
ICPSR var. number:
ICPSR location:
Attitudinal position:

Roll Call 9
Date:
Measure:

Issue:
Vote:
Result:
Location:
ICPSR var. number:
ICPSR location:
Attitudinal position:

February 23, 1798
A motion submitted by Abraham B. Venable, Virginia
Republican, to agree to the report of the committee which
recommended a disagreement to the Resolution for an
expulsion of Lyon and Griswold.
The motion, if agreed to, would not allow Lyon or Griswold
to be expelled from the House.
Yea 73, nay 21. The motion is passed.
The House agrees to the report of the committee, which opposed
the expulsion of Lyon and Griswold.
Annals, p. 1066.
HO52014
Card 2, column 80.
Anti-Lvon representatives would likely vote nay, since the motion,
in effect, opposed his expulsion. Pro-Griswold representatives
would again be tom, since they desired to expei Lyon and retain
Griswold.
February 23, 1798
A motion submitted by Robert Williams, North Carolina
Republican, to pass the resolution that Lyon and Griswold, for
disorderly behavior, are highly censurable, and that they be
reprimanded by the Speaker in the presence of the House.
The motion, if passed, would reprimand Lyon and Griswold’s
behavior by the Speaker.
Yea 47, Nay 48. The motion is defeated.
Lyon and Griswold will not be reprimanded in the presence of
the House.
Annals, d . 1067.
HO52015
Card 2, column 33.
Anti-Lyon representatives would likely vote yea, since even a
reprimand would be better than no action being taken at all.
Pro-Griswold representatives would likely be split once again, as
they wanted to punish Lyon, but not Griswold.

February 22, 1799
A motion submitted by James A. Bayard, Delaware Federalist, to
pass the resolution to expel Lyon from the House for violating the
Sedition Act of 1798.
The motion, if passed, would expel Lyon from the House.
Yea 49, Nay 45. The motion is defeated because the Constitution
requires two-thirds of the members present for expulsion.
Lyon is not expelled.
Annals, d . 2973.
HO5033
Card 3. column 80.
Anti-Lyon representatives would likely vote yea. By doing so
they sought to expel Lyon from the House.

APPENDIX D
The following is a list of the roll calls used in the analysis of the passage of the Sedition Act.
Roll Call 1
Date:
Measure:

Issue:

Vote:
Result:
Location:
ICPSR var. number:
ICPSR location:
Attitudinal position:

Roll Call 2
Date:
Measure:

Issue:
Vote:
Result:
Location:
ICPSR var. number:
ICPSR location:
Attitudinal position:

Roll Call 3
Date:
Measure:

Issue:

Vote:
Result:
Location:

July 5. 1798
A motion submitted by Edward Livingston, New York
Republican, to reject S.R. 31, “An Act in addition to the act for
the punishment of certain crimes against the U.S.” [Sedition Act],
The motion requires a vote on additional punishment of certain
crimes, such as libel and sedition, against the government of the
United States.
Yea 36. Nay 47. The motion is defeated.
Consideration of S.R. 31 will be continued by the House.
Annals, p. 2113.
HO52067
Card 2, column 37.
Representatives who opposed the Sedition Act would likely vote
yea, since by doing so they would be voting to reject the bill.

July 9. 1798
A motion submitted by William C.C. Claiborne, Tennessee
Republican, to A make the judges of the country decide what
constitutes libel under S.R. 31, and not the president.
The motion would require the court system to determine what
constitutes libel.
Yea 67, Nay 15. The motion is passed.
S.R. 31 no longer permits the executive to judge libelous
activity. Instead it is placed in the hands of the judiciary.
Annals, p. 2137.
HO52071
Card 2, column 41.
Representatives who opposed the Sedition Act would likely vote
yea, since by doing so they would make the judiciary, not the
executive, the sole judge of libelous activity under S.R. 31.

July 9. 1798
A motion submitted by Samuel Smith, Maryland Republican, to
strike out the words in S.R. 31, “by any writing, printing, or
speaking, shall threaten su ch office or person in public trust,
with any damage to his character, person, or estate, or shall.”
The motion would eliminate one section of S.R. 31, which
would eliminate writing, printing, and speaking from the bill.
This effectively would take the teeth out of the Sedition Act.
Yea 43, Nay 39. The motion is defeated.
S.R. 31 still permits the prosecution of sedition via writing,
printing, and speaking.
Annals, p. 2138.
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ICPSR var. numbers:
ICPSR location:
Altitudinal position:

Roll Call 4
Date:
Measure:
Issue:
Vote:
Result:
Location:
ICPSR var. number:
ICPSR location:
Attitudinal position.

HO52072
Card 2, column 42.
Representatives who opposed the Sedition Act would likely
vote yea. since by doing so they would eliminate any possibility
that writing, printing, and speaking would be covered in the
Sedition Act, resulting in a very weak law.
July 10, 1798
A motion submitted by the House for a final vote on the
passage of S.R. 31, the Sedition Act.
This vote would decide whether or not S.R. 31, the Sedition
Act, will be passed by the House.
Yea 44, Nay 41. The motion is passed.
S.R. 31, the Sedition Act, becomes law.
Annals, p. 2171.
HO52073
Card 2, column 43.
Representatives who opposed the Sedition Act would likely
vote nay in order to prevent passage of S.R. 31.

APPENDIX E

BLOC STRUCTURE OF HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ON 13 ROLL CALLS,
FIFTH CONGRESS, 2ND & 3RD SESSIONS
PRO-LYON BLOC, CORE
Representative

State/Partv

Abraham Baldwin
Richard Brent
Samuel J. Cabell
Thomas Claiborne
William C.C. Claiborne
Matthew Clay
John Clopton
John Dawson
Lucas C. Elmendorf
William Findley
John Fowler
Albert Gallatin
James Gillespie
Andrew Gregg
John A. Hanna
Carter B. Harrison
Jonathan N. Havens
Walter Jones
Matthew Locke
Nathaniel Macon
Blair McClenehan
Joseph McDowell
John Milledge
Anthony New
John Nicholas
Thomas J. Skinner
Samuel Smith
Richard Sprigg Jr.
Richard Stanford
Thomas Sumter
Abraham Trigg
Joseph B. Varnum
Abraham B. Venable
Robert Williams

Georgia (R)
Virginia (R)
Virginia (R)
Virginia (R)
Tennessee (R)
Virginia (R)
Virginia (R)
Virginia (R)
New York (R)
Pennsylvania (R)
Kentucky (R)
Pennsylvania (R)
North Carolina (R)
Pennsylvania (R)
Pennsylvania (R)
Virginia (R)
New York (R)
Virginia (R)
North Carolina (R)
North Carolina (R)
Pennsylvania (R)
North Carolina (R)
Georgia (R)
Virginia (R)
Virginia (R)
Massachusetts (R)
Maryland (R)
Maryland (R)
North Carolina (R)
South Carolina (R)
Virginia (R)
Massachusetts (R)
Virginia (R)
North Carolina (R)
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PRO-LYON FRINGE
Representative

State/Partv

David Bard
Lemuel Benton
Thomas Blount
Nathan Bryan
Dempsey Burges
Thomas T. Davis
Joseph Hiester
David Holmes
Edward Livingston
William Smith
Abraham Trigg

Pennsylvania (R)
South Carolina (R)
North Carolina (R)
North Carolina (R)
North Carolina (R)
Kentucky (R)
Pennsylvania (R)
Virginia (R)
New York (R)
South Carolina (R)
Virginia (R)

ANTI-LYON BLOC, CORE
Representative

State/Partv

Bailey Bartlett
James A. Bayard
David Brooks
Stephen Bullock
Christopher G. Champlin
James Cochran
John Chapman
Joshua Coit
Samuel W. Dana
Abiel Foster
Dwight Foster
Jonathan Freeman
Henry Glen
Chauncey Goodrich
William Gordon
Thomas Hartley
William Hindman
Hezekiah L. Hosmer
James H. Imlay
John Wilkes Kittera
Samuel Lyman
Lewis R. Morris
Harrison Gray Otis
Isaac Parker
John Reed
John Rutledge Jr.
Samuel Sewall

Massachusetts (F)
Delaware (F)
New York (F)
Massachusetts (F)
Rhode Island (F)
New York (F)
Pennsylvania (F)
Connecticut (F)
Connecticut (F)
New Hampshire (F)
Massachusetts (F)
New Hampshire (F)
New York (F)
Connecticut (F)
New Hampshire (F)
Pennsylvania (F)
Maryland (F)
New York (F)
New Jersey (F)
Pennsylvania (F)
Massachusetts (F)
Vermont (F)
Massachusetts (F)
Massachusetts (F)
Massachusetts (F)
South Carolina (F)
Massachusetts (F)
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Thomas Sinnickson
William Shepard
Nathaniel Smith
Peleg Sprague
George Thacher
Richard Thomas
Mark Thomson
John E. Van Alen

New Jersey (F)
Massachusetts (F)
Connecticut (F)
New Hampshire (F)
Massachusetts (F)
Pennsylvania (F)
New Jersey (F)
New York (F)
ANTI-LYON FRINGE

Representative

State/Partv

George Baer Jr.
William Craik
John Dennis
George Dent
Thomas Evans
Nathanie Freeman Jr.
William B. Grove
Robert Goodloe Harper
James Machir
William Matthews
Josiah Parker
Samuel Sitgreaves
Thomas Tillinghast
Peleg Wadsworth
John Williams

Maryland (F)
Maryland (F)
Maryland (F)
Maryland (F)
Virginia (F)
Massachusetts (F)
North Carolina (F)
South Carolina (F)
Virginia (F)
Maryland (F)
Virginia (F)
Pennsylvania (F)
Rhode Island (F)
Massachusetts (F)
New York (F)

PRO-SEDITION ACT BLOC, CORE
Representative

State/Partv

John Allen
George Baer Jr.
Bailey Bartlett
James A. Bayard
David Brooks
Christopher G. Champlin
John Chapman
James Cochran
Joshua Coit
Samuel W. Dana
William Edmond
Abiel Foster
Dwight Foster
Jonathan Freeman

Connecticut (F)
Maryland (F)
Massachusetts (F)
Delaware (F)
New York (F)
Rhode Island (F)
Pennsylvania (F)
New York (F)
Connecticut (F)
Connecticut (F)
Connecticut (F)
New Hampshire (F)
Massachusetts (F)
New Hampshire (F)
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Henry Glen
Chauncey Goodrich
Roger Griswold
William Hindman
Hezekiah L. Hosmer
James H. Imlay
John Wilkes Kittera
Samuel Lyman
Harrison Gray Otis
Isaac Parker
John Reed
John Rutledge Jr.
James Shureman
Samuel Sewall
William Shepard
Nathaniel Smith
Peleg Sprague
George Thacher
Richard Thomas
Mark Thomson
Thomas Tillinghast
John E. Van Alen
Peleg Wadsworth

New York (F)
Connecticut (F)
Connecticut (F)
Maryland (F)
New York (F)
New Jersey (F)
Pennsylvania (F)
Massachusetts (F)
Massachusetts (F)
Massachusetts (F)
Massachusetts (F)
South Carolina (F)
New Jersey (F)
Massachusetts (F)
Massachusetts (F)
Connecticut (F)
New Hampshire (F)
Massachusetts (F)
Pennsylvania (F)
New Jersey (F)
Rhode Island (F)
New York (F)
Massachusetts (F)

PRO-SEDITION ACT FRINGE
Representative

State/Partv

Stephen Bullock
Thomas Evans
William Gordon
William Barry Grove
Robert Goodloe Harper
Thomas Hartley
William Matthews

Massachusetts (F)
Virginia (F)
New Hampshire (F)
North Carolina (F)
South Carolina (F)
Pennsylvania (F)
Maryland (F)

ANTI-SEDITION ACT BLOC, CORE
Representative

State/Partv

Abraham Baldwin
David Bard
Lemuel Benton
Thomas Blount
Richard Brent
Dempsey Burges
Thomas Claiborne

Georgia (R)
Pennsylvania (R)
South Carolina (R)
North Carolina (R)
Virginia (R)
North Carolina (R)
Virginia (R)
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John Clopton
John Dawson
John Fowler
Albert Gallatin
James Gillespie
Andrew Gregg
John A. Hanna
Carter B. Harrison
Jonathan N. Havens
Joseph Hiester
David Holmes
Walter Jones
Edward Livingston
Matthew Locke
Matthew Lvon
Nathaniel Macon
Blair McClenehan
Joseph McDowell
Anthony New
John Nicholas
Samuel Smith
William Smith
Richard Sprigg Jr.
Richard Stanford
Thomas Sumter
John Swanwick
John Trigg
Philip Van Cortland
Joseph B. Varnum
Abraham B. Venable

Virginia (R)
Virginia (R)
Kentucky (R)
Pennsylvania (R)
North Carolina (R)
Pennsylvania (R)
Pennsylvania (R)
Virginia (R)
New York (R)
Pennsylvania (R)
Virginia (R)
Virginia (R)
New York (R)
North Carolina (R)
Vermont (R)
North Carolina (R)
Pennsylvania (R)
North Carolina (R)
Virginia (R)
Virginia (R)
Maryland (R)
South Carolina (R)
Maryland (R)
North Carolina (R)
South Carolina (R)
Pennsylvania (R)
Virginia (R)
New York (R)
Massachusetts (R)
Virginia (R)

PRO-SEDITION ACT BLOC, CORE
Representative
Bailey Bartlett
Thomas Evans
Abiel Foster
Dwight Foster
Henry Glen
Chauncey Goodrich
William Barry Grove
Robert Goodloe Harper
Thomas Hartley
William Hindman
James H. Imlay
Samuel Lyman
William Matthews

State/Partv
Massachusetts (F)
Virginia (F)
New Hampshire (F)
Massachusetts (F)
New York (F)
Connecticut (F)
North Carolina (F)
South Carolina (F)
Pennsylvania (F)
Maryland (F)
New Jersey (F)
Massachusetts (F)
Maryland (F)
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Harrison Gray Otis
Isaac Parker
John Reed
John Rutledge, Jr.
William Shepard
Nathaniel Smith
Peleg Sprague
Richard Thomas
Thomas Tillinghast
Peleg Wadsworth

Massachusetts (F)
Virginia (F)
Massachusetts (F)
South Carolina (F)
Massachusetts (F)
Connecticut (F)
New Hampshire (F)
Pennsylvania (F)
Rhode Island (F)
Massachusetts (F)

ANTI-LYON/PRO-SEDITION ACT FRINGE
Representative
George Baer, Jr.
James A. Bayard
David Brooks
Stephen Bullock
Christopher G. Champlin
John Chapman
William Cochran
Joshua Coit
Samuel W. Dana
Jonathan Freeman
William Gordon
Joseph Hiester
James H. Imlay
John Wilkes Kittera
Samuel Sewall
George Thacher
Mark Thomson
John E. Van Alen

State/Partv
Maryland (F)
Delaware (F)
New York (F)
Massachusetts (F)
Rhode Island (F)
Pennsylvania (F)
New York (F)
Connecticut (F)
Connecticut (F)
New Hampshire (F)
New Hampshire (F)
Pennsylvania (R)
New Jersey (F)
Pennsylvania (F)
Massachusetts (F)
Massachusetts (F)
New Jersey (F)
New York (F)
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